



DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLES IN CHALLENGING TIMES:

INSIGHTS FROM MONGOLIA AND AROUND THE WORLD

Edited by Christian Suter, Stephen Brown, Dolgion Aldar
and Tamir Chultemsuren



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About the World Society Foundation

The World Society Foundation (WSF) was established in 1982 by Peter Heintz with the aim of encouraging and supporting research on world society, that is, its emergence and historical evolution, its structure, its dynamics, and current transformation. Until 2003, the main purpose of the Foundation's sponsoring activities was to finance entire research projects focusing on the various processes of social integration and disintegration within worldwide systems—world culture, world economy, world politics, and intergovernmental systems—and on how global processes affect the perceptions and actions of individual and collective actors worldwide. Its current sponsoring policy is to provide award programs for research papers and to support international conferences on world society topics. In accordance with this new policy, the Foundation has introduced its WSF Award Program for Research Papers on World Society and held a series of international conferences in order to maintain a network of excellent scholars interested in transnational and global research topics. The World Society Foundation Award honors outstanding research papers on world society that address a specific topic announced by the Foundation in its Award Program. The World Society Foundation also publishes the book series "World Society Studies." World Society Foundation is domiciled in Zurich, Switzerland. The current members of the Board are: Volker Bornschiefer, Mark Herkenrath, Hans-Peter Meier, and Christian Suter (President). Former members of the Board include: Peter Heintz, Karl W. Deutsch, Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, and Bruno Fritsch. More detailed information on past research projects sponsored, the topics and recipients of the 2007–2019 WSF Awards, the WSF book series "World Society Studies," and the call for papers of the current WSF conferences can be found on the Foundation's website at www.worldsociety.ch.

Preface and Acknowledgements

Mongolia's democratic system celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2019, marking an important milestone in its history; if Mongolian democracy were a human being, it would have recently graduated from a university and started a career. It would be struggling to find its own path among a wide variety of options in the midst of omnipresent globalization and resurgent nationalism. Mongolia is characterized by high levels of education, but, in some respects, it has less experience and has not fully matured. As the second country in the world to establish a communist system and as the first in East Asia to shift from communist rule to a free, democratic society, Mongolia's experience is of global interest and fuels the pride of its people.

Throughout the world, the democratization process has encountered new challenges, including nationalism and insular religious beliefs. At this critical time, the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia (IRIM) organized an international conference on Democracy in the 21st century: Challenges and Future Trends, in partnership with the World Society Foundation (WSF), based in Switzerland. The conference assessed current democratization processes, consolidated understandings of democracy and created new knowledge. It was held on July 9–10, 2018, in the majestic Ulaanbaatar Hotel, on the eve of the traditional Mongolian Naadam Festival. Organizing it at peak tourist season was not an easy task to accomplish. Of the many research papers presented at the conference by national and international scholars, a selection is included in this volume, published in both English and Mongolian editions.

This project is rooted in close cooperation between Mongolian and Swiss researchers. It brings together Mongolia's "fragile" and Switzerland's "abundant" democratic experiences; the collaboration lasted almost three years, from the initial planning to its conclusion with the publication of this volume.

The conference was a significant event, bringing together 34 researchers and scholars from 15 countries to present their papers on the topic of democracy. Of the speakers, 14 were sponsored with full scholarships and four were provided with travel grants. The conference focused on three main sub-themes: "Urban-rural divide and democracy," "Civil society and democracy" and "Extractives economics, resource-rich countries and democracy."

The conference was particularly symbolic as it also marked the 10th anniversary of the establishment of IRIM, which acts as a knowledge hub and is the first independent research institute of its kind. The institute aims to provide a bridge to the world through the export of Mongolian knowledge products and consulting services.

The conference papers are published in two languages, Mongolian and English, with the intention that all stakeholders, including universities, early-career and veteran researchers, media, non-government organization practitioners and public officials will find it accessible.

The WSF made the conference and the publication of this volume possible through its generous financing of the conference. The support of the Swiss Development Cooperation is also gratefully acknowledged.

We extend our heartfelt gratitude to all our speakers, including our keynote speakers Dr. Steven Fish, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Berkeley; Dr. Ganbat Damba, Director of the Political Education Academy of Mongolia; and Dr. Tapan Sarker, Professor of International Business and Asian Studies at Griffith University, Australia.

The Swiss Ambassador Jean-Jacques de Dardel pointed out during the Opening Session that the “two countries share the same issues in democracy,” highlighting the need to increase democracy education. Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Battsetseg Batmunkh emphasized the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach to democratic development. Also, former Deputy Minister of Justice Enkhbayar Battumur presented a paper on the regulatory framework and draft law on nonprofits, fueling an interesting discussion among participants.

We encountered many of the challenges that organizers of such events typically face, such as selecting the participants from very different disciplines. We extend our sincere gratitude for their thorough intellectual work to our Scientific Council members: Dr. Christian Suter, WSF President; Dolgion Aldar, IRIM Board member; Prof. Byambasuren Yadmaa, Director of the School of Management Sciences, Academy of Governance; Dr. Khatanbold Oidov, Scientific Secretary, Institute of Philosophy, Mongolian Academy of Sciences; and Dr. Tamir Chultemsuren, IRIM Board Chairman and Professor at the National University of Mongolia.

Dr. Christian Suter, Dolgion Aldar and Dr. Tamir Chultemsuren also co-edited this volume, joined by Prof. Stephen Brown of the University of Ottawa, who was a conference speaker. We deeply appreciate the latter’s contributions, including editing and finetuning many of the papers. We also need to recognize the excellent organizational skills and hard work of Erdenetsetseg Dashdeleg for successfully coordinating both the conference and this publication.

The experience and expertise that IRIM accumulated over its decade of operations were complemented, throughout the entire process, by the warm and relentless support and never-ending efforts of its Swiss counterparts. Once again, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to our Organizing Committee members—Narantuya Darinchuluun, Batsugar Tsedendamba, former CEO of IRIM, Minjirmaa Namjinbaatar, former COO of IRIM, Tserendorj Erdenebat and Bold Tsevegдорж—for their hard work. The conference has directly benefited from Mrs. Bulgan Luuzandamba’s contribution in developing the conference concept and design.

Sincere gratitude also goes to all researchers who submitted their papers for the volume and to the translators (Sengelmaa Dashnyam, Gankhuyag Demid and Dashnyam Bumbei).

Last but not least, it is my privilege to present you with this work that was produced by the sharing of international experience. I hope that this conference and the volume that resulted from it demonstrate that the synergies created by bringing the perspectives of the vast steppe together with global experiences help create solutions to the challenges facing democratization today.

Dr. Bekhbat Khasbazar, Ambassador and President of IRIM (Independent Research Institute of Mongolia).

Introduction: Studying Democracy in Challenging Times

Stephen Brown

Trends in democratization and the study of democracy

Democratization tends to occur in waves. The most recent large wave began in 1989–1990, as former socialist countries, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe, but also Mongolia, shed their Communist Party-run political systems and planned economies to embrace political and economic liberalization. Simultaneously, a large number of Sub-Saharan African countries adopted multiparty systems and held elections. Not all cases, however, led to a transition to democracy. Numerous authoritarian leaders presented themselves as born-again democrats in hybrid or semi-authoritarian political systems, ensuring that they did not lose elections that deliberately failed to meet any reasonable standards of free and fair. They liberalized the political systems, but not enough to risk losing power. Others dug in their heels and used outright repression in their attempts to remain in power, sometimes sparking widespread violence or bloody civil wars.

The study of democracy is also prone to waves. The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by deep pessimism regarding the potential for countries in the developing world to democratize. Departing colonial powers installed democratic political systems just before granting independence to their former colonies in Africa and Asia, but these rarely lasted. Almost all of Latin America was under authoritarian rule during that period. Academic scholarship thus focused on supposed structural prerequisites for democracy, including high levels of economic development, literacy and urbanization (Lipset, 1959). Scholars believed that, in order to become and remain democratic, countries first had to resemble Western liberal democracies across multiple dimensions, and achieving their goals would take multiple generations.

Starting in the mid-1970s, a democratic wave surged. In quick succession, longstanding dictatorships in Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal) and South America (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, among others) fell and were replaced with democracies, some of which have lasted until today. Scholars had to adapt, as outcomes were clearly not as predetermined as they thought. Rather than focusing on “deep” structures, they emphasized contingency, the

fact that almost anything could happen anywhere and that a political regime's outcomes depended greatly on the strategic interactions of elite actors who try to negotiate transitions from authoritarianism (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).

The numerous instances of democratization that followed the end of the Cold War reminded observers of the importance of the international dimension, a hitherto neglected factor. It also fed a view of democracy spreading inexorably across the world. This optimism, however was soon tempered by resurgent authoritarianism operating behind thin veils of supposedly democratic institutions. Former Communist and one-party state officials retained or regained power and ensured that they would face no serious challenges. Still, mass movements often challenged their monopoly of power, often spreading across their region as in the "colour revolutions" of the early 2000s that pushed back against entrenched authoritarian elites in post-Soviet countries (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and Ukraine).

Once again, scholars of democratization had to adapt to the changing political terrain. It became increasingly clear that simplistic causal models would not hold. The actions of individuals mattered, but so too did structural characteristics, including natural resource endowments, which often fed wide-scale corruption and even created rentier states that forestalled democratic pressures. Theorizations needed to integrate factors such as the diffusion of ideals, learning from other countries' experiences, the role and tactics of popular mobilization (including the use of social media), and international influence (be it through direct pressure or indirect linkages). With the multiplication of relevant factors, including the nature of the systems in place before democratization, scholars gave up on attempts to develop a grand theory of democratization. Instead, the study of democratization fractured, with various scholars privileging their preferred actors, variables and perspectives on how change occurs, adopting a range of qualitative and quantitative approaches.

If anything, the political landscape has become even more complicated in recent years. Although several countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the world's least democratic region, experienced major popular mobilizations during the 2011 "Arab Spring," in most cases the democratic openings were aborted, leaving several countries worse off, notably Syria—with a ripple effect across the region and further afield, especially through huge flows of refugees into Europe, exacerbating xenophobia, Islamophobia and isolationism. Russia and especially China provide support for authoritarian regimes around the world, helping them suppress democratic movements. Russian actors deliberately try to undermine democracy in European countries and the United States, while China, in particular, provides loans, investment and assistance that shore up authoritarian rule and dominant parties mainly in Africa and Asia. China also serves as a model of a highly autocratic regime that has achieved

remarkable economic growth rates for several decades without interruption, providing a powerful counterexample to the old argument that economic development leads to democratization, as well as to assertions that democratic freedoms provide better conditions for long-term economic growth.

The discrediting of traditional political parties and the resurgence of populism have profoundly destabilized even well-established democracies in Europe and the United States, challenging assumptions about their democratic consolidation. Around the world, declining public trust and satisfaction with political institutions, as well as persistent or even growing social inequalities, have eroded people's belief in the desirability of democracy. Authoritarian practices and a disregard for the rule of law are on the rise around the world, destabilizing the international order. For over a decade, democracy has been "in retreat" (Freedom House, 2019). These are truly challenging times.

Overview of the contributions

This volume brings together a range of scholars from different countries, disciplines and career stages to analyze different facets of democratic struggles in these challenging times. Reflecting the current state of democratization studies, the contributors use different approaches and methodologies in highly complementary ways. They do not attempt to develop any overarching theories, but shed light on underexamined facets of democracy from a variety of perspectives.

The book is divided into two sections of four or five chapters each. The first section addresses the democratization process in Mongolia, one of the least-studied cases of post-Cold War democratization. What little literature there is emphasizes the significant levels of corruption (Fritz, 2007), including the political impact of the country's overwhelming dependence on mining (Bulag, 2009), Mongolia's lack of so-called prerequisites for democracy (Fish, 1998; Fritz, 2002) and the roots of its political culture (Sabloff, 2002). Two common themes recur in this literature, most of which was written in the first dozen years after democratization: how unexpected Mongolia is as an outpost of democracy sandwiched between Russia and China (and highly dependent on trade with the latter), and how vulnerable Mongolia's democratic achievements are. The chapters in this section also reflect a combination of celebration of democratic endurance with caution about weaknesses and threats; however, the contributions deepen earlier analysis and extend the time frame by almost two decades.

The opening chapter by **M. Steven Fish** and **Michael Seeberg**, which originally appeared in the *Journal of Democracy*, begins with an examination of Mongolia's 2016 general elections, noting that, although there were some problems, they were free and fair and in fact mark 25 years of democracy in

the country. What explains this success, despite an inhospitable geopolitical environment and a modest level of development, among other impediments? Political parties' acceptance of the principle of alternation is part of the answer, but the authors argue that Mongolia's exceptionally strong civil society plays a key role. Civil society organizations not only serve as watchdogs, ensuring that the government and politics follow the established rules, but also push for further reforms, such as greater transparency, as well as better protection of marginalized groups and the environment, including against the side effects of mining. Nonetheless, the chapter recognizes that the country's democracy remains vulnerable, especially because of its overdependence on the extractive sector, which feeds corruption and subjects the country to the pressures of powerful international extractive companies.

The next chapter, by **Byambajav Dalaibuyan**, also highlights the importance of civil society in Mongolia, but from a more historical perspective. The previous chapter focused on the positive role of CSOs on democracy, whereas this one analyzes their evolution and is more pessimistic about their influence. It traces how, after a decade of domination by non-confrontational NGOs in the 1990s, the first decade of the 2000s witnessed a burgeoning of multiple forms of social mobilization. The author argues that the shift was primarily due to widespread dissatisfaction with the Mongolian political system, which led to the re-emergence of protest movements. The latter had been crucial in the fall of socialism and the transition to democracy, but, starved of resources and competing with opposition political parties, they were unable to once again mobilize large numbers of people and therefore had less influence on the ruling political party.

The constitution, a key component of democracy and the rule of law, is the focus of **Munkhsaikhan Odonkhoo's** chapter. More specifically, he analyzes the innovative process known as deliberative polling that the Mongolian government employed in 2017 to consult the population on potential constitutional amendments. By design, constitutions are difficult to amend, and amendments require a higher degree of consultation and approval than regular legislation. Deliberative polling in theory provides key information and facilitates debate among a small sample of the population, providing a more informed and legitimate reflection of the public's will than a plebiscite. The author argues, though, that in practice the government's use of this process did not respect the substantive and procedural conditions for its success and as a result, the outcome should be considered invalid and not be used to draft constitutional amendments. Moreover, the chapter suggests that this consultation would be open to manipulation in the selection of the topics and materials presented even if the government had followed the best practices of deliberative polling. Contrary to its promise, deliberative polling actually undermines rather than strengthens democracy, a conclusion that carries implications beyond Mongolia's borders.

Elizabeth Fox, in her chapter, analyzes how democracy is experienced at the urban grassroots. Drawing from her ethnographic study of life in poor ger districts of Ulaanbaatar, she first examines political parties' attempts to buy votes and how residents resist such interference in free democratic choice. Second, she analyzes social relations within a ger district and the lack of social cohesion that characterizes communities made up of people from across the country. Third, she assesses the role of ger district residents in the democratic polity, disputing both their characterization as problem-causing people from rural areas that have moved to the big city and their depiction as victims of a socio-economic and environmental conditions that forced them to relocate. Instead, she paints a nuanced portrait of how ordinary Mongolians deal as best they can with the problems and challenges that they face under the current democratic dispensation.

The second section of this volume broadens the analysis to cover democratic struggles in other parts of the world and considers in particular the governance of natural resources, which is a key concern for Mongolia and other countries that rely economically on the extractive sector. **Andrea Haefner's** chapter examines the interaction of national and international/regional factors affecting natural resource management and environmental protection in Southeast Asia. Focusing on water resources and air quality in Laos and Indonesia respectively, she finds that members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) cooperate on infrastructure projects, but are unwilling to accord the authority to the supranational body to enforce commitments that they made at the regional level. Other factors including corruption, weak institutions and patron-client relationships contribute to national governments' refusal to adopt and implement national policies that would protect their own environments and reduce the transboundary impact of some national practices. State sovereignty remains a key impediment to more effective regional action.

The next chapter, by **Delgerjargal Uvsh**, flips a common concern—the effect of a national resource boom on democracy—and asks what the impact is of a bust, that is to say, the sudden drop in revenues. Her statistical analysis—spanning 55 years and covering all countries with a population over 500,000 inhabitants—finds that such shocks, though economically painful, are followed by an increase in democratic scores in countries that are democratic, especially in those that rely on oil and gas. These effects, however, are weaker or not present in authoritarian regimes and democracies reliant on other natural resources, such as coal and metal. Studies of the relationship between natural resource dependency and regime change, this suggests, need to consider not only the types of regimes being studied but also the types of natural resources.

Boldsai Khan Sambuu also considers the impact of natural resource dependency, focusing on the use of resource rents to buy votes via economic populism and clientelism in democracies. Combining case studies of Botswana, Ghana and Mongolia with larger-N quantitative analysis, his results are mixed. On the one hand, dependence on natural resources makes political parties compete more on the basis of their programs, but only when overall competition among parties is weak or the poverty rates are low. Conversely, when competition is strong and voters generally poor, parties spend their resources on clientelism. As in the previous chapter, these findings suggest that a nuanced approach is required when analyzing the relationship between natural resources and democracy, in this case taking into account the variables related to the party system and economic status.

Mathias De Roeck and **Ronan Van Rossem** take a macro approach to democratization in their chapter. In contrast to the focus on mainly domestic factors in the analysis of democratization in most cases discussed in this volume, the authors use quantitative analysis to trace the international influences that promote or hinder democracy. They find that a country's embeddedness in dependency networks with either democratic or authoritarian regimes was historically the best predictor of its regime type; however, in the years following the end of the Cold War, this systemic effect weakened. The rise of China and other regional powers presented countries with a range of dependency ties and lessened the West's influence on democratization at the global level. The alternative source of ties and resources available to autocrats enabled them to halt the wave of democratization that characterized the early 1990s.

Finally, **Núria Suero Comellas** presents a qualitative case study of mass mobilization in an "advanced" liberal democracy, namely Spain, based in large part on participant observation. She analyzes the impact of the Catalan independence referendum, which the Catalan regional government held in 2017 despite it having been banned by the central government. The latter responded with legal intimidation and an unexpected degree of violence against unarmed civilians who wanted to exercise democratic free expression. The Spanish government's heavy-handed response sparked a massive protest movement, expanding the agenda beyond Catalan independence to include the enduring legacy of state authoritarianism. The grassroots movement, she argues, constituted a transformative event for the Catalan population on the need to deepen democracy, including via non-violent civil disobedience. The referendum opened up a highly inclusive discursive space for protesters, based on a deliberative model of democracy.

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PART 1

Democratization in Mongolia

The Secret Supports of Mongolian Democracy

M. Steven Fish and Michael Seeberg

Despite a host of unfavorable structural conditions, democracy has persisted and thrived in Mongolia. Chief among the causes for democracy's success has been Mongolia's robust civil society. Among other functions, Mongolia's deeply rooted civil society organizations (CSOs) have pried open government operations to public view, pushed back against domination of the political sphere by well-endowed mining interests, and focused governmental attention on hidden social problems such as domestic abuse. Yet Mongolian democracy faces numerous challenges, including official corruption, imperious politicians, ingrained habits of changing the rules on the eve of elections, and possible meddling by powerful neighbors. The vigor of Mongolia's potent civil society sector will be key to meeting such challenges and keeping one of the developing world's most remarkable experiments in democratic governance on track.

Introduction

Well into the fifth decade of the Third Wave of global democratization, we know that getting to democracy is, relatively speaking, the easy part. Sustaining it is more difficult. From Russia to Thailand and from Mali to Turkey, initial breakthroughs to open politics have been aborted as security services or high-handed executives have scrapped civil liberties and returned to rigged elections.

In postcommunist Eurasia, a region littered with failed democratic experiments and frozen autocracies, Mongolia stands out. Not only did it make a clean break with its authoritarian past when its Soviet-style regime collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s, but it has avoided backsliding as well.

Mongolia's most recent parliamentary elections on June 29, 2016 confirmed its status as a democracy. The contest met exacting international standards for propriety. It was administered efficiently using electronic voting, which made possible public announcements of the results as they came in on the night of June 29. The system virtually eliminated the danger of fraudulent vote-counting and bolstered the credibility of the process.

As in previous contests, two parties predominated: the Mongolia People's Party (MPP), the successor to the communist Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), and the Democratic Party (DP), the relatively liberal party of change founded at the outset of the transition in 1989–1990. In 2016 the MPP won resoundingly, capturing 65 of 76 seats. During the prior session of parliament (2012–2016), the DP had held a narrow plurality and led a broad coalition. The alternation in power was typical: Of the seven contests held since democratization commenced, four have produced a turnover.

The 2016 election was not without its problems, including a last-minute switch in the electoral system. Electoral rules in Mongolia are notoriously fluid. With the exception of the 2012 contest, elections have been based on a majoritarian principle. The 1992 and 2008 elections used the block vote, with voters in 26 districts casting 2, 3 and 4 votes, depending on district size, for the same number of seats in parliament. Elections in 1996, 2000, and 2004 had used a pure first-past-the-post electoral system in 76 districts. The 2012 elections followed a mixed formula: Forty-eight seats were allocated by plurality vote in 26 electoral districts with district magnitudes ranging from 1 to 3, while 28 seats were awarded via proportional representation based on party lists. The amendments to the electoral law in 2016 reinstated a pure majoritarian system with 76 single-member districts (SMDs), the same rules that had been in place during the 1996, 2000 and 2004 contests (Enkhbataar, 2015).

In electoral rules do not per se violate democratic norms, but relentless volatility and changes on the eve of the balloting come dangerously close to doing so. In March 2012, the Constitutional Court affirmed the mixed majoritarian/proportional format, but in April 2016 the Court ruled that PR was unconstitutional, and parliament swiftly switched back to a pure SMD system. The biggest cause for concern was that parliament, in amending the electoral law in December 2015, dropped a provision that forbids rule changes within six months of the election. The move opened a loophole for very late changes, which were made in May 2016. If Mongolia's electoral practices suffer from a real flaw, it is chronic inconstancy and last-minute adjustments in the rules. Greater consistency and a ban on eleventh-hour changes would make an otherwise sound electoral system better.

Changes in electoral rules are almost always driven by political considerations, and Mongolia's 2016 revisions were no exception. Leaders of the DP flipped the switch back to pure majoritarianism because they thought it would enable them and their smaller partners to cling to a parliamentary majority even if their opponents made gains in the popular vote. The electoral engineers proved to be too smart by half: The new rules only magnified the MPP's victory, enabling it to claim 86 percent of seats, though its candidates won only 46 percent of the vote. The DP's parliamentary presence was decimated, with its candidates receiving 34 percent of the vote but just 12 percent of seats. Such artless machinations are not uncommon. In Palestine's 2006 elections, for example, changes in the rules backed by the ruling Fatah party ended up handing a disproportionate share of seats to Hamas, which gained a big majority in the legislature despite edging out Fatah by just three percent of the vote.

In Mongolia, despite these problems, competition was vigorous, the media open, and procedural irregularities few. All major players accepted the result (OSCE, 2016). The vote marked an unbroken quarter-century of democracy.

A democracy that should not exist

Mongolia presents a paradox. By the lights of conventional theories, it should not be a democracy at all. Scholars have found that geographical proximity to other democracies confers advantages, but Mongolia's closest neighbors, China, Russia, and Kazakhstan, are all autocracies. Mongolian democracy remains robust even in the face of potentially detrimental diffusion effects.

Mongolia is not just an overachiever in its neighborhood; it does well globally compared to other countries at its level of development. Greater wealth has long been associated with more open politics, and Mongolia is not a rich country. Its per capita income of about \$12,000 at Purchasing Power Parity is less than half of Russia's and roughly equivalent to the figures for Jordan and Egypt. Among Third Wave democratizers with incomes per capita of \$15,000 or less, only Mongolia, Benin, and São Tomé and Príncipe have been rated Free by Freedom House in every annual survey for the past twenty-five years (Freedom House, 2016). Mongolia represents a remarkable case of robust democracy amid material scarcity.

This unbroken streak is especially noteworthy given the lopsided majorities and single-party-led governments that elections often produce in Mongolia. In many new democracies, the capture of a large majority by a single party is often followed by a systematic effort to rig the system to guarantee that party's perpetuation in power. Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Turkey under Prime Minister and now President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are two prominent examples. In Mongolia, however, even though one of the two major parties has held an overwhelming majority in parliament much of the time, neither has used its advantage to rig the system. Part of the reason may be in the existence of a directly elected president who enjoys a real veto (a two-thirds supermajority is required to override it) and who has often hailed from the rival party to the parliamentary majority. Most power in Mongolia is vested in parliament and the prime minister is the most powerful politician, but the president's veto power, as well as his leading role in judicial appointments, gives him some countervailing authority. The current president, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, is a DP stalwart who can be expected to resist overreaching on the part of the new MPP government. That said, Elbegdorj will leave office in mid-2017 and could be replaced in the June 2017 presidential election by an MPP politician, leaving the entire government in the hands of a single party.

In the past, the presidency and the parliament have sometimes been under the control of the same party. In 1996–1997 and 2012–2016, the DP was fully in charge, and in 2000–2004 and 2008–2009 the MPP was in control, yet democracy survived. Politicians have tinkered with election rules but have done nothing to lock in one party's dominance, and the losers generally accept the results. Even when there is little pushback from within the system, elites in power tend to respect the rules. The MPP's virtual monopoly today is cause for concern, but there is precedent for democracy persisting despite single-party dominance.

One key to maintaining pluralism even in the presence of such potentially unfavorable conditions is Mongolia's powerful civil society. The absence of pushback from within the system does not leave officials unconstrained, since they must grapple with a host of pressures from below. While analysts have noted that postcommunist polities tend to have relatively weak civil societies, Mongolia is an exception (Pop-Eleches et al., 2013). From the first sign of its opening in 1989 to the present day, autonomous interest groups and social movements (here often jointly referred to as civil society organizations, or CSOs) have helped keep officialdom honest, or at least nervous, and the polity open. Their vigor provides a key to understanding the persistence of democracy.

Civil society and democracy

A rich civil society has long been seen as a boon to democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville attributed the robustness of the democracy he found in Jacksonian America in part to Americans' inclination to band together into self-constituted organizations for every conceivable cause. Contemporary Tocquevillians such as Robert Putnam also see spirited nonstate associations as democracy's ally (Tocqueville, 2004).

Not all scholars tout a strong civil society. Some argue that extremist, fanatical, or destructive CSOs are as likely to emerge as benign ones. The skeptics often adduce Weimar Germany, which was rich in nonstate associations at the time of Hitler's rise. They see restive, well-organized masses as at least as great a threat to democracy as are high-handed elites (Berman, 1997; Armony, 2004)

There is no doubt that civil society can include bad apples, and strong CSOs are no substitute for sturdy state institutions. But empirical support for the case against a strong civil society is paltry, and arguments that emphasize the "lessons of Weimar" have an anachronistic ring. In the postwar world, democratization has been derailed far more frequently by governing elites—typically chief executives—than by unruly grassroots movements (Fish et al., 2009). There is a reason why Russia's Vladimir Putin, Belarus's Aleksandr Lukashenko, Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbaev, and other autocrats work so assiduously to thwart the emergence of potent CSOs: They know that societal lethargy and demobilization suit their interests. The last thing they want to face is an assertive, well-organized civil society.

Mongolia's postcommunist experience illustrates the trouble vigorous CSOs can cause for rulers who would prefer electorates that remain ignorant and manipulable, underprivileged groups that are resigned to their fate, and government operations that are safely shielded from pesky public prying. In fact, from the outset of its transition Mongolia's muscular civil society has differed starkly from Russia's anemic one, which helps explain why Mongolian

democratization has been so much more successful (Fish, 2005). Mongolian civil society engages in all the democracy-enhancing functions that Tocqueville identified in early nineteenth-century America. Examining four of those functions and the groups that perform them illustrates how a vibrant civil society sustains democracy despite unfavorable structural conditions.

Perhaps the best-known function of civil society is pushing back against the state, and Mongolian democracy was born amid an upsurge of popular movements to resist the Soviet-type regime and carve out spaces for free expression. The demonstrations that would quickly help topple the regime started in the provincial capital of Hovd, on December 7, 1989. This illegal gathering led to the founding of the Mongolian Democratic Union, the Democratic Socialist Movement, and the New Progressive Union. In the first half of 1990, after rolling waves of mass protests and hunger strikes, the country's new pro-democratic parties met with the MPRP and got it to renounce its monopoly on power, grant civil liberties, release political detainees, and hold free national parliamentary elections. While MPRP candidates won the July vote, the popular uprising had already helped reduce the Party to a party. Due in large part to the push from below, Mongolia held its first free elections at the same time that the countries of Eastern Europe held theirs, over a year before the demise of the USSR (International Republican Institute, 2015).

Controlling state power once democracy takes hold requires less romantic but no less vital efforts, and few causes are less glamorous or more important than curtailing officials' ability to shield their actions from public scrutiny. Officials often press for a degree of secrecy in government operations that goes far beyond the requirements of national security. Ensuring that they have to live with uncomfortably high levels of transparency is an ongoing struggle in all democracies, but it is essential for sustaining an open political regime.

In Mongolia, as in all fledgling democracies, establishing rules and norms that ensure citizens' access to information is a tall order, but several organizations have pressed the cause and racked up real accomplishments. One is Globe International (GI), a nonmembership NGO founded in 1999. It has received funding from the Open Society Institute, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and USAID.

GI launched its efforts in 2002 with a year-long project called "The Right to Know: Freedom of Information." It organized workshops and seminars in addition to a roundtable with parliamentarians. It established links with Article 19, a British human rights organization that takes its name from the part of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights that enjoins the right "to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." In 2004–2005 GI published several guidebooks on freedom of information and deepened its work with parliament and with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs. The ministry agreed to work with a draft law on freedom of information drawn up by GI lawyers and their international partner, Article 19.

Unsurprisingly, the push to enact sweeping legislation ensuring public access to government operations elicited something less than frenzied enthusiasm on the part of governing elites. In 2005–2006, the cabinet discussed submitting a draft law to parliament but decided to postpone action pending further study of information security issues. In 2007, a group of five progressive MPs submitted a draft law to their colleagues but parliament did not take action. In 2008, the government included a proposed law on freedom of information in its Action Plan for 2008–2012. To many politicians, freedom of information seemed like the kind of thing that should end up in that long-beloved graveyard of nice things that will never really happen, the Four or Five Year Plan.

Now abundantly aware that more years of vigorous advocacy would be necessary, GI pulled together an alliance of ten NGOs into a lobbying coalition as part of a larger project dubbed Better Access to Reduce Corruption. In 2009, the president of GI and the director of the Open Society Forum met with the MPs who had submitted a draft law two years earlier and the participants agreed to write a new draft law. After another year of roundtables, public presentations, coalition-building, draft-law revisions, and intensive lobbying, the government approved Resolution No. 143 on information transparency and submitted its own draft law to parliament. In mid-2011, almost a decade after GI initiated its Right to Know campaign, parliament enacted the Law on Information Transparency and Right to Access Information (Globe International, n.d.).

The statute is a remarkable achievement. It requires that the government's budgets, finances, and procurement activities be made public, and it specifies how agencies are to release information. It stipulates that all government funds allocated to the media, including expenditure on advertising, be a matter of public record. It grants all citizens and legal entities the right to request information and obliges officials to respond within seven working days. The law includes provisions for shielding highly sensitive information, as is standard in even the most open polities. Abuse of such provisions by power holders is universal in authoritarian regimes, which typically promise their citizens a bouquet of rights and then eviscerate them with dubiously broad interpretations of exemptions for "security" and "the public interest" (UNESCO, 2016). Over the half-decade since its passage, however, Mongolia's law has shown that it has real teeth. It might even be affecting the way the government operates. In Transparency International's yearly Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Mongolia has posted notable gains every year since the law was passed, moving between 2011 and 2015 from the thirty percentile in the global rankings of countries to the fifty-seventh (Transparency International).

The law certainly would never have been enacted without tenacious pressure from GI and allied CSOs—especially since freedom of information is rarely pursued by governing elites and has little allure to most members of the general public.

Few things are more important for sustaining democracy than keeping government operations open. Voters, after all, can act only on information they have; the quality of their choices depends on how much they know about their leaders' behavior in office. What is more, politicians' probity is always a function of how much they must reveal. Groups such as GI advance democracy by keeping voters in the know—and politicians on notice.

Assisting the state

While monitoring and checking state power is an important function of civil society, the relationship between civil society and the state can be cooperative as well as antagonistic. GI's work on drafting a law on freedom of information is an example of how an autonomous organization can use its expertise to help the state make policy. Another case is the Mongolian National Federation of the Blind (MNFB). It has gone a step further, assuming burdens that otherwise would fall to the state but that state agencies have failed to shoulder effectively.

The MNFB, founded under communist rule in 1978, functioned as most "popular" organizations did in Soviet-type regimes: It ostensibly represented popular interests but actually was controlled entirely from above. Like other such groups, it did more to create the appearance of advocacy than actually to engage in it. In 1993, however, shortly after the demise of the Soviet-type regime, the MNFB became independent. Thereafter it became a dynamic defender of the interests of the blind and of disabled people more generally, as well as a real help to the state in advancing their welfare. Assistance from abroad has been crucial: The MNFB is funded by a grant from the Danish International Development Agency.

The MNFB started flexing its muscles during the middle of the 2000s, when it staged hunger strikes to call attention to the plight of the disabled. In Mongolia, as in many developing countries, the disabled have often been hidden away and had their access to employment and public services severely restricted. The hunger strikes raised public awareness, leading in 2012 to the creation of a Department for Development of Persons with Disabilities Protection within the Ministry of Population Development and Social Protection.

The hunger strikes also prompted the government to invite representatives of the MNFB to assist parliamentary committees with drawing up legislation. The group subsequently used its access to develop a relationship with official bodies that enabled it both to press its cause in the corridors of power and to assist official bodies with making and implementing laws. In 2013, the MNFB took over drafting a new law and identified a champion of its cause among MPs, Oyun Sanjaasuren. Oyun headed the parliamentary working group that drew up the final draft, and she then carried the bill into the legislature for consideration.

In February 2016, parliament passed the Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which aims to eliminate discrimination and to integrate people with disabilities into mainstream society. The new law promotes understanding of disability among officials and the general public. It stipulates measures to improve the living and working conditions of the disabled, requiring enforcement of standards in buildings, infrastructure, and public transportation. It also defines the rights of people with disabilities to education, work, health, and social protection.

At the time the law was enacted, the leader of the MNFB, Gerel Dondow, became a special adviser to Mongolia's president on the rights of the disabled. Her status affords her full access to parliament and the right to interact freely with MPs, and it gives lawmakers a direct line to a leader of the disabled who can offer information and advice on policy. The MNFB increased its efforts both to pressure and to aid policy makers when it established under the city council of Ulaanbaatar a Council of the Disabled Person, with 15 members from the city council and seven representatives from CSOs representing the disabled.

In addition to interacting with the state in a manner that has reshaped the way officialdom deals with the disabled, the MNFB has established a nationwide apparatus to provide services and employment for the blind. The MNFB has 9,500 members and a paid staff of 52, with branches in each of Mongolia's 21 provinces. It runs its own center for teaching braille and the use of computers, and employs some of those it serves in a printing operation that produces books in braille. It has its own radio station, staffed by the blind and the partially sighted. It also runs a factory employing the blind and the partially sighted that produces the gers (yurts) that many Mongolians use as dwellings (Young-Saver, 2013).

The MNFB furnishes a noteworthy case of how a CSO can enhance the quality of legislation and the provision of public services and thereby help the state to overcome information and resource constraints. Left to their own resources, government officials lacked the expertise and motivation needed to push for legislation that would really help the disabled. The MNFB stepped in to draw up the draft legislation that lawmakers subsequently used as the basis for what would become the Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. As might be expected in a developing country such as Mongolia, the government also lacked the resources to create a substantial number of jobs for blind and other disabled people. So the MNFB set up its own enterprises, providing gainful employment for people who might otherwise have had no job prospects at all. By assuming such tasks itself, the MNFB engages in burden-sharing with the state, relieving pressure on state agencies and bolstering the regime's legitimacy.

Without the efforts of the MNFB, the disabled and their families might feel excluded from the corridors of power as well as the workplace. As it is, however, they have developed a stake in the stability of a political order under which they have made real gains.

The MNFB also shows how some organizations with roots in the Soviet era were able to become real vehicles for the representation of popular interests under a democratic regime. In many other postcommunist countries, public organizations with communist origins have either withered or remained tools of the state. Mongolia's MNFB shows that organizations that did more to mimic representation than to advance popular interests during Soviet times can become autonomous and assertive in an open polity—even while they continue to assist the state and enhance regime legitimacy.

Pushing back against powerful economic interests

A strong civil society can check powerful interests in society as well as guard against an overweening state. An example is the Ongi River Movement (ORM) and its successor organization, the United Movement of Mongolian Rivers and Lakes (UMMRL), which has scored victories on behalf of Mongolia's nomadic peoples against large mining corporations.

The ORM was founded in 2001 in three provinces through which the Ongi flows. The group's mission was to reverse the desiccation of the Ongi River system and Ulaan Lake. The river system originally spanned 435 kilometers, but intensive gold mining activity reduced it to just 100 kilometers and led to the drying up of Ulaan Lake. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, an NGO affiliated with Germany's Christian Democratic Party, provided start-up support, and the movement subsequently attracted funding from the Asia Foundation, USAID, Mercy Corps, and the Open Society Forum.

In 2002, the ORM sponsored a study that concluded that mining activities had diverted a dozen rivers and prevented them from flowing properly into the Ongi. The group presented its findings to key parliamentarians and lobbied the Ministry of Nature and the Environment to conduct its own investigations. The following year, ORM leaders sent a letter to Mongolia's president and submitted a petition to the prime minister urging action to restore the river system. The appeal was signed by 1,200 people, most of whom resided in the districts affected by the devastation.

The movement's activity picked up steam in 2004. In the May and June two thousand activists held a protest march tracing the original 435 kilometer path of the Ongi River and organized twelve public rallies along the way, including one at a gold mine. The media provided extensive coverage of the events, which generated widespread public sympathy. Following the march, the ORM and a governmental agency, the Mineral Resource and Petroleum Authority (MRPA), conducted a joint tour of gold mining sites. They were joined by governors of three affected districts as well as by representatives of the mining companies. The MRPA then commissioned a comprehensive study into the causes of river and lake depletion. The ORM strengthened its lobbying power by recruiting a group of parliamentarians to act as advisers and

improve the organization's ties with government agencies. The ORM grew and acquired allies in civil society dedicated to environmental protection (Beck et al., 2007). In 2008–2009, the ORM and affiliates came together to form the UMMRL, which sent activists, accompanied by officials and academic specialists, through every region of Mongolia to delineate environmental protection zones and negotiate new arrangements with affected local populations.

The time was ripe for governmental action, but curbing the power of the mining companies was no small task. When parliament dragged its feet on legislation, the UMMRL launched a hunger strike. At the same time, UMMRL activists worked with sympathetic MPs to draft legislation. The result was the so-called “law with the long name”: the Law to Prohibit Mineral Exploration and Mining Operations at the Headwaters of Rivers, Protected Zones of Water Reservoirs and Forested Areas (Rivers Without Boundaries, n.d.).

Even after the law was passed, another round of radical action was required to force its implementation. In May of 2011, hundreds of nomadic herders traveled to Ulaanbaatar and staged a hunger strike in Chinggis Square in the heart of the capital. In October Mongolia's Supreme Court heard a case brought by the UMMRL, and issued a decision obligating the government to enforce a ban on mining in river and forest areas. This essentially forced the government to begin seriously implementing the “law with the long name” (Simonov, 2013).

The tug of war continues between the organizations of nomads and their supporters, on one side, and politicians who are continually being enticed by well-endowed mining interests on the other. This conflict has become a permanent feature of Mongolia's contentious political landscape. In February 2015, the government took up amendments to the “law with the long name,” prompting a new round of hunger strikes and demonstrations. Despite the protests, on the eve of the Mongolian New Year, with public scrutiny of government in abeyance—parliament quietly passed amendments that eased some restrictions on the mining companies (Shourd et al., 2015).

As these 2015 amendments to the “law with the long name” show, the UMMRL and its allies do not win every battle. Still, for scattered and impoverished rural communities such as Mongolia's nomads to score real victories against immensely wealthy multinational companies is a noteworthy achievement. Despite some setbacks, the UMMRL and its allies have succeeded in halting dozens of destructive mining operations that threatened rivers and lakes in the Ongi River Basin, thereby protecting large swaths of pastureland used by nomads (Goldman Environmental Prize, n.d.). Such David-beats-Goliath moments are rare in developing countries—and, for that matter, in advanced industrialized democracies as well. Nearly all of Mongolia's urban population is no more than two generations removed from the desert and the steppe, and more than a third of Mongolians still live in these areas. Checking the mining companies' takeover of the land preserves a millennia-old way of life and slows the influx of people from the countryside into Ulaanbaatar, where they often face dim prospects.

The UMMRL, together with other grassroots environmental organizations that it has spawned, inspired, and supported, helps make democracy work for many of Mongolia's nomads. Even in the face of mighty business firms indifferent to the delicate ecosystems that sustain the country's traditional communities, the UMMRL fights for the perpetuation of a way of life that is intimately tied to what it means to be Mongolian. It also deters the takeover of the state by mining interests that can readily afford to ingratiate themselves financially with every one of Mongolia's 76 MPs—and a few ministers to boot. It would be hard to imagine a movement more directly and powerfully bolstering democracy.

Articulating and pressing social demands

Advancing the interests of traditionally underprivileged groups against the powerful is one of the most significant functions of CSOs. The UMMRL does this by pushing back against the mining companies that threaten the nomads' grasslands. Other organizations assist disadvantaged groups without necessarily confronting a corporate or government opponent. In some cases, the foe is ignorance, shame, and silence.

The National Center against Violence (NCAV) is such an organization. It has raised public consciousness about violence against women and advocated legislation that has reshaped the way the law deals with the problem. It has eighteen branches throughout the country, runs six shelters, and employs a staff of twenty. The Asia Foundation was one of the first organizations to provide funding for the NCAV's activities (Asia Network of Women's Shelters, n.d.).

The NCAV was founded in 1995 by an alliance of three women's groups: The Liberal Women's Brain Pool, Women for Social Progress, and the Mongolian Women Lawyers Association (MWLA). The NCAV brings the age-old and rampant problem of domestic violence out of the shadows. Its early efforts included conducting a survey of 5,000 respondents, as well as a large follow-up survey. It then carried out studies of child abuse in 2001 and of elder abuse in 2003. Its research strategy and methods are bold and imaginative, involving not only high-quality surveys but also extensive interviews and the use of hospitals' forensic records.

Armed with information drawn from its studies, the NCAV has transformed public discourse about violence against women. Its leaders appear in the electronic and print media, conduct public seminars, and relay letters from victims of domestic violence to high-ranking public officials. At the beginning of the century it began to move into electoral politics. In the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary elections, it teamed up with the MWLA to urge candidates to include a promise to advance legislation against domestic violence in their platforms.

In 2003, the NCAV published a summary of the findings from all of its previous studies and set about using the information to push for new legislation.

Officialdom responded. Shortly after publication of the document, parliament set up working groups composed of representatives from the police, the courts, the prosecutor's office, and the media. The NCAV director, Enkhjargal Davaasuren, and MWLA director Chinchuluun Naidandorj assumed key leadership positions on the working groups. In 2004, parliament's Legal Affairs Standing Committee brought in the directors of the NCAV and the MWLA to address MPs and make the case for stringent new legislation. The result was the Law on Fighting Domestic Violence, jointly sponsored by 19 MPs (a quarter of all members) and passed by unanimous vote in May 2004 (Beck et al., 2007).

The law requires police to accept and file complaints of domestic violence, visit the sites of incidents, interrogate offenders, and bring victims to a hospital or a shelter. It also provides for sanctions against offenders, including expulsion from the home; prohibitions on the use of joint property, on contacting victims, and on access to minors; and compulsory training aimed at behavior modification (U.S. Department of State, 2015).

Groups such as the NCAV and the MWLA buttress democracy by giving otherwise voiceless people—in this case, victims of domestic violence—a stake in the democratic regime. Even when people might feel powerless and left behind by politicians, advocacy organizations such as the NCAV and the MWLA give them a voice.

The vigor of such CSOs might explain why, even when Mongolians overwhelmingly express disapproval of the government, they consistently support the democratic regime. Surveys conducted by Mongolia's leading polling agency show a decline of confidence in the economy and the quality of government over the past several years. Yet in a spring 2016 survey, 67 percent of respondents say that "governance through democratically elected representatives of the people" is "good" or "rather good," while just 21 percent consider it "rather bad" or "bad." (Saint Maral Foundation, 2016). The most recent wave of Asian Barometer surveys, conducted in 2014, largely corroborates these findings. To be sure, not all its findings are unequivocally favorable. Asked whether "democracy is always preferable" or "authoritarian government can be preferable," 44 percent affirm the former and 35 percent latter. The numbers show that over a third of Mongolians conceive the possibility that authoritarianism might be better than democracy. Some other survey items, however, more unequivocally affirm popular commitment to democracy. Asked whether they believe that "democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government," 82 percent agree versus just 16 percent who do not (Asian Barometer, 2014).

Current challenges

Despite its muscular civil society, Mongolian democracy faces immense challenges. One is the dominance of a single party. The dedication of the ruling MPP to pluralism is not in question at the moment, but neither can it be taken for granted. After the party's electoral triumph in 2016, it took all 16 ministerial positions itself. Single-party hegemony can pose a challenge to open government under the best of conditions. And it is difficult to argue that Mongolia faces the best of conditions. Its neighbors' aversion to democracy in their vicinity has only grown in recent years. Russia in particular is investing heavily in international autocracy-promotion (Diamond et al., 2016).

Mongolia's current economic crisis might make it especially vulnerable to pressures and enticements from abroad. The recent slump in commodities prices has left the country in need of financial help, and some Mongolian leaders are eyeing China as a potential alternative to the IMF (Bernard, 2016). If Mongolia is to avoid falling under the sway of neighbors who have little but contempt for democracy, Western-led financial institutions will need to commit to supporting the country's sagging finances.

The dramatic expansion in the mining of gold and other precious metals poses its own set of challenges. Governing elites typically have an especially hard time controlling themselves in resource-rich economies, often with grim consequences for democracy. In Russia, the colossal official corruption that resource wealth fueled in the 1990s led many ordinary people to decide that democracy was no barrier to being ripped off by their rulers. The experience soured Russians on democracy and boosted the appeal of a leader who pledged to reduce corruption and break the oligarchs' control over the state, whatever the consequences for democracy. What is more, as Russia's new post-Soviet reformers helped themselves to lucre from oil, their interests in open government—waned; they had too much to hide (Fish, 2005).

A Russian-style scenario is conceivable in Mongolia, but the vitality of civil society gives Mongolian democracy an advantage. Transparency watchdogs such as GI and its allies certainly have not eliminated corruption, but they have pried open government budgets, finances, and procurement practices, helping to prevent the kind of extortionate free-for-all seen in Russia and so many other resource-rich economies. Militant grassroots environmental protection organizations such as the ORM and the UMMRL resist the capture of the state by mighty multinational mining companies. Groups such as the MNFB aid the state in policymaking while pressing the demands of a social group whose interests have traditionally been overlooked. The NCAV brings painful social problems out of the shadows and advances the interests of an immense but until recently silent social group, victims of domestic violence. Mongolia's potent civil society sector may not be sufficient to ensure that the country's remarkable democratic experiment will continue to prosper, but it has been an indispensable component of its success so far.

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Transformation of Mongolia's Civil Society in the Post-Socialist Era

Byambajav Dalaibuyan

While the demobilization of the pro-democracy movement and NGO-zation characterized Mongolia's civil society in the 1990s, the spread of social mobilization and the diversification of social activism defined much of the civil society in the 2000s. Mongolia's "odd" success of democratization (albeit nascent or "feckless") created a favorable environment for the proliferation of diverse themes, forms and repertoires of social activism; however, major changes within civil society were largely determined by the dynamics of opposition parties in the political environment in which the former Communist party, the MPRP (now MPP), dominated most of the time. In addition to the civic space being occupied by political parties in Mongolia, civil society organizations operated in a resource-constrained environment. The forms, activities and values of civil society organizations have been much affected by the availability and access to resources. The occupation of Mongolia's civil society space by political parties weakened, but strong alternative mobilizing structures were not yet in place.

Introduction

The development of civil society in post-socialist transitional countries, where the party-state sought for decades to destroy all sources of independent action and repress groupings outside the party-state institutions, presents us with significant practical and theoretical implications. It has been argued that post-socialist civil society is weak in comparison to other democracies (Howard, 2003; Lane, 2010; Uhlin, 2006). The literature on post-socialist social transformation has documented the increasing political apathy of post-socialist citizens, amoral cynicism, and demobilization of civil society during the 1990s. Many studies showed that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in post-socialist countries were poorly rooted in their local communities or societies and heavily dependent on foreign funding (Crotty, 2009; Mendelson and Glenn, 2002). Scholars have discussed why there has been no strong civil society actions in many post-socialist countries, despite the risk of abrupt transition trending toward authoritarianism (Carmin and Fagan, 2010).

Mongolia, like most post-socialist countries, underwent dramatic transformations after the collapse of state socialism in 1990. However, unlike most former Soviet states and many East-Central European countries that saw significant "democratic backsliding," Mongolia maintained its multi-party political system and free elections (Bertelsman Foundation, 2018). International

observers consistently defined the nation as a democratic success while pinpointing entrenched corruption in political parties and state institutions as a principal threat to the prospects of the consolidation of Mongolia's democracy (Fritz, 2002; Dierkes, 2018).

Mongolia's democratic achievements have presented a puzzle for students of democratization (Fish, 1998, 2001; Fritz, 2002; Radchenko and Mendee, 2018). Steven Fish (1998, 129) asked: "How did a country that "should have" ended up at the level of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in terms of democratic achievement find its way into company with Hungary and Poland?" Indeed, Mongolia was the second socialist state in the world and experienced geographic isolation from the West for decades. The pre-socialist Mongolia was ruled by the Buddhist theocracy. The post-socialist period saw the revival of Buddhism, nationalism, and traditional cultural values. As of the late 1980s, more than one third of the population were directly involved in semi-nomadic pastoral activities. According to Peter Boone (1994), Mongolia suffered a major economic collapse in the early 1990s, the extent of which was far greater than those experienced by other countries during the Great Depression. Under the mainstream theories of democracy that presuppose a number of "preconditions" for democratization such as modernization, urbanization, the existence of middle class (economic stability) and the proximity to the Western culture and religious tradition, Mongolia has presented an anomaly or a deviant case of democratization.

Among other factors, scholars highlighted the crucial role of civil society in Mongolia's democratization (Fish, 1998). Civil society has been an important part of discussions and the lexicon on democracy in the country; however, there has been a lack of empirical investigations of the development of civil society in Mongolia. The Civil Society Index (CSI) assessment of Mongolia carried out by the Center for Citizens' Alliance (CCA) together with the CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation) in 2004 presented an insightful overview (CCA, 2005). It did not, however, provide a longitudinal and process-oriented analysis necessary for understanding the transformation and significant shifts within civil society.

The existing literature on post-socialist civil society concentrates on some relevant regions and countries such as Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Russia, while some countries such as Mongolia have gained scant attention. The lack of attention on Mongolia is in part associated with the grouping schemes of states. Mongolia has long been an "anomaly" in various grouping schemes in the area studies or comparative sociopolitical research (Sabloff, 2011). Depending on different authors' approaches, Mongolia has been recognized as a member of North East Asia, Inner Asia, Central Eurasia or Central Asia. Such multiple identities become an issue when regional comparative studies leave Mongolia out.

Research on post-socialist civil society has shown that distinct civil society patterns (both conceptually and empirically) evolved across post-socialist countries (Mendelson and Glenn, 2002; Uhlin, 2006). Jakobson and Sanovich (2010) argued that the evolution of civil society in Russia underwent a successive change of three models: latent growth, import-dependent and rooted. The rooted model is a pattern of civil society development embedded in the context of the country's economic, social and cultural environment. In Central Asia, scholars have distinguished between neoliberal and communal forms of civil society (Freizer, 2004; Suda, 2005). Furthermore, some scholars suggested that distinct "indigenous" processes within civil society had taken place in post-socialist civil societies (Henry, 2010). In line with these studies, this chapter examines civil society in Mongolia during the first two decades of post-socialist "transition" to understand its initial state and subsequent shifts.

This chapter argues that while the demobilization of the pro-democracy movement and NGO-zation characterized Mongolia's civil society in the 1990s, the spread of social mobilization and the diversification of social activism defined much of the civil society in the 2000s. Mongolia's "odd" success of democratization (albeit nascent or "feckless") created a favorable environment for the proliferation of diverse themes, forms and repertoires of social activism; however, major changes within civil society were largely determined by the dynamics of opposition parties in the political environment in which the former Communist party, the MPRP (now MPP), dominated most of the time. The occupation of Mongolia's civil society space by political parties weakened, but strong alternative mobilizing structures were not yet in place.

Methods and materials

This chapter examines the transformation of civil society during the first two decades of Mongolia's post-socialist transition, based primarily on data collected as part of the author's PhD study at Hokkaido University from 2008 to 2012. The chapter draws on a mixed methods approach (Creswell, 2002). First, the research data included both quantitative and qualitative data, such as interview transcripts, video files, newspaper clippings, and large scale cross-national survey responses relevant to the period. Second, the author conducted interviews with civil society activists, content analyses of major newspapers as well as a survey of civil society organizations in Mongolia. Thirdly, the author used quantitative survey and qualitative interviews to complement the unavailable information in each type of data, increasing validity of the research findings (Small, 2011). Findings derived from different types of data were used to ensure the consistency of the findings and to fill the gaps when one type of research strategy fell short.

Civil society in post-socialist “transition”

The end of the Cold War has been interpreted by some as the beginning of the universal liberal democratic history (Fukuyama, 1993). The invention of the “Washington Consensus,” a set of policy prescriptions that guided international economic and financial institutions to liberalize economic systems in developing and transitional countries since the early 1990s, contributed considerably to the conception of civil society. The concept of civil society was constructed in the frame of liberal democracy and market capitalism. Western donors applied in their programs a rather simplified variant of the concept, equating it with a set of organizations, namely non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Through this framework, Western donors sought to *build, create, or improve* civil society in post-socialist countries. One of the major criticisms of the liberal perspective has been the relationships between donors and NGOs, namely scepticism about the legitimacy and independence of local NGOs and their capacity to represent the interest of local constituents.

On the basis of the author’s review of theoretical and empirical investigations of civil society in post-socialist countries, it is possible to identify the following commonalities: the legacy of socialism, Western aid for civil society and lack of civic engagement.

Legacy of socialism

State socialism was a far more invasive system than were authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world. Unlike early authoritarian regimes, it effectively repressed any socioeconomic and political groupings outside party-state institutions and marketized economic relationships, which would have led to the emergence of a middle class or the bourgeoisie after state socialism collapsed (Uhlir, 2006). Surveillance and paternalism, which were policies aimed at regime stability, encouraged social atomization and distrust. Furthermore, as Lane (2010) argued, state socialist societies were based on a type of “mechanical” rather than “organic” solidarity (in Émile Durkheim’s sense). Socialist “collectivism” or mechanical solidarity was based on the assumption that rights were held by groups and classes, and defined by, and activated through, the state. State socialism instilled these personal attitudes into the minds of people and purposefully suppressed attitudes and behaviours conducive to “organic” solidarity (Lane, 2010).

Furthermore, despite the collapse of Communist rule, many elites managed to maintain their positions during the transition. Important political institutions such as the Communist Party and its satellite organizations did not disappear or even became the dominant political force in some countries (Ishiyama, 2001).

Western aid for civil society

While many authors who focus on foreign assistance acknowledge the significance of such aid to NGO development, they are in agreement on the controversial relationship between donors and NGOs, and the point that foreign assistance to NGOs creates a plethora of organizations and individuals dependent on transnational ideas and funding (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 1999; Spina and Raymond, 2013; Sundstrom, 2006). Foreign assistance constrained social activism by diverting local, indigenous civic actors into grant-seeking competitors (Hann, 2003). Conversely, some argued that, in some circumstances, donor-dependent NGOs that are freed from the constraints of mass membership and public opinion may be more effective on some policy issues (Carmin and Fagan, 2010). Therefore, it is important to consider that the priorities and policies of donor organizations regarding civil society funding had a significant influence on the activities of local NGOs.

Lack of civic engagement

Post-socialist transitional countries have extremely low levels of associational membership compared with other countries (Howard, 2003; Lane, 2010). By examining the 1995–1997 World Values Survey and conducting country-specific case studies, Howard explained the low rates of organizational memberships per person in post-socialist countries in reference to the legacies of the prior socialist experience, particularly prior distrust in state-controlled public organizations and widespread reliance on informal networks (Howard, 2003).

The transformation of civil society and social movement theory

This research defines civil society as the sphere of social interaction comprising a range of public activities carried out by citizens and organizations that lie outside state institutions. The institutional core of civil society is systems of various associations, NGOs, networks and social movements that articulate and channel societal interests and concerns (Habermas, 1996). Concerted action and social self-organization are central to civil society. Separation from the state and autonomy are essential for civil society, although the state establishes the legal and political environment of associational life. Civil society is not a set of organizations and an inherently holistic, “good” and democratic entity. It may contain all manners of exploitations, oppressions and divisions (Burawoy and Behbehanian, 2011).

There is no ready-to-use theoretical framework to analyze the transformations in civil society that have occurred across post-socialist countries. Social movement studies have offered insightful conceptual frameworks to understand the process and outcomes of social and political mobilizations. Scholars have applied the social movement approach to explain events and processes that take place beyond social movements, such as revolutions,

armed conflicts and social change in general (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). In a similar vein, this chapter applies the social movement approach to explain the transformation of civil society.

McAdam et al. (1996) proposed three broad sets of explanatory variables for explaining the dynamics of social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures and collective action frames, which are known as the “classical social movement agenda.” Though applying the social movement approach in investigating a specific social movement or contentious action is different from applying it in analysing civil society, which is conceptualized and measured by a broader combination of different actors and activities, it provides a framework that helps one to identify key aspects of changes in civil society. Political opportunities, mobilizing structures and collective action frames are central to understanding these changes. Political opportunities largely define legal regulations, space for action and the resources available for public activities carried out by citizens and organizations. Mobilizing structures are “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al., 1996, 3). Formal vehicles denote various formal organizations such as voluntary associations and neighborhood organizations. Informal vehicles or structures mean informal networks that facilitate collective action. Collective action frames refer to “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al., 1996, 6).

The specificities of existing mobilizing structures (organizations and networks) influence how citizens and organizations that undertake public activities define their concerns, strategies and forms of action. It should be noted that the reverse is also possible. In other words, changes in the political environment, for example, can have an effect on how civil society groups assess their interests and strategies of action. Applying this approach allows one to focus on the properties and the changes in the environment in which organizations and networks operate, and the main issues and values advocated by civil society while at the same time examining their interrelatedness.

Democratic transition and the advent of civil society in Mongolia

Limited political opportunities and mobilizing structures

The post-socialist state-building processes in the early 1990s and MPRP’s political dominance provided little room for creating supportive regulations and resources for independent public activities. As discussed in this section, organizations and networks for collective action were created and reused but their capacity to mobilize people and resources and channel societal interests was very limited. The pro-reform opposition parties served as the main structures for collective action until they won the parliamentary election in 1996.

Political developments during the late 1980s significantly determined the shape and dynamics of civil society in Mongolia during the 1990s. The slow pace of reform in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and economic backwardness of the country motivated young intellectuals who were also inspired by the movements in Central and Eastern Europe to form pro-reform groups and movements in the late 1980s. After a series of non-violent demonstrations and hunger strikes by the pro-reform movements, which demanded a multi-party system, free elections and respect for human rights, and after negotiations between the MPRP and the government, the MPRP accepted these demands in April 1990, and three months later the first multi-party election took place in Mongolia.

The leadership of the pro-democracy movements was composed of mainly young, urban male intellectuals (university instructors, journalists, writers and students). Many of them were educated in Eastern Europe and Russia. Specifically, a number of the prominent leaders were students in the early and mid-1980s and were aware of the solidarity movement in Poland as well as Western political and economic thinking. When they returned home in the mid-1980s, the political context was shifting, while the country was still economically backward. Many of the leaders of the pro-democracy movements belonged to nomenklature and held administrative and academic posts. They were the people who first conceived the existing situation in terms of the gap between an ideal life and actual life under state socialism.

In February 1990, the four key pro-democracy groups agreed to embark on joint campaigns, which transformed their struggles into a broader democratic movement. Their demonstration in March 1990 led to the first hunger strike in Mongolian political history, in which strikers demanded the resignation of the Politburo and the organization of multi-party elections. During the spring of 1990, new political parties were established, and all of them had their roots in the pro-democratic movements. The MPRP however, had an incomparable advantage. The opposition parties were inexperienced, divided and lacked sufficient resources. They fought with the MPRP and, of course, with each other for votes. Yet the majority of the mass public had not lost their faith in the former Communist Party.¹ Thus the MPRP retained its dominance in the new bicameral parliament. The MPRP won with 85 percent of seats in the lower

1 Kaplonski (2004, 1052) notes that "it is important to realize that however many supporters the demonstrators had, MAHN [MPRP] was not completely isolated. Letters and telegrams of support flooded in... The support varied in its intensity and nature, but lined up behind the Party leadership." Lishtovanny (2007, 79, 82) writes that a survey was conducted among the participants of the first joint demonstration of the pro-democracy organizations. 67% of the total 335 respondents told that they came to express their support for the movements and 4% were bystanders. 28% of the respondents who were a member of the MPRP said that they would continue to believe in the Party while another 23% answered that they would support collaboration between the MPRP and the Democratic Union.

chamber of the parliament, called the State Great Khural, and 58.4 percent in the upper chamber, called the State Small Khural. However, the MPRP leaders decided to cooperate with the opposition. Several leaders of the opposition parties joined the government, taking first and second vice-ministerial posts. One of the opposition party leaders was elected as the country's vice president and speaker of the Small Khural.

While some leaders of these parties played key roles in the process of crafting new legislation and in the new government in 1990–1992, most of the members of these movements did not enter formal politics. The parliamentary election of 1992, in which the opposition parties won only six seats out of the total of 76, and local government elections, in which the MPRP won the majority in all 18 provinces, pushed these individuals further out of formal politics. The Mongolian Democratic Union, which was the leading organization in the democratic movement, had a relatively large number of supporters and members (about 60 local unions), but they were largely demobilized. This situation continued until 1996, when the opposition parties formed the Democratic Union coalition and won the majority of the parliamentary seats.

Socialist-era “mass organizations,” in 1990 (olon niitiin baiguullaguud) such as the Mongolian Women's Federation, Mongolian Elderly's Association and Mongolian Youth Federation officially abandoned their previous ideological mission and reformulated their *raison d'être*. In 1990–1991, most “mass organizations” were stripped of the majority of privileges that they had enjoyed under the previous regime. However, their connection to the ruling party, the MPRP, did not alter much except for the Youth Federation, which was headed by young leaders in the pro-democracy movements. The Mongolian Women's Federation, for example, had been the MPRP's women's organization until 1990, and most of its leaders and activists retained their membership in the MPRP, which was relatively common among the members of other socialist-era “mass organizations.”

The first Western-style, issue-oriented citizens' organizations were established in the early 1990s, which were led by women who were primarily members of the opposition parties. In addition, different types of associations such as the Mongolian Association of Private Herders, Mongolian Buddhists' Association and Mongolian Green Movement emerged. It is unclear how many such informal organizations, most of which were likely to be ad-hoc groups, existed in Mongolia at that time. According to an informal source, there were only seven new citizens' organizations in 1992, but the number increased rapidly, as there were more than 400 organizations in the mid-1990s (UNDP, 2000); however, most of these organizations were “paper organizations,” and an unofficial estimation was that there were approximately 50 active NGOs at that time (UNDP, 2000, 31).

Creating the legal environment for the existence of voluntary citizens' organizations independent from the state was part of the institutional change that pro-democracy reformers and donor organizations sought to accomplish; for

example, a number of donor organizations provided support to the Mongolian government and civil society groups to draft the law on NGOs. With the active role of several female members of parliament who had previously led NGOs, the new law was promulgated in 1997. The law had an immediate impact. An average of 500 new NGOs were registered every year following 1997 (OSF, 2005).

In the early 1990s, international organizations and foundations such as the Asia Foundation, Soros Foundation and some German political foundations concentrated on assisting NGOs to become independent organizations capable of monitoring power holders and the reform process while collaborating with the government on fundamental political and legal reforms. Towards the late 1990s, however, donor support became less focused on the political aspects of civil society activism and more focused on the socio-economic support role of the emerging non-governmental sector, emphasizing the service-delivery functions of NGOs over their advocacy and monitoring roles (CCA, 2005). NGOs in Mongolia, as in other developing countries, were considered by donor organizations as effective channels to reach people in need. A survey conducted in 2000 showed that 93 percent of the total 302 projects implemented by NGOs from 1996 to 2000 were funded by foreign sources (UNDP, 2000). In a relatively short period of time, the scope of NGO activities became considerably broad. NGOs were successful in some specific areas such as education, women's rights, press freedom, support for vulnerable groups and aid for children. The support of donor organizations was crucial for emerging NGOs, which faced constraints in the resources to carry out regular activities. While a number of NGOs became relatively well institutionalized and financially stable, most, however, were financially unstable and had low organizational capacity.


In the absence of civil society groups to monitor and restrain the activities of power holders, the pro-democracy opposition parties served as the primary institution for the articulation and channelling of publicly relevant needs and wants. Frustrated by the alleged media manipulation and the government's tight control over independent social activism, the pro-democracy opposition parties held demonstrations and hunger strikes in protest of the MPRP government in Ulaanbaatar and other cities in April 1994. Besides demanding the government's resignation, they called for a guarantee of press freedom and the right to organize demonstrations based on the adoption of relevant legislation.

When the coalition of opposition parties, the Democratic Union, won a landslide victory in the 1996 parliamentary election, public anticipation was high. The right-leaning Democratic Union was committed to market-oriented reform and took action to eliminate fixed prices and custom tariffs, step up the privatization of state enterprises and holdings and reform the financial sector. However, economic reforms did not bring a positive, immediate impact on people's livelihoods. The Democratic Union began to falter in the face of faction-

al politics, competition for political offices and allegations of corruption. The MPRP became a strong opposition force in the parliament. The MPRP was able to paralyze the parliament by refusing to attend parliamentary sessions. The growing political instability was reflected in the resignation of three prime ministers during four years and the murder of Sanjaasurengiin Zorig in 1998.

The public dissatisfaction with the political developments between 1996 and 2000 and the general economic situation, as shown in Figure 1, contributed to the demise of the coalition government. The 2000 election brought a devastating result—a single seat—for the Democratic Union. The opposition parties lost their momentum and the previous public identity that allowed them to mobilize ordinary citizens. The defeat in the 2000 election was described by some observers as the end of the democratic movement of 1990 (Murai, 2001). Several demonstrations to protest against the MPRP government were organized by some leaders of the opposition parties during the early 2000s, but these efforts did not gain popular support.

Figure 1. Public views toward political system and economic situation, 1995–2005



Source: Data from Prohl and Sumati (2007); the percentages are from the polls carried out in June or November of the corresponding year.


Diversification of civil society during the 2000s

Expanding political opportunities and mobilizing structures

Unlike the first decade of the post-socialist transition, the diversification of actors within civil society and the rise of civic movements characterized Mongolian civil society in the 2000s. The emergence of various protest movements since 2005 added diversity and strength to the Mongolian civil society. The data on protest events collected through the author's scanning of two major daily newspapers published in the period between 2002 and 2008 was used to understand the emergence and transformation of the protest movements. This data was compared with the data on the same topic collected by Muneyuki Murai, and no significant difference was found between the two (Murai, 2011) Figure 2 shows the number of protest gatherings (demonstrations, protest meetings, sit-ins and hunger strikes) that took place between 2002 and 2008.

Protest events that arose ranged from large-scale mass demonstrations against the government, to a taxi drivers' march and to a hunger strike of a few people demanding that the government compensate their financial losses that were caused by the bankruptcy of a private company. Movements that called themselves "citizens' movements" were at the centre of these protest events. Approximately 40 self-styled "citizens' movements" emerged between 2001 and 2008. These movements were most active in the period between 2005 and 2007.

Figure 2. Number of protest gatherings, 2002–2008



Source: Daily News and Unuudur, 2002–2008. The numbers indicate an occurrence of protest gatherings: demonstrations, public meetings, sit-ins, and hunger strike). A protest event continued for days counted as one occurrence.

Most of these movements appeared after the 2004 parliamentary election, which resulted in a hung parliament. As a result, the major parties agreed to follow the Israeli model of “consensus government.” A coalition of opposition parties agreed to rule the country for the first two years, and the MPRP was set to rule the remaining two years until 2008. However, the coalition of opposition parties was vulnerable to factional politics, and the MPRP was able to reject the previous agreement anytime if needed. Under this fragile alignment of political elites, the first series of large-scale demonstrations was organized from February to May 2005 by the Movement for Healthy Society. The emergence of other major organizations such as “Radical Reform,” “Free Pensioners’ Union” and “Our Mongolia’s Homeland” followed these protests. Several rural environmental movements that opposed environmentally damaging mining operations were formed in this period as well. The initial purpose of the Movement for Healthy Society was to fight against corruption and to remove corrupt politicians from their posts. This purpose was extended, however, and became ambiguous as other movement organizations joined protest events. “Citizens’ movements” gained considerable public attention for their actions against the enabling, pro-investor policy of the Mongolian government regarding the mineral sector. Ivanhoe Mines, a Canadian mining company, announced to its investors in 2005 that it had discovered the Oyu Tolgoi deposit, one of the world’s largest undeveloped copper-gold deposits located in the South Gobi region of Mongolia, and that it had negotiated an investment agreement with the Mongolian government. This allegedly secret negotiation stirred public discontent in Mongolia. “Citizens’ movements” were the leading opponents of the agreement.

New collective action frames

Unuudur, which was Mongolia’s major daily newspaper, called the political developments in this period (2005–2007) *Yarguin huvisgal* (literally, the “Pulsatilla revolution”), envisaging the trajectory of the protest movements as a variant of the spread of the revolutions (the Colour Revolutions) in some post-socialist countries between 2000 and 2006. Indeed, the forms and rituals of protest activities that the Movement for Healthy Society organized in part resembled some of the movement organizations that led to the Colour Revolutions. Inspired by the Colour Revolutions, citizens’ movement activists wore yellow scarfs and ribbons around their wrists, attempted to create nationwide networks of pro-reform movements and attracted public attention through conflictual protest tactics.² The “Citizens’ Coalition,” which was a union of

2 Like the Colour Revolutions, there were allegations that Western organizations provided funding to the movement leaders. Furthermore, there was a widespread allegation against the protest movements that they were merely racketeers who sought money and other resources from power holders and businesses by threatening them through organizing protest performances. Some described the protest movements as “easy money-making.” In response, some movement organizations occasionally disclosed their financial reports.

organizations formed by pro-reform movement leaders, journalists, scholars and NGOs in 2007, also talked about the “electoral revolution,” which was an alternative name of the Colour Revolutions.

During the two years between 2005 and 2007, the protest movements were able to achieve government compromises on a number of contested issues such as re-negotiating mining investment agreements and reforming pension systems. Government and power holders came to accept the influence of the movements and often invited them into policy discussions, at least to show the public that they listened to the movements. However, significant political changes or shifts, which the movements demanded, did not occur. Having failed to achieve significant outcomes, the protest movements started to disintegrate, and some prominent leaders either established their own political parties or joined the existing parties to run in the 2008 parliamentary election.³ However, none of the leaders of the protest movements won a seat in the 2008 election.

Some of the protest movements, especially anti-mining groups, consistently carried out a variety of direct action campaigns in Ulaanbaatar and mining regions. The United Movement of Mongolian Rivers and Lakes (UMMRL) succeeded in lobbying and persuading parliament members through engagement with a parliamentary group and direct action protests to adopt a controversial law on prohibiting mineral exploration and mining operations at headwaters of rivers, water protection zones and forested areas, known as the “Law with Long Name” in 2009 (Byambajav, 2015). However, the law was not consistently implemented on the ground because of inherent ambiguities within the law, government inefficiency and opposition by mining companies. UMMRL persistently conducted advocacy and demonstrations to demand the government to enforce the law without delays and revisions. They used symbolic activities to attract public and media attention such as occupation of the central square located in front of the Parliament House by *ger* (Mongolian traditional dwelling) and horses and shooting at the Parliament House with a bow. However, in September 2013, the leader of UMMRL and some movement members came to the Parliament House with a weapon to draw public and media attention to their frustration with potential invalidation of the law by the Mongolian parliament, and to show that they had a genuine and patriotic cause. Their action was viewed as very disturbing by the public. By law, they were detained and sentenced for threatening public stability.

3 The Citizen's Movement Party was established in 2007 as a coalition of the protest movements.

Demanding civil society

Thus, while Steven Fish described the Mongolian civil society of the late 1990s as “matriarchal,” meaning women-led, NGOs largely represented it (Fish, 1998), and the civil society in Mongolia during the first decade of the new century was characterized by much diversity. Furthermore, the “demanding” aspect of civil society led the Mongolian government to take an apparently cooperative approach towards civil society organizations in the late 2000s compared with its earlier position of indifference towards civil society.⁴ The platforms of almost every new government and also the president of Mongolia stated their support for NGOs and pledged to promote a partnership between civil society and the government. For instance, the action program of the President of Mongolia in 2005 stated that government agencies would be monitored on their practice of engaging with civil society organizations. Besides these largely symbolic political actions, the government also took some concrete steps to engage with civil society. For instance, “civil society councils” were established by government ministries and agencies.

The “citizens’ movements” altered the content and forms of civil society in Mongolia and paved the way for the diffusion of political and social activism. These movements represented an alternative “demanding civil society,” which was different from the neo-liberal model of civil society composed mainly of NGOs. To some extent, these movements were not “civil” (they used disruptive and sometimes illegal tactics), “good” (there were allegations that some movements demanded money from mining companies) or non-political (prominent leaders joined political parties or were party members). The wave of protest mobilizations created a different image of civil society, however, and manifested the possibilities of social activism. “Citizens’ movements” represented organized social activism, a key feature of which was demanding concessions from power holders and mobilizing people.

Political parties in the civil society space

The predominance of political parties in the associational terrain in Mongolia seemed to have important effects on the citizens’ movements. Like post-socialist transitional countries, Mongolia had a very low level of associational membership (Byambajav, 2012); however, the country’s notable difference was a high level of political party membership. According to the Asian Barometer surveys, 24.2 percent of Mongolia’s adult population reported affiliation with political parties in 2006. It decreased to 19.9 percent in 2010.⁵

4 For example, several ministries and government organizations, including Ministry of the Environment, established civil society councils and consultative groups.

5 Asian Barometer. Wave 2 (2006) and Wave 3 (2010) Mongolia survey data. <http://www.asianbarometer.org/>.

Table 1. Associational membership in the Western Europe, the post-socialist regions and Mongolia (% of “yes”)

Associations	Regions & countries				
	Western Europe	Central/ Eastern/Baltic	Southern Europe	CIS	Mongolia
Church & religious	27.9	20.5	21.5	12.4	4.7
Sport/recreational	27.9	9.1	6.4	3.4	3.9
Art & education	15.4	5.2	4.1	2.8	3.8
Trade union	17.0	5.9	6.6	8.9	10.9
Environmental	7.5	2.3	2.6	1.8	2.9
Professional	13.7	4.7	4.6	3.0	3.9
Humanitarian	19.1	4.5	4.1	2.2	5.6
Youth	5.1	3.4	3.0	2.8	5.0
Political party	4.0	3.1	9.0	4.9	24.0
N	5504	10805	8844	12711	1000

Source: Life in Transition Survey 2010.

A measure of associational memberships per person offers a general comparative view. Life in transition Survey (LITS), which covers post-socialist countries, including Mongolia, showed that Mongolia had an “exceptionally” high rate of membership in political parties: 24 percent.⁶

On one hand, securing and maintaining broad based public support in the party dominated civil society space posed a serious challenge for citizens’ movements that lacked a solid membership base and monetary and non-monetary resources; on the other hand, political parties competed to occupy the civil society space. All major political parties established a variety of NGOs that aimed to recruit and reach out to different segments of the population, such as women, youth, students and the elderly.⁷ Thus, the party capture of the civil society space was in part the main rationale behind why some citizens’ movements turned into political parties or chose to join existing political parties.

6 EBRD. Life in Transition Survey. See <https://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395236498263&d=Mobile&pagename=EBRD%2FContent%2FContentLayout>.

7 For example, Mongolian People’s Party, one of two major parties in Mongolia, has four NGOs officially associated to the party: Association of Democratic Socialist Youth, Association of Democratic Socialist Women, Association of Democratic Socialist Students, and Senior Members Association.

Conclusion

In the changing international environment, Mongolia's democratic movement led the country to a peaceful political transition in 1990. The evolving civil society in the country since 1990 has been shaped by the context of major socio-economic and political transformations. The first and second decades of the post-socialist transition present two different patterns of civil society. While the first decade is characterized by demobilization and NGO-zation, much of the second decade is characterized by the spread of social mobilization and the diversification of social activism. This difference is largely determined by the dynamics within the Mongolian political system, specifically, the evolution of opposition parties in the political environment in which the former Communist party, the MPRP, dominated most of the time. The opposition parties in Mongolia, which originated from the democratic movement of 1990, served as rather civil institutions because they were marginalized by the dominant party, and there were not advocacy-oriented citizens' organizations during the early 1990s. In this period, civil society was largely occupied by emerging NGOs and the inherited "mass organizations," both of which avoided politically sensitive issues to maintain their good relations with donor organizations and the government respectively.

The intensification of political and social mobilization in the mid-2000s was preconditioned by political convulsions caused by rivalries among major political parties. The increasing public discontent over ineffective political institutions and widespread allegations concerning corruption in state institutions were manifested by the emergence of various "citizens' movements." The wave of protests mobilized by these movements in both Ulaanbaatar and the rural areas changed the contours of prevalent forms and activities within Mongolian civil society. Low levels of participation in non-political associations and very high rates of party membership in Mongolia indicate that civil society space was captured by political parties in Mongolia, posing serious challenges to emerging civil society actors. In addition to the civic space being occupied by political parties in Mongolia, civil society organizations operated in a resource-constrained environment. The forms, activities and values of civil society organizations have been much affected by the availability and access to resources. A lack of civic participation, for example, led many "citizens' movements" to prefer symbolic politics rather than seeking mobilizations of a large number of people.

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The 2017 Deliberative Polling on Draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution

Munkhsaikhon Odonkhuu

In 2016, the Mongolia People's Party (the MPP) ran for the general election with a manifesto that promised to amend the Constitution "after asking the people," and it won 65 of 76 seats in the Parliament, which allowed it to gather more than enough votes to amend the Constitution. Using an innovative experiment of deliberative polling founded by James Fishkin, the first deliberative polling to facilitate debate and consultation among the population on the draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution was held in April 2017 in Ulaanbaatar. This chapter defines the substantive and procedural conditions for successful deliberative polling and reviews conformity of the conditions based on Fishkin's theory, Mongolian Law on Deliberative Polling and the best practices of deliberative polling in other countries. The chapter concludes that the results of the deliberative polling on some of the particular issues could not express fully informed judgments that the participants would achieve after considering pros and cons of each of arguments since some of the substantive and procedural conditions for successful deliberative polling were not safeguarded in law nor fulfilled in practice. This chapter, which analyzes the deliberative polling conducted in April 2017 and following related events until September 2018, is composed of five sections: (1) experimenting with unique ways of popular participation in constitutional reform; (2) substantive conditions for deliberative polling; (3) procedural conditions for deliberative polling; (4) substantive issues in the draft amendments submitted on May 25, 2017; and (5) complementing deliberative polling with broader public participation.

Introduction

The Mongolian people peacefully transitioned from socialism to constitutional democracy in 1990, adopting their first liberal Constitution in 1992. Mongolia has had eight parliamentary elections and seven presidential elections since 1990, and political power peacefully switched between two main political parties, the Mongolian People's Party (the MPP) and the Democratic Party (the DP). In the last general election in 2016, the MPP won 65 of the 76 seats, and the DP nine seats. Due to the majoritarian election system, the MPP won 85 percent of the seats with just 45 percent of the popular vote, while the DP won 12 percent of the seats with 33 percent of the vote. Constitutional amendments require a $\frac{3}{4}$ majority of all members of the Parliament of Mongolia (the State Great *Khural*). As such, the MPP can now unilaterally amend the Constitution. Despite its dominance, the MPP has opted for public participation including the deliberative polling on Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution.

James Fishkin (2009) founded a theory of deliberative polling, which was summarized as follows in Participant Guide: What's Next California (Center for Deliberative Democracy, 2011): a random sample of citizens is given a questionnaire on particular issues of public policy. After completing the questionnaire, they will be invited to attend a deliberative meeting. Those participants who say they will attend the meeting are sent balanced briefing material. The participants then come together for a weekend and will be randomly assigned to small groups to discuss the issues under the guidelines of trained moderators. During their discussions, each small group will develop questions to ask a balanced panel of experts on each issue. The panel of experts then answer each of the questions raised by the small groups. At the end of the meeting, the participants fill out another questionnaire. Any shifts of opinion from before and after the deliberations are then analyzed, and shared with the larger public and relevant policy-makers. As only several hundred citizens participate in the deliberative polling, and all citizens cannot join this polling, the results of this process are only suggestive and not mandatory. An advisory committee is in charge of organizing the deliberative polling, choosing the topics of deliberation, selecting panels of experts and approving briefing material.

The first deliberative polling on the draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution, which was held in April 2017, was an innovative experiment not only in Mongolia but also around the world. This chapter defines the substantive and procedural conditions for successful deliberative polling, based on Fishkin's theory, Mongolian Law on Deliberative Polling and the best practices of deliberative polling in other countries, and reviews conformity of these conditions in the deliberative polling on the draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution. I participated as an expert in the panel of experts in the deliberative meeting, the second stage in the deliberative polling.

This chapter argues that the deliberative polling on the draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution should be considered flawed because some of the basic conditions, material and procedural, to successfully conduct the deliberative polling were violated in April 2017. The topics were politically pre-selected by the Parliament, and participants received unbalanced, inaccurate information concerning some of the topics in the *Briefing Material* (2017) and the expert explanations, and some of the questions were drafted as leading statements, increasing their chances of endorsement by the sample group. Moreover, most of the procedural guarantees were disrespected: it is doubtful whether the briefing material were prepared by experts in constitutional law or political science; the opposing parties were not given a chance to comment on accuracy and balance of information in the draft briefing material the Deliberative Council (advisory committee) was not given power to review and approve the accuracy and balance of information in the draft briefing material the participants did not have enough time to read the briefing material; the participants deliberated on six topics and 15 proposals for only a single weekend; the Deliberative Council did not nominate the experts to the Parlia-

ment; the Deliberative Council did not enjoy full power to draft or approve the questionnaires; there were not enough transparency on the process of deliberative polling; and the Deliberative Council lacked independence and expertise to organize the deliberative polling. The Law on Deliberative Polling was not thoroughly respected in April 2017.

The 2017 Law on the Deliberative Polling should be amended so that the violations of the basic conditions, material and procedural, to successfully conduct the deliberative polling are prevented and reduced. Even if all the material and procedural conditions are implemented, the deliberative polling cannot fully express informed views of participants due to certain factors inherent to the process. The organization, who organizes, initiates or funds the deliberative polling, preselects all the topics, and information in the briefing materials are often inaccurate and imbalanced. Thus, the deliberative polling is doomed to be manipulated, and Fishkin has not proposed any good mechanism to prevent such manipulation. Therefore, the results of the deliberative polling cannot express informed judgments that the participants would achieve after considering pros and cons of each of arguments on particular issues.

This chapter, which analyzes the deliberative polling conducted in April 2017 and following related events until September 2018, is composed of five sections: (1) experimenting with unique ways of popular participation in constitutional reform; (2) substantive conditions for deliberative polling; (3) procedural conditions for deliberative polling; (4) contentious substantive issues in the submitted amendments; and (5) complementing deliberative polling with broader public participation.

Experimenting with unique ways of popular participation in constitutional reform

The MPP's manifesto for the 2016 election had a clause, later inserted into the 2016-2020 Action Plan of the Mongolian Government, to strengthen the parliamentary system by amending the constitution after "asking the people." According to the MPP, "asking the people" could involve a deliberative polling, a public discussion, a national referendum, or some mixture of these.

On February 9, 2017, the Parliament enacted a new Law on Deliberative Polling, proposed and advocated by MP G. Zandanshatar, a former Senior Advisor to the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University, which was directed by James S. Fishkin. The Parliament also amended the 2010 Law on Constitutional Amendment Procedure so that deliberative polling is required to amend certain constitutional provisions including those related to parliament, the president, and the prime minister.

Subsequently, the Parliament enacted a resolution to conduct a deliberative polling on constitutional amendments under six topics with 15 proposals on April 7, 2017, which were translated in the *Briefing Material* (2017, unofficial translation, 2–3) as follows:

Topic 1: Ensure effective checks and balances between the State Great Khural and the Government

Proposal 1.1: Grant Prime Minister of Mongolia with authority to form his/her cabinet, appoint and dismiss members of the cabinet.

Proposal 1.2: Limit number of ministers appointed from members of the Parliament to one third of the total members of the cabinet.

Proposal 1.3: Include names of ministries and determine structure of the cabinet in the Constitution to ensure sustainability and stability of state policies in terms of cabinet structure specifically.

Topic 2: Clearly identify rights and responsibilities of the President to eliminate duplication of functions pertinent to strengthening national unity

Proposal 2.1: Set term of the presidency to 6 years, elect the President for a single term.

Proposal 2.2: Elect the President for a single term of six years through an extended plenary session of the Parliament of Mongolia (Membership of the expanded plenary session of the Parliament will consist of 76 members of the Parliament and all members of the Citizen's Representative Council of aimags, cities and the capital city).

Proposal 2.3: Revoke constitutional rights of the President to initiate legislation.

Proposal 2.4: Revoke constitutional rights of the President to direct Presidential decrees to the Cabinet.

Topic 3: Strengthen professional, skilled and reputable civil service free from politics

Proposal 3.1: Make the Civil Service Commission of Mongolia to be Constitutional authority free of political influence.

Proposal 3.2: Create civil service system to ensure professional, stable civil servants and promotions based on merit.

Proposal 3.3: Civil service to be free from political interference. Add clauses in the Constitution of Mongolia that prohibits discriminating civil servants based on political views and dismissal of civil servants because of election results or for any other unjustifiable reasons other than those stated in laws and legislative acts.

Topic 4: Perfecting the administrative and local governance systems

Proposal 4.1: Strengthen the changes in the Constitution setting forth that both administratively and territorially, Mongolia is divided into aimags, capital city and cities; aimags are then divided into soums and cities (town with local status), then lower level soums are divided into baghs and villages, and the capital city is divided into districts, which is then divided into khoroos and the city into khoroos.

Proposal 4.2: Governors of soums, districts and cities (with national status) are to directly appoint the Governors of baghs, khoroos and villages.

Topic 5: Improve legislative system to strengthen state responsibility, accountability, discipline and justice

Proposal 5.1: To increase state accountability and strengthen justice, establish an independent Constitutional organization that is free from politics.

Proposal 5.2: To increase state accountability, ensure anti-corruption policy implementation and protect social justice, establish an independent and impartial organization that is free from politics.

Proposal 5.3: Expand the composition of Judicial General Council, which is responsible for ensuring independence of courts and impartiality of judges, and clarify the systems for appointing judges and the Chief Justice.

Topic 6. Ensure necessary conditions to openly discuss a proposal to have two chambers of parliament: Upper chamber—People’s Great Khural and legislative body—State Baga Khural

The resolution also established a Deliberative Council composed of eight members representing researchers, the private sector, and NGOs. The Council is formally charged with administering polls, developing relevant questions based on the topic, and nominating experts to provide explanations to questions raised during the process. Although members of the Council must legally be “independent professionals with relevant knowledge and experience,” there are no appropriate protections of such independence.

The first deliberative polling on the constitutional amendments was held in April 2017. A random, representative sample of 1515 citizens was first polled on suggested amendments clustered into six topics. After this prelim-

inary questionnaire, 669 members of the sample were invited to gather at the Government Place in Ulaanbaatar on April 29 and 30, 2017, in order to discuss proposals under six topics. The sample included diverse membership in terms of gender, geography, employment, age, education, marriage and views on democracy (National Statistics Office of Mongolia, 2017). For example, it included 314 men and 355 women. These citizens obtained a written explanation covering the six topics (*Briefing Material*, 2017), and they received oral answers from experts to questions that they chose in small group discussions. After these deliberations, the participants were again asked the original questionnaire. All the oral answers given by the experts in plenary sessions were broadcast live on television.

Based on the result of the deliberative polling, the Deliberative Council submitted recommendations on constitutional amendments on May 3, 2017. The recommendations of the Council contained conclusions some of which were supported by the participants, a few were rejected, and some others needed further research. On May 5, 2017, the Chairperson of the Parliament established a working group in charge of drafting the constitutional amendments (the working group), which was composed of 26 members representing the majority and minority parliamentary parties. The working group and the Parliament could reject or modify the recommendations of the Council when drafting and adopting the constitutional amendments.

The 1992 Constitution was adopted through an inclusive, participatory and deliberative process over 15 months (Enkhbaatar et al., 2016), but the only amendments made to the Constitution in 2000 were adopted in closed doors without any meaningful public discussion. Other failed attempts to amend the Constitution were similarly neither open nor inclusive (Munkhsaikhan, 2016b). In view of this experience, it was important to have citizens' participation in the current constitutional amendment process.

Substantive and procedural conditions for a successful deliberative polling can be defined from Fishkin's theory, Mongolian Law on Deliberative Polling and the best practices of deliberative polling in other countries. Four substantive conditions are as follows: balanced selection of topics, provision of balanced information, provision of relevant information, and accurate questions in the questionnaire. Eight procedural conditions are as follows: authorship of the briefing material, check on accuracy and balance of information in the briefing material, enough time for participants to read the briefing material, enough time for qualified discussion and considered judgments, nomination and appointment of experts, authorship of questionnaire, transparency and independence and professionalism of the Deliberative Council (advisory committee). The subsequent two sections of this chapter review conformity of substantive and procedural conditions in the deliberative polling on the draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution.

Substantive conditions for deliberative polling

Preselection of topics by the politicians

The particular public authority usually sets the agenda in the mini-publics. Citizens “are being asked to deal with a problem that has been defined as such by a particular public authority or other organization that is commissioning the mini-public: if the charge is altered to something less relevant to the authority, it is difficult to see why it would finance and respond to the mini-public” (Smith, 2009, 89).

The case of the deliberative polling on the draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution supported the conclusion that the deliberative polling and other mini-publics are easily manipulated. The parliamentary majority, the MPP, not only appointed all the members of the Deliberative Council but also preselected all the topics. Some well researched topics such as strengthening the executive power, reducing the powers of the president, and improving judicial independence (Munkhsaikhan, 2016a; Mashbat 2015; Munkhsaikhan et al., 2015) were properly selected and well discussed during the deliberative polling. However, the ideas, such as five-powers or bicameralism, were unfamiliar topics in political and academic discussions in Mongolia, yet were inserted in the deliberative polling. Therefore, while the overall idea was unique and useful, the deliberative polling in April was conducted in a manner that allowed some political actors to influence the agenda and outcomes.

Moreover, “some important views might be forgotten, and there are risks that the most important issues may never even make it onto the agenda” (Sanders, 2010, 42). For example, issues such as how to make the Constitutional Court of Mongolia more independent and efficient (Munkhsaikhan, 2014), which have been much researched and are more urgent, were not inserted in the deliberative polling.

Selection of the topics also influenced the answers of the participants. For example, it is unclear why the topic of the parliament with chambers was selected instead of the increase of members of the parliament, and why both of them were not discussed together. The Mongolian unicameral parliament has only 76 members, one of the lowest among parliamentary democracies. Qualities of legislation, parliamentary check on the government, and representation of the whole population can be improved by the increase of the members of the parliament instead of the parliament with two chambers (Uurtsaikh, 2016).

Inbalanced information concerning some of the topics

Balance of process and information is crucial for the deliberative polling. Fishkin (2009, 116) wrote that “given the work that advisory groups typically do to prepare balanced briefing materials and panels of experts and politicians or policymakers, the transparency and balance of the process should serve to insulate against this difficulty.” According to article 5.1.2 of Law on the Deliberative Polling, the principle of “equally providing information of all sides” must be respected during all stages in the deliberative polling.

The result of the deliberative polling may be influenced by how the experts were selected and how the briefing material were written. According to Fishkin (2009, 116), “the plenary sessions in which the questions from the small groups are answered are balanced by competing experts and policymakers who each get to offer rival answers to the same questions.” Sanders (2010, 42) argued that “the second, balancing briefing material, is perhaps the most obviously open to distortion or manipulation and therefore, in my view, the least concerning.” For example, Everret Carll Ladd (1996, 44), who had been reviewing public opinion findings on a continuing and systematic basis for 20 years, criticized Fishkin’s theory, saying “briefing material that will be given to the participants on the three complex topics they will discuss—foreign affairs, the status and needs of American families, and the US economy—will inevitably be highly selective and thus in one sense biased.”

The participants received unbalanced information concerning some of the topics in April 2017. For example, almost all the expert explanations favored the constitutional entrenchment of the Public Service Council and related principles, even though problems connected to the public service were largely unrelated to the constitution. I carefully listened to all the answers given by the experts of this panel, and observed that all of these experts argued for constitutional entrenchment of the Public Service Council and related principles. When I asked some of the other participants about my observation on the Public Service Council, they also said that there was no expert who strongly argued against this entrenchment.

A briefing booklet distributed to the participants did not include balanced information on each of the topics. For instance, arguments for establishing a new constitutional organization called the State Control Organization was covered over five pages, yet each of the other issues were given only two pages. This topic was an unfamiliar theme in political and academic discussions in Mongolia, yet was inserted into the deliberative polling and occupied much space. In the five pages for Section 5.1 of the *Briefing Material* (2017, Mongolian version), the State Control Organization, whose classic model is the Control Yuan of Taiwan according to MP G. Zandanshatar, was called “the best model” that “fits for the Asian customary law.”¹

1 Briefing Materials (2017, unofficial translation) eliminated the word “the best model” that was in the Mongolian version of the Briefing Material. Page 46 of Briefing Materials (unofficial translation) said: “Independent constitutional organization: A model that is popular in East Asian constitutional law is the “monitoring and control power.” This is based on traditional laws that include respect for the state. It will control and monitor all state institutions on whether they are implementing laws. However, the first sentence of page 47 of the Mongolian version of the Briefing Materials (2017) said that “б) Үндсэн хуулийн хараат бүс байгууллага: Хамгийн шилдэг загвар нь зүүн Азийн Үндсэн хуулийн эрх зүйд түгээмэл дэлгэрч буй “Хяналт, шалгалтын эрх мэдэл” гэж үздэг.” This sentence should be translated as follows: “b) The Independent Constitutional Organization: The best model is “the Monitoring and Control Power” that is popular in East Asian constitutional law.”

This kind of statement was unfounded and was clearly biased in favor of establishing such an entity. The briefing material mentioned Taiwan as the only example, and I could not find any qualified policy research supporting the Taiwanese model as the best one for a democracy, or that other democracies should adopt it. Further, there was no such citation in Section 5.1 of the briefing material.

Responding to my criticism (Munkhsaikhan, 2017), Fishkin and Zandanshatar (2017) wrote that “each of the 18 proposals had a page with a tabular format where the proposal was clearly spelled out, and key arguments in favor and arguments against were listed side by side.” In actuality, this was not the case. Some of the topics in the briefing material contained unbalanced statements with the relevant information written in “a tabular format.” For example, “definition of the proposed amendment” in *Briefing Material* (2017, unofficial translation, 34) was that “Creating a civil service system to ensure professional, stable civil servants and promotions based on merit.” The following two arguments were written: first, “Strengthening the civil service with a skilled and qualified work force will increase productivity and quality of work, which will elevate civil service performance and results,” and second, “More stable civil service and real implementation of a merit system.” However, it provides only one opposing argument: “No direct benefit of adding this issue in the Constitution as other laws can regulate this” (actually, this was the only main opposing argument, but there were multiple supporting arguments in all the three topics of civil services). Moreover, the proposal was unclear whether it was about the constitutionalization of the public service or creating a new one by statute. It is also highly disputable to achieve the result of “creating a civil service system to ensure professional, stable civil servants and promotions based on merit” just by writing these principles in the Constitution. Mongolia already has a Law on Civil Service that includes principles of career system and meritocracy (though poorly implemented). Article 1.2 of the Constitution already includes fundamental principles such as “justice and equality,” which should be implemented in public service.

The lack of relevant information concerning some of the topics

Providing the correct information is necessary for deliberative polling. Fishkin (2009, 42) said that “Lack of information (or the provision of misinformation) the participants believe to be relevant can lead the deliberations astray.” According to article 5.1.2 of the Law on the Deliberative Polling, the citizens shall be enabled to engage with “real, direct participation” in the deliberative polling. Without provision of relevant information, citizens’ participation cannot be real and direct.

Citizens were also not provided with relevant information concerning some of the topics during the first deliberative polling on the draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution. For example, the Conclusion of Section 5.1 of the

Briefing Material (2017) also said that “Civil and public interest protection authorities are very efficient in countries that respect the rule of law. In countries where the rule of law is weak, researchers note that constitutionally mandated institutions can resolve these issues.” I found no such research, and there is no citation in the briefing material.

As mentioned before, page 47 of the Mongolian briefing material included the sentence: “The best model is “the Monitoring and Control Power” that is popular in East Asian constitutional law.” However, there is no such constitutional organization with such a broad mandate in any democratic country in East Asia (for instance, Japan and South Korea have no such organization in their Constitutions) except in the territory of Taiwan. Taiwan established this organization (and the Examination Organization) due to a unique set of historical circumstances. Yet even Taiwan made many constitutional amendments to weaken the Control Yuan between 1991–2000 (Jau-Yuan Hwang et al., 2003, 32). However, the briefing material (unofficial translation, 2017, 46) and oral presentation by MP Zandanshatar during the deliberative meeting defined the Taiwanese Control Yan as before the 1990s and did not talk about the substantial changes that have occurred in Taiwan since. This fact alone shows how poorly the briefing material were drafted. Sections on other topics, such as the parliament with two chambers, public service council and administrative and local governance systems, were also written weakly. Sections on proposals related to the government and the president were written relatively well.

Some sections of the *Briefing Material* (2017) were also written without any substantial supporting research. For instance, Section 5.1 of the *Briefing Material* (2017) was named “To increase state accountability and strengthen justice, establish an independent Constitutional organization that is free from politics.” Mongolia already has the Auditor General, the National Human Rights Commission² and the Anti-Corruption Agency. Yet none of these three institutions in Mongolia were mentioned, discussed or evaluated in Section 5.1. These three institutions were mentioned only in Section 5.2 which stated that they “... increase state accountability, ensure anti-corruption policy implementation and protect social justice, establish an independent and impartial organization that is free from politics,” and a parliamentary oversight committee and an investigation committee, were proposed, potentially confusing participants and causing them to misunderstand the different issues discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the *Briefing Material* (2017). Except for a few sentences in the Table in Section 5.1, there was no discussion as to why such constitutional organization should or shouldn’t be created, and whether this organization could “improve system of state responsibility, discipline, justice

2 The model of human rights commission was deliberately chosen instead of the model of ombudsman in 2000. The National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia has been functioning relatively well since 2001 (Enkhbaatar et al, 2016, 59–62).

and implementation of legislation.” I argue that this and other shortcomings in the briefing material influenced the participants to answer positively to the question of “Creating mechanism in the Constitution for state responsibility and accountability.”

Leading questions concerning some of the topics

Fishkin (2009) wrote almost nothing on the quality of questions to be asked in the deliberative polling. Article 10.1 of Mongolian Law on Deliberative Polling stated that “the questions asked in the deliberative polling shall be written to be accurate, brief, understandable.” However, two of the questions asked in the deliberative polling on the draft Amendments were drafted as leading statements, increasing their chances of endorsement by the sample group, despite the fact that the problems were not necessarily constitutional issues. Leading questions were often vague questions which the participants were likely to answer positively, or to give an answer that the designer wished to hear.

The first leading questions in the *Briefing Material* (2017, unofficial translation, 53) were: “Question 1: Do you think the current system of accountability of high-ranking government officials is sufficient enough? 2) What are your thoughts on creating a constitutional institution in charge of government accountability?” The exact content of this question is inserted into Question 216 of the Questionnaire (2017, unofficial translation, 3): “Creating mechanism in the Constitution for state responsibility and accountability.” Even though the question on this subject (Question 216 of the Questionnaire) was in the 0 to 10 format, it was still so vague that the participants were likely to answer positively to this question, especially when considering the widespread perception of corruption and public mistrust in the government-Mongolia was the 93rd out of 180 countries, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 (Transparency International, 2018). The working group in charge of drafting the constitutional amendments later used these positive answers in order to put forward the constitutional entrenchment of a State Control Organization, even though the recommendations of the Deliberative Council indicated only that “the participants were provided with information on means and mechanisms rather than establishing a constitutional organization [a State Control Organization].”

A further statement was written as follows in the *Briefing Material* (2017, unofficial translation, 44): “Definition of The Proposed Amendment: Expand the composition of Judicial General Council, which is responsible for ensuring independence of courts and impartiality of judges, and clarify the systems for appointing judges and the Chief Justice.” This issue was inserted into Question 219 of the Questionnaire (2017, unofficial translation, 3): “r) Creating more clear procedures and principles for appointment of judges and chief justice.” The participants again gave positive answers, which the working group used to suggest a system of appointing the Supreme Court judges by the Parliament, instead of the President.

There is much research on the appointment of judges in Mongolia (Munkhsaikhan et al, 2015). Unfortunately, Section 5.3 of the briefing material said almost nothing about how the judges are appointed according to the relevant clauses of the current Constitution, and how well these clauses have been implemented over the last 25 years. Section 5.3 discussed only the composition of the Judicial General Council and the statutory (not constitutional) powers of the President, yet it included the vague question on the judicial appointment without good explanation. Participants in the deliberative polling (except a few politicians in the working group to draft the amendments) did not have a chance to know how the system for appointing judges would exactly be clarified in the draft amendments, since there is no such proposal in the briefing material. Therefore, the participants, the ordinary citizens, gave positive answers to the general question, expressing their support to creating “more clear procedures and principles for appointment of judges and chief justice” in principle. Surprisingly, the working group later used these positive answers to suggest a system of appointing the Supreme Court judges by the Parliament instead of the President. This specific proposal was not discussed in the deliberative polling in April 2017. The appointment of the judges by the parliament would make the appointment more political and would not improve the independence of the court (Venice Commission, 2007).

The defects, such as biased information and leading questions, influenced the participants to support some strange propositions, such as changing the three-powers-structure (legislative, executive, and judicial branches as in most democratic countries) into a five-powers-structure (legislative, executive, judicial, control (audit and other general powers), and examination (public service) organizations as in Taiwan). This change would alter the basic structure of the 1992 constitution and weaken the system of checks and balances. The details of control and public service organizations would be determined not in the constitution, but by law. Therefore, the composition, powers and competence of these organizations may be so vague that they might intervene in the competencies of the legislative, executive and judicial branches. There is also no suggested mechanism to review the activities of these organizations by the regular courts and the Constitutional Court, and there is a danger of politically abusing all the powers concentrated in these organizations, in particular the State Control Organization.

Procedural conditions for deliberative polling

Unclear authorship of the briefing material

Fishkin (2009) wrote less on who should write the briefing material. Good practice is that experts in the field should write these materials. For example, the professors of political science and other experts prepared the Participant Guide: What’s Next California (Center for Deliberative Democracy, 2011), the

briefing material for A California Statewide Deliberative Poll for California's Future. Moreover, the professors and experts authored the briefing material for Deliberative Polling on Energy and Environmental Policy Options for Japan (Center for Deliberative Democracy, 2012a).

The Law on the Deliberative Polling said nothing about who should write the briefing material. The principles of "efficiency" and "equally providing information to all sides" implied that the experts should write the briefing material. The *Briefing Material* (2017) published for the deliberative polling on the draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution had no authors explicitly mentioned, which raised the risk of political influence and the lack of accountability. It is suspicious that sections on judicial appointment, state control organization and structure of the parliament in the *Briefing Material* (2017), all of which were written poorly, were written by experts in constitutional law or political science even though there are others sections well written.

Lack of check on accuracy and balance of information in the briefing material

Fishkin (2009) provided no mechanisms to check the accuracy and balance of information in the briefing material. However, there are two good practices of such check. During a deliberative polling on the Euro, "the information material was carefully prepared in order to balance all arguments on the issue," and "all campaigning political parties and movements were invited to comment on the information material before its publication" (Hansen and Anderson, 2004, 267).

Accuracy and balance of information in the briefing material should be reviewed and corrected by the Deliberative Council. For example, during the Macao Deliberative Polling on the Amendment of the Press Law and the Audio-Visual Broadcasting Act, the research team spent more than two months to compile the "Balanced Briefing Information" after studying the experiences of Macao and many nations and regions in the world. "To ensure accuracy, balance, and comprehensiveness of the information provided, this report was submitted to the Balanced Briefing Information Advisory Committee for examination and approval, and the research team made revisions in keeping with the comments and suggestions of the advisory committee" (Center for Deliberative Democracy, 2012b).

Mongolian Law on Deliberative Polling said nothing on check on the accuracy and balance of information in the briefing material. The Deliberative Council might provide such check under its general authority to "organize the deliberative polling" (Article 8.12.2 of the Law on Deliberative Polling). However, there is no report that accuracy and balance of information and arguments in the briefing material were reviewed and corrected by the Deliberative Council, any independent organization or the parties of the both sides on each topic.

Lack of time for participants to read the briefing material

Fishkin (2009) is silent on how much time the participants should be allowed to read the briefing material. Nevertheless, there is a good practice that the participants are provided with enough time to read and reflect the briefing material before attending the deliberative meeting. For example, during Deliberative Polling on the “Amendment of the Press Law and the Audio-Visual Broadcasting Act” in Macao, the “Ten days before the DP-Day, the complete document was mailed or otherwise delivered to all public and professional participants who had promised to attend” (Center for Deliberative Democracy, 2012b). However, there is no guarantee that the participants will read the briefing material. “A non-trivial proportion of the Deliberative Polling participants report that they do not read the briefing material completely” (O’Flynn and Sood, 2014, 49).

The participants were not given enough time to read the briefing materials before the start of the discussion on April 29, 2017. In the expert meeting on the April 28, Professor J. Amarsanaa found a mistake inconsistent with the foreign policy of the Government of Mongolia: Taiwan was called “the country of Taiwan” at page 45 of the *Briefing Materials* (2017 Mongolian version) though the Government openly supports one China policy. It was not a minor mistake during the event organized by the Parliament and the Government of Mongolia. The working group recognized the mistake and said all the briefing materials had not been distributed yet, so they would be distributed after correcting the mistake. The briefing materials probably were distributed late evening on Friday or morning on Saturday if the staff corrected the mistake in more than 800 copies.³ While observing some of group discussions, I also learned that many of group members did not read the materials, and it was hard for the participants to understand the poorly written sections of the briefing materials.

Lack of time for qualified discussion and considered judgments

Citizens need to have enough time to read and reflect before deliberation and judgment on any serious topic. If the citizens were given to deliberate on too many topics for a short period of time, they may be unable to make informed judgments. Deliberative polling is usually conducted for a weekend. Unfortunately, Fishkin (2009) did not write about how many topics could be deliberated during a weekend or how much time should be provided depending on the complexity or number of topics. The good practice is that one or few topics are discussed during the deliberative polling conducted in Denmark (Anderson and Hansen, 2007), Japan (Center for Deliberative Democracy, 2012a) and Macao (Center for Deliberative Democracy, 2012b).

3 On April 29, 2017, I asked some of the participants when they received the Briefing Materials. Some of them said they received it late evening on April 28, 2017, and some said they received it morning on April 29, 2017.

It was almost impossible for most of the participants to understand so many complex topics of constitutional law and political science during just one weekend. Six topics and fifteen proposals discussed in the deliberative polling on the draft Amendments were so broad that it would change the basic structure and the major institutions in the Constitution of Mongolia. The proposals to replace unicameral parliament with bicameral or the Soviet type of two chambers and to transform the distribution of powers from three branches to five branches would alter the basic structure of the Constitution. Moreover, major changes to almost all the key institutions such as the parliament, the government, the president, the court, the judicial council, and the local government (except the Constitutional Court) were discussed during the deliberative polling. I do not deny lay people's ability to understand the constitutional issues, but what I am arguing is that the participants, most of whom might never have thought about any of these abstract and fundamental problems for their entire lives up until that point, cannot come to understand them well in just two days. The poor writing and lack of research concerning some of the topics in the briefing materials made it considerably more difficult.

No public nomination of experts to the Parliament

Fishkin's theory (2009), makes it unclear who would nominate or appoint the experts or how experts would be appointed. Article 8.12.3 of Law on the Deliberative Polling said that the Deliberative Council would nominate experts to the authoritative organization, the Parliament in the first deliberative polling on the draft Amendments. However, the Deliberative Council did not nominate experts to the Parliament, and the Parliament did not make any decision on appointments of experts. It is unclear who chose the experts on the panel and what criteria were used in choosing them. Therefore, it is reasonable suspect that the experts were politically selected according to what answers were desired from some of the topics from the participants. For example, the fact that there was no expert who strongly argued against the constitutionalization of the Public Service Council during the deliberation, as has been previously mentioned before in this chapter.

Unclear authorship of questionnaire

Article 8.12.3 of Law on the Deliberative Polling said that the Deliberative Council would construct the questionnaire. However, some of the members of the Deliberative Council said that the Deliberative Council had no control over the questionnaire. It is reasonable to suggest that the Deliberative Council did not exercise its statutory power to review and approve whether the questionnaire is in line with requirements. For example, "the questions asked in the deliberative polling shall be written to be accurate, brief, understandable" (Article 10.1 of Law on the Deliberative Polling). Some questions mentioned above in this article led the participants to give certain answers, which the designers wanted to have.

Lack of transparency

For a successful deliberative polling, transparency is important. Ian O’Flynn and Gaurav Sood (2014, 53) recommended greater transparency in the deliberative polling because of the following reasons:

Lack of control over the crafting of the briefing materials naturally gives rise to concerns about their neutrality, comprehensiveness and correctness, not least because the process by which briefing materials are constructed tends to be woefully opaque. We need to know a lot more about where the information they contain comes from, what resources were expended in drawing them up, how the order in which information is presented was determined, which organisations (or ‘experts’) were consulted and how they were consulted (for example, did any organisation have a veto?), and so on. The lack of data (a consequence of opaque procedures) means that it is hard to make progress on these issues, other than by relying on reports from participants, which may not be very diagnostic.

Some of the deliberative polls were more or less transparent. For example, during a deliberative polling on the Euro, “the information material was then made public on a website and sent to all Danish public libraries” (Anderson and Hansen, 2007, 547). Therefore, transparency of the deliberative polling is a good practice to conduct this kind process.

According to article 5.1.5 of Law on the Deliberative Polling, the principle of “transparency and openness” must be respected during all stages in the deliberative polling. However, the deliberative polling was not fully transparent and open in April 2017; for example, who drafted, reviewed and approved the briefing materials, where the information in the briefing materials came from, when the briefing materials were distributed to the participants, who drafted, reviewed and approved the questionnaire, and who nominated and appointed the experts were unknown to public.

The briefing materials have not been publicized in any Mongolian source yet, even now. The Mongolian version of the briefing materials was not published online before or during the deliberative polling. After my article on the deliberative polling was published in June 2017 (Munkhsaikhan, 2017), the Mongolian version was posted for the first time on the website of the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University in August, 2017, four months after the deliberative polling, but it has not been posted on any of Mongolian websites.

Lack of independence and professionalism of the deliberative council

Fishkin (2009) emphasized the important role that the Deliberative Council plays in keeping information balanced and accurate, as well as the composition of experts balanced. However, he did not talk much about the independence or qualifications of the Deliberative Council.

The Deliberative Council that represents the public interest is in charge of organizing the deliberative polling, and it is composed of five to eleven members among Mongolian citizens, scholars, researchers, and representatives of private sector and non-governmental organizations, who are independent experts with knowledge and experience in the matter (Article 8.1–8.3 of Law on the Deliberative Polling). All of the Deliberative Council members except two professors (one of these two professors was appointed as Minister of Education by the ruling party just after the deliberative poll) are not professionals in constitutional law or political science, though Law on the Deliberative Polling implies that they must be professionals.

The authoritative organization, the Parliament in the current case, is required to publicly announce vacancies for membership of the Deliberative Council (Article 8.5 of Law on the Deliberative Polling). Within seven to fourteen days, universities may nominate scholars and researchers, professional associations and NGOs may nominate representatives of the private sector, and individuals may nominate themselves to the Deliberative council. However, there were no such public announcement for the vacant members of the Council. Law on the Deliberative Polling has no clause on proportional or balanced representation of membership of the Deliberative Council. All of the Council members therefore were proposed and appointed by the Parliament. There is no legal guarantee of independence of Deliberative Council.

The Deliberative Council exercised only two of its statutory six powers (Article 8.12 of Law on the Deliberative Polling). This body provided public information on deliberative polling, and submitted recommendation based on the result of the deliberative polling. However, the Deliberative Council was hardly given chances to exercise their other four powers. First, it is unclear whether the Deliberative Council drafted the questionnaire. The Parliament instead of this Council preselected six topics and fifteen proposals and the dates of the polling. Second, the Deliberative Council did not propose nominees to the Parliament, and the Parliament did not appoint the experts. Third, it is unclear whether the Deliberative Council checked the principles of respecting the laws, providing information from all sides transparency, openness, and independence were followed during the deliberative polling. Fourth, the council lacked the real opportunity to organize the deliberative polling.

Articles 11.9 and 11.10.1 of the Law on the Deliberative Polling said that the authoritative organization shall “organize the second stage of deliberative polling as a deliberative meeting and enact the rules for organizing the deliberative meeting,” and “the rules for organizing the deliberative meeting shall regulate preparation of the briefing materials that includes pros and cons on each of the questions in the deliberative polling.” All of these provisions were not respected during the First Deliberative Polling. For example, Resolution 24 of the Parliament did not include any clauses on “preparation of the briefing materials that includes pros and cons on each of question in the deliberative polling.”

Substantive issues in the draft amendments submitted on May 25, 2017

Based on the recommendation of the Deliberative Council, the working group submitted the draft constitutional amendments to the Chairperson of the Parliament on May 25, 2017. The content of these draft amendments was broad, covering not only legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government, but also administrative divisions. This section briefly introduces some of the most important aspects in addition to the constitutional entrenchment of the State Control Organization and the Public Service Council already discussed above.

With a view to addressing problems of government instability—Mongolia has had 15 prime ministers since 1992—the amendments require an absolute majority for the dismissal of the prime minister, instead of a simple majority as is currently the case. In addition, the decisions of the prime minister to appoint or dismiss cabinet members may not be blocked by either the President or the parliament. Moreover, the amendments require parliament to seek the opinion of the government before increasing or adding any item of expenditure in the budget, although consent of the government is still not necessary.

Following the criticism that allowing the members of the parliament (MPs) to hold cabinet posts concurrently (since 2000) weakens the separation of legislative and executive powers as it enhances the influence of MPs serving as cabinet ministers in the small, unicameral Parliament, the amendments submitted include a clause requiring that not more than one-third of cabinet ministers could be MPs.

In response to the decision of the Constitutional Court invalidating a mixed election system less than two months prior to the 2016 parliamentary elections, the Parliament adopted a majoritarian system, a plurality system where whoever receives the highest votes among the contestants in single-member electoral district wins. Under the submitted amendments, possibly to exclude the Court from invalidating future reforms, the electoral system is left open for determination by law.

Currently, the people directly elect the President of Mongolia, and his/her powers are much broader than the conventional powers of heads of state in parliamentary systems. The general perception among citizens is that of an all-powerful president, who can solve all the problems, such as unemployment or corruption. Presidential candidates therefore make wide-ranging but unattainable promises, and try to gain as much power as possible if elected and so members from the principal political parties expressed their support to reject the popular election of the president. However, the participants in the deliberative polling rejected the replacement of the direct popular election of the President for four years (renewable once) with an indirect election for a non-renewable six-year term by an electoral college of all MPs, and all the

members of provincial and capital city councils (21 provinces plus the capital city). They also rejected the replacement of the unicameral parliament with a bicameral parliament.

Nevertheless, in response to overly powerful previous presidents, the amendments suggest to remove three powers from the presidency: the power to provide guidelines for the government, to initiate legislative bills, and to appoint judges. However, the amendments would not preclude the extension of the powers of the president through laws (statutes). Due to this extension, the president currently nominates the head of the Anti-corruption Agency and the head of the Public Service Council, and appoints all members of the Judicial General Council in addition to the constitutional powers to appoint all judges, the Prosecutor General, and Deputy Prosecutor General.

The Judicial General Council currently selects and presents Supreme Court judicial candidates to the Parliament, who are then appointed by the President. The President also appoints judges of other courts upon the proposal of the Council. Presidents have sometimes refused to appoint judges proposed by the Council, activities which have been criticized as means to politically influence the judiciary (Munkhsaikhan et al, 2015). The submitted amendments require the President to formalize within 72 hours appointments to the Supreme Court upon the approval of the Parliament, following their presentation by the Council, and judges of other courts upon the proposal of the Council. The reforms transfer some of the power of appointment from the President to an already strong parliament, which could politicize the judicial appointment process, and harm judicial independence. Similarly, the draft amendments require the President to affirm the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as selected by the members of the Court. Moreover, the amendments fix the membership to the Council at 11, filling the gap in the current constitution where political actors could influence the Council by merely changing the number of members.

Complementing deliberative polling with broader public participation

The working group sought to submit draft constitutional amendments to a referendum on June 26, 2017, along with the presidential election, and the Government supported this attempt to save money. However, under the Law on National Referendums, if a referendum on constitutional amendments is held together with an election (either parliamentary or presidential), the Parliament had to declare the referendum 65 days prior to the election. This meant that the Parliament should have passed a decision by April 21, 2017, which it did not. Subsequently, on June 2, 2017, the parliament amended the law to reduce the 65 days to 21 days. Nevertheless, the Parliament finally decided not to hold the referendum on 26 June following criticism that the people could not be meaningfully informed about the amendments in 21 days.

Since the constitution does not require a referendum for constitutional amendments, except in cases where 2/3 of MPs vote for it, it is up to the Parliament to adopt the amendments, or to submit them to a national referendum. In the MPP manifesto, the deliberative polling and the public participation process constitute sufficient modalities of “asking the people,” without the need to organize a referendum.

While the Parliament was discussing the amendment to the Law on the National Referendum, the working group submitted the draft constitutional amendments to the Chairperson of the Parliament on May 25, 2017. On June 2, 2017, the Parliament adopted a resolution to organize public discussions on this draft and to ask the public to submit their views between June 5 and September 10, 2017. The resolution also ordered the working group to officially propose draft constitutional amendments by October 1, 2017 based on the results of the public discussion, but the Parliament can modify or reject the proposed amendments.

The working group organized the public discussion with assistance from the Secretariat of the Parliament. The draft constitutional amendments were published online on June 14, and public discussion started in early August 2017 and ended in late September 2017. In order to facilitate public discussion, provide an introduction to the draft amendments and give citizens opportunities to express their opinions, the working group opened a special forum on the official website of the Mongolian Parliament on June 14, 2017, a Facebook page on August 10, 2017, and an application for smart phones on August 24, 2017. Moreover, Commentary on Draft Amendments to the Constitution of Mongolia (Ulziisaikhan et al. 2017) was published for public discussion in August 2017.

Between July 31, 2017 and September 3, 2017, seven teams appointed by the Secretariat of the Mongolian Parliament conducted trainings for trainers in all the 21 provinces (*aimags*) and nine districts of the Capital City, introducing them draft Amendments to the Constitution with guidelines. These trainers conducted public discussions on the draft Amendments to the Constitution in counties (*soums*) and subcounties (*baghs*), which were organized by governors of each provinces, counties and subcounties and respective local councils (the *Khurals* of Citizen Representatives). The results of these public discussions were submitted to the working group. More than 320,000 proposals concerning the Draft Amendments were collected during the public discussion that ended in September, 2017 (Media and Public Relations Section of the Mongolian Parliament, 2017a, 2017b, 2018).

The working group charged with preparing the Draft Amendments to the Constitution organized a research conference under the title of “Theoretical and Practical Issues Concerning the Amendments to the Constitution” at the Parliament Palace of Mongolia on December 18, 2017. Other conferences and discussions on the Draft Amendments were organized by the Mongolian Bar Association on June 14, 2017, the Judicial General Council on September 14,

2017, Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 18, 2017, the Department of Political Science, National University of Mongolia on October 24, 2017, and the National Legal Institute on November 1, 2017. Moreover, the head of the working group formed several sub-working groups including one that was composed of constitutional experts (scholars) and was in charge of preparing the proposal to the Draft Amendments. The subworking group of constitutional experts submitted their first proposal in May 2018.

Based on the public discussions, the research conferences and constitutional experts' opinions, the working group prepared a revised version of the Draft Amendments dated June 22, 2018, which were supported with signatures of 67 of 76 members of the Parliament. The working group published the revised version of the Draft Amendments and sent it to the President of Mongolia, Prime Minister of Mongolia, the National Security Council, the National Human Rights Council, the Bank of Mongolia and the Judicial General Council for their comments. The subworking group of constitutional experts was also asked to submit their second proposal concerning the revised version of the Draft Amendments dated June 22, 2018, which it had not yet submitted.

The Draft Amendments dated June 22, 2018 excluded some of the most criticized clauses from the Draft Amendments dated May 25, 2017. For example, the Draft Amendments rejected the ideas of creating the State Control Organization as a constitutional organ and transferring the power of appointing the Justices of the Supreme Court from the President to the Parliament. Maybe, in order to seek support from Kh. Battulaga, who was elected as President of Mongolia in July, 2017, the Draft Amendments gave up the idea of removing three powers from the presidency: the power to provide guidelines for the government, to initiate legislative bills, and to appoint judges. Moreover, new clauses were also added to the Draft Amendments dated June 22, 2018. For example, principles, procedures and transparency of activities and finance of political parties and conditions to provide financial support to the political parties from the state budget would be regulated by law, and the political parties that violated the Constitution would be dissolved by the constitutional court.

The Draft Amendments includes more concrete clauses concerning judicial appointments and the Judicial General Council. The first sentence of Article 51.3 of the Constitution, "A Mongolian citizen who has reached thirty-five years of age with a higher education in law and a professional career of not less than ten years may be appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court," would be replaced by a clause "A Mongolian citizen who has reached forty-five years of age with a higher education in law and a professional career of not less than fifteen years may be appointed for twelve years as a judge of the Supreme Court." Moreover, the second sentence of Article 51.3 of the Constitution, "A Mongolian citizen who has reached twenty-five years of age with a higher education in law and a professional career of not less than three years may be appointed as a judge of the other courts," would be replaced by two sentences, "A Mongolian citizen who has reached thirty-five years of age with a higher ed-

ucation in law and a professional career of not less than five years may be appointed as a judge of the other courts. The judges of an appellate court shall have working experience as a judges at the court of first instance specialized in the same judicial proceedings for a minimum of six years.”

The submitted amendments require the President to formalize within 21 days appointments to the Supreme Court upon the approval of the Parliament, following their presentation by the Council, and judges of other courts upon the proposal of the Council. The President might reject the appointment of judges only if he or she announces publicly the reasons that they are not qualified with the constitutional requirements of judges.

Judicial General Council would be composed of eleven members appointed for non-renewable terms of four years. Three of the five members of the Council, who have a higher legal qualification in law and a professional legal career of not less than ten years, would be appointed by the Parliament and other two by the President of Mongolia. Three of other six members of the council would be appointed amongst any of judges by judges of courts of the first instance, two by judges of courts of appeals and one by the court of cassation. The head of the Council will be elected from amongst any of the five members appointed by the Parliament and the President by a majority of votes of all the members.

Conclusion

In 2016, the Mongolia People’s Party (the MPP) ran for the general election with a manifesto that promised to amend the Constitution “after asking the people,” and it won 65 of 76 seats in the Parliament, which allowed it to gather more than enough votes to amend the Constitution. The process to amend the Constitution by the MPP-dominated Parliament and its Government has been much more transparent and inclusive than previous attempts to amend the Constitution. For example, the public knew the 2000 constitutional amendments only after already being enacted. The previous Parliament, in which the Democratic Party, the current opposition party, had the highest number of seats, also created a working group to amend the Constitution in 2015, but this working group submitted the draft Amendments to the Parliament without allowing any public discussion or consultation.

According to the MPP, “asking the people” in its 2016 manifesto could involve deliberative polling, a public discussion, a national referendum, or some mixture of these. On February 9, 2017, the Parliament enacted a new Law on Deliberative Polling, and it also amended the 2010 Law on Constitutional Amendment Procedure so that deliberative polling is required to amend certain constitutional provisions. The first deliberative polling on the constitutional amendments was held in April 2017. Based on the result of the deliberative polling, the Deliberative Council submitted recommendations on

constitutional amendments on May 3, 2017. On May 5, 2017, the Chairperson of the Parliament established a working group in charge of drafting the constitutional amendments. The working group sought to submit draft constitutional amendments to a referendum on June 26, 2017, along with the presidential election, and the Government supported this attempt to save money. Nevertheless, the Parliament finally decided not to hold the referendum on June 26, following criticism that the people could not be meaningfully informed about the amendments in 21 days. While the Parliament was discussing the amendment to the Law on the National Referendum, the working group submitted the draft constitutional amendments to the Chairperson of the Parliament on May 25, 2017.

The current constitutional amendment process has involved innovative and unprecedented aspects that could potentially enhance the legitimacy of the reforms. Although the MPP has the necessary majority in the Parliament to easily amend the Constitution, it has opted to pursue consensus with the DP and other smaller parties and to reflect the opinions of the public. Nevertheless, the need to insulate the deliberative process from the influence of strong political actors requires broadening the agenda setting authority, ensuring neutrality in the deliberation process, and guaranteeing the independence of the organ in charge of the process. In the absence of such safeguards, the process could merely legitimize the dominance of the actors pushing for the reforms. Substantively, the scope of the draft amendment submitted on May 25, 2019 is much broader than the current political consensus on the solution for constitutional problems. While the amendments contain various provisions that could improve the workings of the government, there are certain areas that still need further debate and refining, especially to further ensure judicial independence, to strengthen the system of checks and balances, and to constrain the dominance of parliament.

On June 2, 2017, the Parliament adopted a resolution to organize public discussions on this draft and to ask the public to submit their views between June 5 and September 10, 2017. The resolution also ordered the working group to propose draft constitutional amendments based on the results of the public discussion. After the public discussion, the working group published the revised version of the draft Amendments dated June 22, 2018, which eliminated some of the most controversial proposals such as the constitutional entrenchment of the State Control Organization and the parliamentary appointment of the Justices of the Supreme Court.

The working group has been using the results of the deliberative polling to justify the draft amendments to the Constitution, saying that these results truly express the will of the public. Many people including the members of the Deliberative Council have been arguing that the working group cannot propose any amendment that was rejected during the deliberative polling. The deliberative polling on the draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution should not be taken too seriously not only because the material and procedur-

al conditions to conduct any successful deliberative polling were violated, but also because the deliberative polling is not immune from manipulation and other limitations inherent in the process. Some of the results of the deliberative polling are distorted, so the recommendations based on them should not be given much persuasive power as the politicians have been claiming during the discussion on the constitutional amendments proposals.

I do recognize Fishkin and most of others who participated in this project are well intended and did go to a great effort. Nevertheless, amending the Mongolian Constitution is more than an experimental object of a political theory. It is about the fate of a young, but fragile, democracy sandwiched between two huge non-democratic neighbors, Russia and China, and it is about the future of the protection of basic human rights of individuals in this country.

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Everyday Democracy in Mongolia: An Anthropological Approach to Democracy as Lived in the Ger Districts of Ulaanbaatar

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Life in Mongolia has changed rapidly over the last two-and-a-half decades. One key change has been the movement of people into the capital city, Ulaanbaatar, particularly to the areas known as “ger districts” that surround the built-up city center. Within the broader aim of presenting an anthropological perspective on the ger districts—a perspective that prioritizes the voices and lived experiences of residents in the “age of the market”—this chapter will deal with three issues of contemporary Mongolian democracy. The first is the health of democratic processes in the ger districts. Describing attempts by political parties to buy votes, the discussion covers how such activities take place and how residents respond. It then traces the connection between democracy and social cohesion (or lack thereof) in the ger districts. Finally, the discussion addresses how ger district residents understand their place as citizens of a democratic Mongolia. This chapter makes the case for a new understanding of ger districts and their residents that does not simplistically cast them as either victims or villains, arguing instead that much can be learned from listening to and paying attention to the everyday ways in which residents negotiate the challenges Mongolia faces. If one such challenge is a growing rural-urban socio-economic cleavage, then this chapter argues that ger district residents are uniquely positioned to shed light on what forms this cleavage is taking and why.

Introduction

Life in Mongolia has changed rapidly over the last two-and-a-half decades since the country transitioned to democracy and market capitalism. One of the key changes in recent years has been large-scale population movement towards the capital city, Ulaanbaatar (IOM, 2018).¹ Almost half the population

1 According to the Institute of Migration (IOM) Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar has seen a net migration inflow of 21,000 persons per year since 2000 (IOM, 2018, 1). The Affordable Housing Institute (AHI) reports that “nearly one-half of all Mongolian’s live on the 0.3% of Mongolia’s land that is Ulaanbaatar” (AHI, 2014, 5). According to the website of the National Statistics Office (NSO) of Mongolia, by 2017 1.46 million people (approximately 46 percent of the country’s population) were resident in Ulaanbaatar (<http://www.nso.mn/> accessed November 30, 2018). See also NSO Bulletin 2018.

of Mongolia now lives in this one city, a large proportion of whom reside in the areas known as “ger districts” (*ger horoolol*) that surround the city center and account for 83 percent of Ulaanbaatar’s built environment (World Bank, 2015, 1).² The ger districts are distinguished by their architectural form, which generally consists of a fenced enclosure of land (*hashaa*) that contains at least one ger (commonly known in English as a yurt) and/or detached house (*baishin*). Most ger district homes have electricity but are not connected to other city infrastructure such as running water, central heating or the city sewers. Instead, the roads are generally unpaved, residents pay for and collect water from local kiosk wells, burn wood and coal for cooking and heating on household stoves, and use outdoor latrine pits.

Scholars have written about these areas from a number of perspectives, including the impact of ger district infrastructure (or lack thereof) on residents’ health, education and opportunities (Altantuya et al., 2012; Basandorj and Altanzagas, 2007; Batkhuyag et al., 2016; Hasenkopf, 2012; Janes et al., 2006; UNICEF, 2016). Much has also been written on Mongolia’s urbanization, primarily through the push—and pull—factor paradigms of migration literature (Batbaatar et al., 2006; IOM, 2018). In contrast to the existing literature, which tends to methodologically rely on surveys and formal interviews, this chapter seeks to present a different perspective on life in the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar.

My primary methodology as a social anthropologist is participant observation. This is a long-term form of research whose “method is a way to collect data in a naturalistic setting by ethnographers who observe and/or take part in the common and uncommon activities of the people being studied” (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002, 2). Based on over 20 months of intensive fieldwork carried out in an Ulaanbaatar ger district, and months spent living with families in the ger district—eating, working and sleeping alongside those who are actually experiencing, and indeed producing, the urbanization of Mongolia—I will present an ethnographic account of daily life inside an area that is generally viewed from the outside.³ This chapter will thus deal with the lived experience of democracy in an area of Mongolia that is considered both urban and peripheral.

First and foremost, this chapter argues that the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar provide a rich site for exploring contemporary democracy in Mongolia because they are, I suggest, a fundamental manifestation of Mongolian

2 In 2015, the World Bank reported that 60 percent of Ulaanbaatar residents live in the ger areas (IEG, 2015, 67). Between 2000 and 2010, ger areas grew by 73 km², or about 39 percent (World Bank, 2015, 5) and the number of households living in ger areas increased 149 percent, “accounting for 68 percent of all new households formed in UB over this period” (World Bank, 2015, 2; see also AHI, 2014).

3 In keeping with standard practice in Anthropology, to protect their privacy and anonymity, I use only pseudonyms to refer to my interlocutors and do not refer by name to the ger district where I conducted my field research.

democracy in the sense that they have emerged as such only in the democratic age. Let me clarify. The “*hashaa and ger/baishin*” architectural form that characterizes the ger district has a long history, and is still seen throughout the countryside in every *aimag* (province) and *sum* (district) center. It was also the original form in Urga, the Mongolian capital that preceded Ulaanbaatar (Campi, 2006; Rupen, 1957). Until socialism, therefore, the city was the ger district; in other words, ger districts existed in form but not in name. During socialism, as the modern city of Ulaanbaatar was planned and constructed, apartment blocks and other such architectural forms began to replace the previous built environment, and urban gers became increasingly peripheralized (Duurenbayar, 2016, 35). The ger-dominated areas that remained were considered temporary and bound for eventual transformation into formal urban structures consistent with modernist urban ideology (Sneath, 2006). Furthermore, state restrictions on internal migration and land ownership severely regulated urban growth. Thus, it has only been with the beginning of democracy that migratory and regulatory conditions have aligned to bring the ger districts into existence as distinctive, recognized and non-temporary urban areas. Key to this transformation have been two cornerstones of the post-revolutionary constitution, which enshrined the rights of citizens to free movement and to private land use. The latter legislation, which entitled all Mongolians to a plot of land up to 700m², has reinforced the current pattern of ger district growth.

Having established the ger districts as a distinctly valuable site within which to carry out research on contemporary experiences of democracy in Mongolia, this chapter will deal with three aspects of how democracy is viewed and experienced by ger district residents. Beginning on the small scale, the first issue covered is the health of democratic processes in the ger district. Drawing on first-hand observation of attempts by political parties to buy votes, I will cover how such activities are taking place and the responses of ger district residents. In doing so I will argue that while democratic values are clearly threatened by illegal handouts, ger district residents themselves demonstrate their commitment to democratic ideals by resisting politicians’ attempts to undermine their right to a free vote. Moving to the medium scale, I will then trace the connection between democracy and social cohesion (or lack thereof) in the ger district. I will explore how the freedom of movement characteristic of the democratic age, and the laws on private land ownership introduced following the democratic revolution, have indeed produced a large city in which people from all over Mongolia live side by side, yet one in which personal and regional networks still shape social relations. I will explore the consequences of this social reality for Mongolian democracy now and in the future. In doing so, I am led to the third, large-scale issue this chapter will address, namely ger district residents’ understanding of their own place as citizens of a democratic Mongolia. On this topic the literature is generally split into two perspectives: the first treats ger district residents as passive victims, driven to the city by natural disasters or political and economic decline; the

second frames the ger districts as a key problem holding back Mongolia's development due to residents' pollution of the air by burning coal, pollution of groundwater reserves and resistance to moving into apartment buildings, as well as their low levels of education or high levels of unemployment. This chapter makes the case for a new understanding of ger districts and their residents as neither victims nor villains in the simple sense. It argues instead that much can be learned from actually listening to ger district residents and paying attention to the everyday ways in which they negotiate the challenges Mongolia faces. What emerges is a picture of practical democracy in a space of political disappointment and social dislocation.

Democratic process in the ger district

Since I began researching in Mongolia in 2012, I have been present in the country for two parliamentary and two presidential elections. As is well known, the last legislative election before 2012—namely that of 2008—became notorious for its violent aftermath, during which five civilians were killed and hundreds injured. Fortunately, the 2012 election passed without violence, as have the subsequent three elections that I witnessed from the capital. In terms of voter participation, city residents are usually highly engaged in the lead-up to elections; they keep abreast of the candidates and their campaigns via television and turn up at the polling station eager to assert their democratic right to vote. The statistics on voter turnout support this impression, as despite the country's vast geography and dispersed population, the last four elections have seen participation at nearly 70 percent of those eligible (IFES, 2019). On the surface, all is well. Power has been transferred peacefully according to the votes of an engaged citizenry. Not far underneath the surface, however, the story is somewhat different.

I will now share an account of the presidential election of 2017 in order to speak to the experience of democratic process in the Ulaanbaatar ger districts.⁴ Rather than an overview that seeks to account for how the country or city “as a whole” engaged in this election, I present a close ethnography that weaves a number of ger district residents' experiences into a single narrative. I do so in order to present a coherent account of how the election unfolded in the ger district that does not compromise the anonymity of my interlocutors.⁵

4 The 2017 presidential election was contested by candidates from the three major political parties in Mongolia: the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) [candidate: M. Enkhbold], the Democratic Party (DP) [candidate: Kh. Battulga] and the Mongolian Revolutionary People's Party (MPRP) [candidate: S. Ganbaatar]. For an insightful overview of the 2016–2017 parliamentary and presidential election cycles in Mongolia see Radchenko and Jargalsaikhan (2017).

5 It should be noted that this chapter does not seek to present an “objective” or “balanced” political analysis of the election, nor does it contain my personal political views. The aim is to relay the opinions expressed by my interlocutors.

The road to the election had been both long and disappointing, and many in the ger districts felt that this had been the “dirtiest” election the country had seen in its 26 years of democracy. From the start there was mudslinging, or as it is known in Mongolian, “black PR” (*har pr*). Each of the three presidential candidates had been implicated in one scandal or another. Indeed, when the candidates were announced, many said there was no one to choose from, that each was as bad as the next and this would be an “unelectable election” (*songoltgui songuul*).

For those on the margins who have seen 26 years of democracy lead to increasing inequality and economic turmoil—the fat cats at the top hoarding the country’s natural bounty—sweet words and promises from wealthy politicians mean little. “They’re all the same,” people repeated, “they’ll say anything and then, when they’re elected, they’ll do nothing but eat money.”

While there were rumors of cash handouts in the run-up to the parliamentary elections last year, politicians had also used fairly “clean” methods to attract votes, such as building a new road or distributing shares of the Tavan Tolgoi mine.⁶ This year, however, cash was flowing in every direction. Phone calls were made back and forth, and what felt like hundreds of cars descended on the neighborhood. Suddenly the call would go around, “The car is here!” There would be a rush to check for one’s ID card, and four or five people at a time would leave the ger to meet the car. After the doors closed, each person would be handed a 20,000 MNT note (\$8.50) and told to vote for a candidate. The passengers would then be dropped off a short distance from the local school that was serving as a polling station to avoid police detection. The party workers, temporary employees who stood to earn a 300,000 MNT (\$127.50) salary for 20 days of work, would also receive payment according to the number of “white papers” (voting receipts) they collected from voters. In some areas, parties were offering 100,000 MNT (\$42.50) for 30 papers, in other areas it was 100,000 MNT for five. An instant economy of white papers thus sprang up: people bartered over them, sold them to one another and told each other to deliver them to so-and-so. As matters unfolded on the ground, people were also glued to Facebook checking for news. A car carrying 120 million MNT (\$51,000) to be distributed to voters in western Mongolian provinces caused a stir. It was clear that the parties would do whatever it took to win.

Ger district families were quick to take advantage of the parties’ activities. For example, some relatives who live in the countryside but were visiting the city had wrongly heard that they could vote anywhere. Believing they could vote in Ulaanbaatar, they did not return to the countryside in time for the election. That, however, did not stop them from getting in the car and pledging to vote in exchange for 20,000 MNT. A couple of residents under the voting age of 18 also managed to collect the money.

6 For a discussion of electoral gifting in the 2016 parliamentary election in Mongolia see Bonilla and Shagdar (2018).

Polls closed and the election circus around the bus stop began to clear. People returned home to hear the 10 o'clock announcement of the early results. There was great shock and happiness when it became clear that the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) candidate Enkhbold had done poorly. While the Democratic Party (DP) candidate Battulga was leading the race, the strong showing of many people's preferred candidate, Ganbaatar from the Mongolian Revolutionary People's Party (MPRP), looked like it would force a run-off election, as no candidate would reach the minimum 50 percent vote threshold. That prospect was incredibly exciting, as people felt sure that Ganbaatar would win a two-horse, second-round race. The results continued to come in as the night progressed, and people remained glued to the television until around 2am. By that point, the picture seemed clear and members of the large family began to fall asleep in the ger one by one.

The shock upon awakening to hear that during the night Enkhbold had somehow overtaken Ganbaatar cannot be overstated. In the ger district, it was considered a fraud. People felt for Ganbaatar; they argued he had run a clean race, as he had been unable to raise funds to distribute the kinds of cash that the other two candidates were throwing around. Despite or because of this, he had lost. Some days of confusion and dismay followed. There was debate over how exactly the second round would be organized, but eventually it became clear Ganbaatar had been cut from the race; the second round would be contested with no clean candidate.

In the days between the first- and second-round elections, the only positive people could find in the situation was the possibility that the second-round election might encourage even bigger cash handouts. Ger district residents had heard from countryside relatives that up to 50,000 MNT (\$21.25) per vote had been distributed last time, and were excited at the prospect another cash bonus. Rumors continued to swirl about the dark methods by which big candidates sought to secure their own victory. Apparently, the party workers of one of the candidates would collect people's registration numbers and then "hack" the electronic voting machines to ensure that those votes would go to him. Indeed, two days before the election a relative of the family arrived at the home asking them to write down their registration numbers and promising to give them 20,000 MNT.

The morning of the election came and went without event. The previous day the ruling party had released a notice that the 'children's money' (20,000 MNT/month per child) social benefit, which had been stopped for all but the poorest families since February, would suddenly be restored, the full amount to be automatically deposited into people's accounts. Queues at the bank reached into the hundreds of people. For the ger district family this development was a disappointment. As a poor family, they had been collecting the children's money every month as a vital part of their monthly income, so there was no windfall for them. This development was taken as further evidence that the ruling party did not care about the poorest citizens.

It wasn't until the evening that people heard there would be cash payouts after all. This time no car came, and the eligible voters walked to the polling station. A phone call told them to wait behind a small shop that sells second-hand clothes. Another call instructed them to go behind the school. A third call then instructed them to vote first and collect the money afterwards. The family duly deposited their ballots and then began to congregate with neighbors and relatives outside the polling station. Rumors abounded, yet no money appeared. Tired of waiting at the bus stop, people eventually headed home. That night the money came: another 20,000 MNT each.

Despite his various efforts, Enkhbold did not win the election. Battulga defeated him. Ger district residents seemed to lose interest in politics the day after the election. Some people even said, "Maybe it would have been better if Enkhbold had won: what can a DP president do in the face of a majority MPP parliament?" People were proud of their blank ballots: around 100,000 had been cast across the country, but not enough to force another election. For the most part, however, things returned to normal: politicians do not care about the ger district, and their chronic absence speaks louder than the occasional sweet words residents hear around elections. Ger district residents resumed their lives, briefly a little bit richer but without any hope that positive change was on the horizon.

Democracy and social cohesion

In this section I explore the relationship between democracy and social cohesion in the distinctively democratic space of the ger district. I argue that it should not be surprising that the ger districts are lacking in social cohesion, for democracy as a political system is far less concerned with creating an idea of "the people" (*ard tümen*) as a state-directed project than the political systems of Mongolia's recent past, especially state socialism (Sneath, 2003).

Indeed, Mongolian democracy today still cannot be considered without reference to the socialist era, as so many of the constituency grew up within an entirely different political system and themselves experience democracy as a comparative phenomenon. Questions about life in the democratic "age of the market" (*zah zeeliin üye*) are invariably answered with reference to how things used to be before the democratic revolution. There is little doubt that those who grew up towards the end of the socialist era (i.e. people ~35 and up) have embraced the types of personal freedoms that were out of reach under socialism, particularly the right to free movement and the right to own land. But, in the inevitably nostalgic eyes of those such as ger district residents who have not fared particularly well over the last quarter century, the benefits of such freedoms have come at the cost of a kind of social unmooring (cf. Buyandelgeriyn, 2007; Højer and Pedersen, 2019; Pedersen, 2017; Pedersen and Højer, 2008; Sneath, 2003). They speak of the post-socialist era as being a race that

they were not only unprepared to run, but that they didn't even realize was in progress until after they had been lapped. Indeed, social cohesion in the sense of society existing "as a whole," in which every person's role and actions exist in relation to every other's, is felt to be long gone (if it ever existed). Those who were ready for the seismic shift from socialism to democracy—in other words, who anticipated this shift from cohesion to competitive social atomization—are understood to have weathered the post-socialist storm better than the rest, who as they themselves see it, were caught offguard.

The imagined social "whole" that fractured and fragmented following the end of socialism left in its place a network structure of social ties that generally bind people through two related conceptions of connection; namely, kinship and common origin or "homeland" (*nutag*).⁷ While these networks function to a greater or lesser extent while people remain in the countryside, migration to the city produces urban - rural cleavages, and the intervening distance disrupts networks. Origin-based conceptions of identity such as those based on common *nutag* produce social fragmentation when people from different homelands move to the city because, rather than building a sense of identity based on current location, it remains tied to one's "origin point." People in the ger district continue to rely on kin and *nutag*. This cannot be well understood through the idea of "traditions" failing to keep pace with "modern lifestyles," but is instead fueled by two difficult realities. One is that people in the ger district say that, unlike their *nutag*, their ger district location offers nothing "to be proud of," and thus nothing from which to cultivate an identity.⁸ The second is that the elites (both government and private businesses) consistently fail to produce narratives of the country that include the urban poor, a class of people that has emerged as the direct result of neoliberal democratic policies.

Ger district democracy

Thus far this chapter has examined democracy in Mongolia on two scales, the small and the medium. Now I build on these to look at how ger district residents understand their place as citizens in democratic Mongolia, and how this intersects with other narratives about them that are generated from the outside, as it were. I will begin with two of the dominant external narratives about the ger districts: the first sees them as victims; the second paints them as villains.

Ger district residents as "victims" of ecological and social changes

Academic and development studies texts tend to treat ger district residents as victims. They are understood to have been driven out of the countryside by

7 For more on the complex Mongolian concept of *nutag* and its importance to ideas of collective identity and political activity, see Sneath (2010) and Shagdar (2015).

8 Although see certain counter-examples, such as the rapper Gee; see also Dovchin, (2017).

a series of harsh winters over the last decades that devastated the nation's herds. The standard narrative runs as follows: "Global market shifts generated volatility within the state economy. This combined with recurring *zud* disasters to produce large-scale poverty and the loss of millions of livestock. This poverty was often most acute in rural areas and resulted in massive rural-to-urban migration" (Diener and Hagan, 2013, 637). From there on, life in the ger district is portrayed as one of hardship. Ger districts are characterized as "an ever-expanding infrastructureless sprawl" (Bolchover, 2016, 22). Numerous papers speak to the material difficulties of life there. Issues of pollution are highlighted, including that of soil, water and especially air (Altantuya et al., 2012; Baris et al., 2006; Batkhuyag et al., 2016; Hasenkopf, 2012; Ishihara et al., 2016; Uddin, 2016; UNICEF, 2016). The dangers of burning wood and coal—the staples for heating and sometimes cooking in the ger districts—are increasingly well known. As Anderson et al. (2017, 218) report, "An estimated 29 percent of cardiopulmonary deaths and 40 percent of lung cancer deaths in Ulaanbaatar can be attributed to outdoor air pollution." A 2013 study showed that 1 out of every 10 deaths in Ulaanbaatar is connected to air pollution (Allen et al., 2013).⁹ Equally devastating have been recent reports that connect seasonal air pollution to significant increases in pregnancy loss. The study found that in the month of December the number of spontaneous abortions can reach 73 per 1,000 live births, a dramatic increase from 23 per 1,000 in May (Allen et al., 2013; see also Aghajanian, 2015).

Ger district homes are not connected to running water, and as such, research highlights the extent to which residents struggle to access clean, safe and affordable water. Studies have documented the time people spend queuing for water from kiosk wells, the toll this can take on health—especially in the winter—and the negative impact this has on children's schooling (Basandorj and Altanzagas, 2007; see also Hawkins and Seager, 2011). Furthermore, ger district residents use a tiny fraction of the water of their apartment-dwelling counterparts (8–10 liters per day, as opposed to 240–450 liters per day), and pay 84 times as much as industries and mining companies for it. Bureaucratic hurdles such as a lack of human resources in the Municipal Governor's Office, particularly the environmental policy planning and air quality protection departments, are also acknowledged in the literature (Altantuya et al., 2012). These affect ger district residents disproportionately in terms of access to health and education (Batbaatar et al., 2006; Dovchin, 2017; Enkhtuya et al., 2009; Janes and Chuluundorj, 2004; Janes et al., 2006; Lhamsuren et al., 2012).

9 The entire city is affected by air pollution; however, those dwelling in the ger districts experience the impact disproportionately since ger and baishin housing bring in more outdoor particulate matter through drafts (Ochir and Smith, 2014; UNICEF, 2016).

Ger district residents as “villains”

Views of ger district residents being victims are often interwoven with passing comments that also paint them as villains, intentional or not. For many, the growth of Ulaanbaatar itself is considered undesirable, a perspective that carries with it the implicit assumption that ger district residents and recent migrants do not bring good things to the city, and instead will be a drain on established (elite) urban society. The casual use of derogatory language in reference to ger district dwellers is commonplace, with the use of the slur *ork* being particularly common around 2016. Even academic papers can slip into such narratives. Diener and Hagan (2013, 639), for example, suggest “The ger suburbs offer a jarring backdrop to the gleaming buildings and other icons of global connectivity sprouting up around Sukhbaatar Square and other downtown districts.” Ecological conditions are also seen to have pushed migrants to the city, but the migrants themselves are held somewhat responsible for these conditions by virtue of having overgrazed their pastures or overloaded their personal herds with goats, putting the priority of lucrative cashmere fiber over the sustainability of the Mongolian steppe (cf. Lkhagvadorj et al., 2013; Sneath, 2003; Upton et al., 2013 on overgrazing).

Within the city, issues of pollution and environmental degradation are tied to ger district residents’ “low awareness” of how to properly dispose of waste (Altantuya et al., 2012; Sugimoto et al., 2007). Despite their comparatively tiny water usage, ger district residents’ “improper” disposal of wastewater is linked to soil contamination. Furthermore, ger district dwellers’ bodies are themselves connected to pollution and public ill health: “Diarrheal diseases, including dysentery, typhoid and Hepatitis A, are one of the major causes of morbidity and mortality under five years” (Basandorj and Altanzagas, 2007, 168). Ger district residents are also criticized for not “taking advantage” of government programs to provide subsidized nighttime electricity while at the same time being described as failing to pay their electric bills—in 2003, Bassaikhan et al. (2003) reported that 4.5 billion MNT (84.6 percent of the total debt) needed to be collected by the electric distribution network shareholding company from the ger districts, and that payment rates were getting worse year by year (see also Nansalmaa, 2011). Bayartsetseg Terbish and Margot Rawsthorne characterize the situation of ger district residents as one of “emergent social exclusion,” a situation they conclude is the result of ger district dwellers’ “inability and lack of opportunity to participate effectively in social life” (Terbish and Rawsthorne, 2016, 11). While these authors recognize the complex factors that produce exclusion, other scholars place blame on residents for failing to be more socially or politically active (Duurenbayar, 2017, 52). Others take this idea further and make statements such as, “this population has no prior experience of living among others—some state there is no word for ‘community’ in Mongolian” (Bolchover, 2016, 22).

Presenting ger district perspectives

Compared to the urban development under socialism, which was regulated and state-directed, democratic Ulaanbaatar has been notoriously under-managed. The various administrations have adopted contradictory attitudes towards the city (Anderson et al., 2017). A paper by Byambadorj et al. (2011) provides a history of land reform and master planning in Mongolia, emphasizing the radical incompatibilities between the two. On one hand land reform works towards formalizing ger districts, while on the other hand master planning seeks to cast them as temporary and illegitimate. The privatization of land has also been used as a political bargaining chip—offered by political candidates in exchange for local votes (Byambadorj et al., 2011, 173). When it comes to accessing healthcare, the bureaucratic apparatus is there, but it often functions to restrict access rather than facilitate it. Formal and informal (bribes, etc.) barriers to attaining things such as local registration documents are tacitly or explicitly underpinned by the government's desire to reduce in-migration to Ulaanbaatar (Lindskog, 2014).

These contradictory administrative currents trap ger district residents between the two poles of villain and victim. The post-socialist withdrawal of state investment in the countryside contributed to the reduced viability of the herding lifestyle and compounded the hardships of already challenging environmental conditions (Lindskog, 2014). For many who now live in the Ulaanbaatar ger districts, the democratic age has not been an easy time. Personal hardships have been compounded by waves of scandal and political inaction. For a number of years scholars have questioned whether disillusionment with democracy is ushering in a post-democratic age. Indeed, there are many in Mongolia who speak of their hope that a strong leader in the style of Chinggis Khan will emerge, either to return the country to its imperial glory or to cleanse the nation of dirty politics. However, the desire for strong, effective leaders does not necessarily signal the end of a commitment to the democratic process. I return to the election of 2017 to illustrate this point.

Every person I know living in the ger district who took the money being handed out by the two major parties voted instead for Ganbaatar. Indeed, people took great satisfaction in having out-hustled the “hustlers” (*luiwerchid*) who had tried to buy their votes. Although the money was a bonus and everyone chased it, there remained some ambivalence and debate over whether it was truly clean. “They’ll say they bought us poor people’s votes cheaply,” one woman exclaimed passionately, the 20,000 MNT note hidden in her clenched fist, “but they’re wrong! They didn’t buy anything. We didn’t even vote for their candidate. And anyway, why shouldn’t we take the money? They sit up there eating everything without a care for us out here. There’s nothing wrong with taking a little back from what’s been stolen from us!” While there was disappointment with the electoral proceedings, no one seemed completely cynical

about the election itself. People voted for Ganbaatar with their hearts and truly hoped he would win, even as they worried that with the amount of money being splashed around by the big parties, their outsider candidate would have no chance.

Even when it became clear that there would be an unprecedented second-round election, people sought to use the democratic tools at their disposal to express their dissatisfaction with the nefarious events of the first-round election night. Even as they hoped that they might take some small financial benefit from there being a second round, this hope was only half the story. Politically speaking, people remained committed to the eliminated candidate Ganbaatar, or at the very least committed against the two remaining candidates. A plan began to form to submit blank ballots as a protest against Ganbaatar's "stolen election," and perhaps even to force a third election with three new candidates. As described regarding the first-round cash handouts above, ger district residents remained ambivalent and ultimately disappointed in the way politics seemed to bring out the worst in both leaders and citizens. During the long and complicated wait for the cash handout near the bus station, a middle-aged man told me, "It's sad isn't it to see how we Mongolians will run after only 20,000 MNT. But what can we do? We need the money and if they're going to give it out why shouldn't we have some?"

Conclusion

Mongolia's democratic age has, admittedly among many other factors, been characterized by: 1, intensive rural-urban migration, and 2, the growth of Ulaanbaatar ger districts. This chapter has argued that scholarship on these topics is therefore fundamental to understanding democracy in Mongolia, for now and for the future. In this chapter, I have presented the case for the importance of complementing top-down studies of these topics with in-depth ethnographic analyses of the daily lives of Mongolians producing and being caught up in these changes. As I have demonstrated, the intimacy and detail of an anthropological account based on participant observation does not limit itself to small-scale topics or hinder analysis. Instead, the texture of the everyday both illuminates and is fundamental to understanding even the largest scale questions, most importantly that of the particularity of Mongolian democracy.

This chapter has sought to argue that the principles of the democratic process remain important to people, including those living in the ger districts of Ulaanbaatar. Ger district dwellers are under no illusions that bribes and handouts undermine democracy, and they are embarrassed at the tactics candidates employ to seek a win. On the other hand, the political infrastructure does appear to remain largely functional, such that even the underhanded tactics of political parties can be countered by citizens exercising their right to a free and secret ballot. The evidence of high voter turnout, and even the

campaign to submit blank ballots in the second round, reveal that even the most disadvantaged citizens are engaged in the democratic process and understand their rights.

Popular media and other citizens often bemoan their counterparts living in ger districts; even as the large population in these outskirts are recognized as a powerful voting block who might be ignored at one's political peril, others take for granted that poverty creates the conditions for their votes to be bought, and cheaply. Viewed thus as victims and villains, ger district dwellers' political preferences are also the subject of mockery. The parliamentary election by a ger district constituency of the singer Jawkhlan—who rode to his rallies on a white horse, flanked by banner men and wearing an old-fashioned Mongolian robe (deel)—has been the source of many jokes and memes. Likewise, few Mongolians living in the city center could speak of Ganbaatar without derision. And yet, who can blame those who have seen the worst of the age of the market—and who experience daily the precarity of being important to leaders only when they are courting votes—for being attracted to candidates who promise a return to the “old days,” whether the nostalgic rose-tinted memories of socialist societal organization or the mythic past of the Mongol empire.

I have demonstrated here that ger district residents cannot be simplistically characterized as either villains or victims. Despite the low tactics their leaders display, ger district dwellers have not lost all hope in the future of a democratic Mongolia. People continue to use the democratic processes to express their dissatisfaction with their politicians and have not been overwhelmed by cynicism. Voting with one hand and taking 20,000 MNT with the other are here not actions that necessarily cancel each other out. Instead, to do so is to hedge one's bets, simultaneously manifesting hope that things could be improved without naively disregarding the likelihood that this may be as good as it gets.

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PART 2

Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Struggles and the Role of Natural Resources

Natural Resources Management in Southeast Asia: Challenges of Corruption, Compliance and Effectiveness

Andrea Haefner

This chapter draws on original research in Southeast Asia with a special focus on environmental governance and the role of ASEAN in dealing with transboundary challenges focusing on haze pollution and water management. Using Laos and Indonesia as case studies, key findings include that economic interests dominate among the riparian states in the Lower Mekong, and that Laos and other countries tend to confine their cooperation to infrastructural development rather than consultation or management of potential adverse transboundary impacts. Likewise, the regional nature of the haze has resulted in a concentration of haze mitigation activities at the ASEAN level; however, these initiatives continually fail to effectively mitigate haze. Key challenges include the general lack of concrete instruments that are able to translate the regional commitments on an ASEAN level into national policy and its implementation, which is often hindered by patron-client relationships, corruption, imbalance within the government agencies and a lack of consideration for the costs of a healthy environment. Environmental goals and the sustainable management of natural resources will only be realized if assertive action is taken to address the institutional and political problems of these countries. Unless effective measures are undertaken to address these concerns, preventing future resource depletion and environmental degradation seems unlikely, further encouraging corruption and patron-client relationships.

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises ten countries,¹ including Indonesia and Lao PDR, situated in the south-eastern part of Asia. ASEAN focuses on the promotion of intergovernmental cooperation and the facilitation of economic, political, security, military, educational, and sociocultural integration among its members and other Asian states. Regional environmental issues and environmental degradation in Southeast Asia are occurring mainly due to the industrialization of Asia into the world economy. The main drivers are a changing political economy, urbanization, growth in population, and change in lifestyles (Nazeer and Furuoka, 2017, 74). Key en-

1 Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos.

environmental challenges include deforestation, logging, air pollution, climate change, landslides, over fishing, the threat of pandemics, illegal wildlife trade, illegal hunting and the discarding of risky wastes (Nazeer and Furuoka, 2017, 75; Chang and Rajan, 2001, 62; Koh, 2012). The region has changed to “dirtier, less ecologically diverse and more environmentally vulnerable” practices (ADB 1997, 199). The region is also affected by climate change resulting in increasing floods and droughts throughout Southeast Asia.

Regional organizations are increasingly challenged with, and need to respond to, transboundary and global environmental problems. Ever more frequently, environmental issues that begin as matters of national concern rapidly become transboundary in scope. Water deserves special attention because of its three key characteristics: it has no substitute; it cannot be secured in sufficiently large quantities through long-distance trade deals; and due to the interconnectivity of the hydrological system, the actions of one country in its water management have a direct bearing on the interests of neighbouring countries (Hsing, 2011, 299). While freshwater is fundamental to all ecological and societal activities, such as energy and food production, industrial development, transportation, health and employment, it is often unequally distributed within a region or even within one country (Gleick, 1993; Frey, 1993). For instance, transboundary water relations are complex and all basins are different because water resource allocation, terrain, and even more importantly, institutional infrastructure, are different (Zeitoun and Allan, 2008, 11).

Conflict between and within states over freshwater resources poses an interesting challenge for scholars and policymakers due to competing claims over water and the concept of territorial sovereignty, which is broken by transnational rivers. Similarly to water, air and air pollution (also called haze) is also transcending traditional borders impacting not only on the national population and interests but also neighbouring countries, providing similar transboundary challenges as water.

Post-Cold War security has a more local and regional focus, and therefore places more emphasis on transnational threats and transboundary cooperation. Jens-Uwe Wunderlich (2007, 2) argues that the regional level gained importance throughout the 1990s because of the worldwide globalization process and a stronger interconnection between states and regions. This assertion is also supported by Barry Buzan (1994, 94–95), who argues that the collapse of the Cold War order, a bipolar system, and the subsequent decentralization of the international system have strengthened regionalism. The removal of superpower rivalry has encouraged multipolarity and contributed to a system in which regional agreements can have greater importance. Thus, through the emergence of globalization, regionalism has gained in significance and is currently the focus at both water and air resource management theory and policy (Beeson and Berger, 2003, 40).

Furthermore, many observers of the state of democracy around the world fear that democracy is in decline, especially when focusing on Southeast

Asia. From the election of President Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines to the harassment of Cambodia's opposition, as well as close countries such as Vietnam and Lao PDR,² contemporary politics across the Southeast Asian region offer many examples of authoritarian leadership. In order to link these changes and the current environment in the region, this chapter focuses on two research questions: What are the key challenges of natural resource management in Southeast Asia? What do these challenges imply for both the national and regional level?

Key research findings have shown that natural resources management in Southeast Asia on a national level is often hindered by; patron-client relationships, corruption, imbalance within the government agencies and a lack of consideration of the cost of a healthy environment, all of which is linked to the country's particular regime. Further, regional commitments on an ASEAN level lack translation into national policy, with poor implementation on the ground further contributing to the degradation of the environment and natural resources in Southeast Asia. This is showcased by the two case studies of Laos and Indonesia, highlighting that it is equally important to focus on both levels of governance—national and regional—but also more importantly at the interface of the two.

The chapter starts by highlighting the role of ASEAN in dealing with regional environmental issues before analysing the key aspects of politics of power, corruption and a lack of institutional capacity. It focuses on two countries, Indonesia and Laos, by using specific case studies including deforestation resulting in haze pollution in Indonesia and the region. In Laos, the chapter focuses on the Xayaburi dam as a case study, which will be the first mainstream dam on the Lower Mekong, highlighting some of the challenges of transboundary water resources management, and its linkage to regime type.

Research approach and methodology

This chapter will address the linkage of natural resources, democracy and corruption in Southeast Asia with a special focus on Indonesia and Laos. To do so, this chapter uses a political science lens, focusing on how power and influence are distributed and exercised within various levels of governance as well as preferences of the individuals and groups who lay claim to power.

This research draws on original research in the Mekong region, using a mixed methods approach including semi-structured interviews, case studies and a comparative analysis. Interviews for this research were held predominantly in the Mekong region including interviews in Vientiane, Lao PDR, be-

2 Thereafter Laos.

tween January and June 2013, as well as in late 2017 which included over 20 interviewees from government agencies and regional and international organizations, as well as INGOs and local networks. The Indonesian case study is informed by desktop research as well as group discussions with Indonesian experts and scholars from Indonesia as part of various regional workshops in Singapore and Phnom Penh. NVIVO software was used to combine both the documents from the desktop review and the transcribed interviews. It allowed me to analyze and cluster all findings in a comprehensive manner, showcasing similarities, differences and interlinkages by coding the texts and interviews based on various key themes.

Role of ASEAN in dealing with regional environmental issues

Southeast Asian countries have been challenged over time by various environmental issues including deforestation, logging, air pollution, climate change, landslides, over fishing, the threat of pandemics, illegal wildlife trade and discarding of risky wastes. In regards to environmental cooperation among its member states, ASEAN introduced the ASEAN Expert Group on the Environment in 1978 (Sunchindah, 2002). In general, environmental cooperation in ASEAN can be divided into three phases beginning with a non-formal web of soft law declarations, including non-binding resolutions, action plans and agreements; followed by an emphasis on environmental protection, collective responses and commonalities later expanding to subsidiary bodies including the Environmental Ministers meeting and the ASEAN Secretariat (Elliott, 2003). Early key focus areas included the management of shared natural resources regarding biodiversity and pollution control, mainly referring to haze pollution through forest fires to acquire agricultural land (Koh and Robinson, 2002).

This chapter will address two of these regional environmental issues: water management and air pollution (haze). Both, water management and air pollution epitomize the dilemmas surrounding common pool resources, when used by one party diminishes the potential benefits to others. Further, transboundary rivers and transcending air pollution are both transboundary challenges in nature, where the concept of territorial sovereignty is broken.

Haze pollution has been a yearly occurrence in Southeast Asia, peaking in 1997/1998. Large scale land and forest fires, predominantly in Indonesia, lead to frequent smoke and pollution periods within ASEAN, especially affecting Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. While some fires started due to natural lightning strikes, there exists incontrovertible evidence that the problem in Indonesia was and is largely man-made (Tan, 2005; Chang and Rajan, 2001, 662). Burning is the easiest and cheapest method to clear undergrowth and logging waste after the removal of valuable tropical timber, often used to create plantations. Today, Indonesia is the world's largest producer of palm oil (Workman, 2017).

In June 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN members signed a historic regional agreement, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, to tackle the challenges of regional haze pollution. This was the first regional proposal in the world which aimed to mitigate and prevent haze pollution through regional cooperation. And as argued by ASEAN representatives, dialogues on the haze agreement addressed for the first time serious differences among its member states (Singh, 2008). However, there are two main dilemmas with the agreement, namely that Indonesia, the main emitter did not ratify the agreement until 2015 and second, that the agreement has a weak mechanism for the settlement of disputes and punishing non-compliance (Nazeer and Furuo-ka, 2017, 76).

Analysing the issue of water usage, the Mekong River is used as a regional example within ASEAN, flowing through six countries (China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam), of which five countries are part of ASEAN. Overall, the ASEAN region has in general sufficient water; however, some countries experience seasonal scarcity, and freshwater resources are under increasing pressures due to rapidly rising demand from industrial activities, agricultural use, and a growing population. The Mekong is covering nearly 4900 kilometres from the Tibetan plateau before ending in the South China Sea. It is the largest river in Southeast Asia and the eighth largest³ in the world, which has enormous economic and ecological resources as well as political significance extending to the six riparian countries (Osborne, 2000; Goh, 2006). The Mekong Subregion is an important subregion in the Asia-Pacific due to its significance for more than 70 million people living directly on the river banks and the unique wide range of ecological diversity in a significant ecological system.

Currently, ASEAN environmental cooperation includes water management through the ASEAN Cooperation on Environment. To ensure equitable access and sufficient water quantity of acceptable quality, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint promotes regional cooperation on integrated water resources management. Recognising the importance of freshwater resources, ASEAN formed the AWGWRM in 2002. Following the endorsement of the ASEAN Long Term Strategic Plan for Water Resources Management in 2003 by the ASEAN Environment Ministers, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Strategic Plan of Action on Water Resources Management 2005 which aims to promote the sustainability of water resources to ensure equitable accessibility and sufficient water quantity of acceptable quality (ASEAN, 2005).

3 This ranking is controversial and depends on the measuring of the river by different methods. Different methods include measuring by the mean annual discharge or the length of the river. More details about the methods and problems can be found in Campbell (2009).

Key challenges in dealing with regional environmental governance: Politics of power, corruption and a lack of institutional capacity

Some of the environmental challenges faced by ASEAN are linked to its culture and principles of non-interference and non-binding decision-making. Other problems include the general lack of concrete instruments that are able to translate the regional commitments on an ASEAN level into national policy and its implementation (Koh and Robinson, 2002). While ASEAN is an umbrella for the subregion, environmental matters and guidelines do not influence the subregion strongly as these procedures and guidelines are often implemented slowly and not monitored thoroughly. Additionally, ASEAN is related to trade, where national views and territorial claims are still dominant. As a result, ASEAN is a rather loose and less focused institution with no ambition to become anything more. This is in stark contrast to for instance the European Union, which has a strong focus on environmental standards and guidelines which are enforced within the member countries, including for instance the Water Framework Directive (Haefner, 2016).

However, to understand the two highlighted environmental challenges, it is important to understand the key players at hand and the key drivers of decision making, not just on the regional level but also at a national level, as this drives the behaviour and implementation on the regional level and vice versa. In regards to haze pollution, Indonesia is central to this as the country is the main source of large-scale land and forest fire which as a result contributes to the majority of the pollution. In regards to water allocation and management on the Mekong, Laos plays a pivotal role as the landlocked country is increasing building and approving hydropower dams, and will be the first country in the Lower Mekong River to have a dam on the mainstream of the Mekong River.

Patron-client relationships

Relationships between politically and economically powerful patrons and a weaker client play a large role in Southeast Asia and are at the heart of relations in the Southeast Asian culture. This is especially true in regards to natural resources management. In the case of haze fires in Indonesia, satellite images taken during the 2013 haze period showed that in the jurisdiction of Riau on the island of Sumatra, fires were occurring within large agro-commercial plantations. However, the agro-commercial communities strongly denied this, instead blaming small scale local farmers near the plantations for the fires (Tan, 2015). Further, after the 1997–1998 fires in Indonesia, 176 plantation and logging companies and transmigration area originators were inspected by the government for illegal burning, but because of a lack of institutional capacity and corruption no one was sentenced (Nazeer and Furuoka, 2017, 78). Gener-

ally, in countries like Indonesia, officers within the government can be bribed by rich plantation corporations to balance out any offences committed (Tan, 1999). Also, often the companies which log land and then convert degraded land into cash crop plantations are one and the same, or a parent or sub-company (Tan, 2005, 654).

In general, the very structure of the Indonesian land and forest land use policies encourage large scale plundering of natural resources by politically connected commercial interests with often little consideration for sustainability. Although estimates vary and are hard to measure, they show that the total forest cover loss in Indonesia over the 32 years of Suharto rule came up to at least 40 million hectares (Tan, 2005). Patron-client relationships are widespread and it is common that the sector supports numerous direct relationships between politicians in office and plantation benefits. Sometimes, retired senior bureaucrats may act as intermediaries with the state, performing advisory and brokerage functions on behalf of a company (Varkkey, 2013). These conditions promote elites to support measures that safeguard regional and domestic political economic stability and market access to these natural resources (Nazeer and Furuoka, 2017, 81–82). It also means that many political parties in power have direct links to these plantation interests. According to Varkkey (2014, 66), the “ASEAN style of regional engagement has enabled political elites to shape ASEAN initiatives to preserve the interests of their clients, while the public continues to suffer annually as a result of haze.”

Similarly, the same can be said about developments of the Xayaburi hydropower dam in Laos, which is currently under construction and will be the first finished mainstream dam on the Lower Mekong.⁴ The Finnish engineering company Pöyry’s carried out the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the dam and then became the lead engineer of the project. In a similar manner to other hydropower developments in the region, this provides a “conflict of interests,” meaning that a company has an advantage by making certain statements and approving projects independent of possible social and environmental impacts, again showcasing linkages and direct benefits between private companies and decision making through patronage linkages.

Imbalance within the government and lack of political will

Another big challenge in regards to environmental governance is often the imbalance within the government structures and the power of individual agencies, both across sectors and within different levels of governance. Government departments do not have one position; often, there are several drivers

4 More about the Xayaburi dam can be found in Haefner (2017a) and Haefner (2017b).

behind the decision-making process. In regards to the haze agreement, there were until 2015 two major ministries in Indonesia, the Environment Ministry and the Forestry Ministry, which had different tasks and functions in regards to the agreement. The Environment Ministry was responsible for the negotiation of agreements in the environmental area and pushed for parliamentary ratification to the agreement. However, this was delayed in parliament and the discussion was transferred from one year to the next. The Forestry Ministry was a key player in these delays, as the ministry was closely linked with the key players on the ground and wanted to “protect their interests.” This ministry has a superior workforce, mandate and budgetary means compared to other ministries and is largely responsible for the misuse of business licensing of the forest to private firms (Tan, 2005). As argued by Nguitragool (2011) and Syarif (2010), the Environment Ministry remains a junior ministry within the Indonesian government, with no powers to force other government ministries to comply with any requirements or expectations, or to enforce domestic law. Both ministries merged in 2015, creating the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. As agrarian studies expert, Noer Fauzi Rachman, expressed [when discussing the personnel transfer holdovers from the previous administration], “this is not a sign of change” (Satari, 2015). However, overall it is too early to say whether this merger will have a positive impact on the issues raised or not.

As well as challenges across several sectors, a further key hindrance is the institutional capacity within all levels of governance, including national, provincial and local levels. As argued by Nazeer and Furuoka (2017, 77), “the main obstruction was and continues to be the insufficient standard of administration and governance at both the local and national levels in Indonesia herself.” This includes the country’s deficiencies in environmental governance, land tenure, forestry management and the decentralization of power and institutional capacity to combat fires and haze pollution effectively (Tan, 2005). Besides the various government actors, lobby groups also hinder ratification, especially the Indonesian Palm Oil Association and the Indonesia Sustainable Palm Oil Commission, which often influence parliamentarians for their own interests and individual benefits (Nazeer and Furuoka, 2017).

National laws do exist; however implementation and enforcement is lacking, and this is often linked back to the lack of institutional ability (Nazeer and Furuoka, 2017, 77). Similar to the national level, on an ASEAN level, the Agreement on Haze pollution is also weak as it lacks enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms that could be imposed on countries not adhering to the policy, which is traceable back to ASEAN’s principle of non-interference and consensus. Above all, however, is a distinct lack of political will, for example, the case of Indonesia, which did not ratify the Haze Agreement for 12 years. Additionally, on a local level, the capacity and means to fight fires on the ground are often non-existent making law enforcement difficult.

In regards to hydropower developments in Laos, imbalances between government ministries are also evident. For instance, the relatively newly established Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment lacks capacity at the national, district and provincial levels, whereas the Ministry of Energy and Mines is a very powerful ministry which is driving the representation of the Lao government in relation to hydropower developments at a national and international level.⁵ In regards to hydropower projects, the sphere was until recently dominated by the former Lao Deputy Minister for Energy and Mines, Viraphonh Viravong, who argued that hydropower is crucial, as it is clean, cheap and renewable, further affirming the statement that "hydropower contributes something like 33 percent to the natural capital of the wealth of Laos. And if Laos wants to leave behind its least developed country status by 2020, this is our only choice" (Varchol, 2012).

Lack of consideration of environmental cost

Another key aspect when discussing environmental issues and impacts, is the lack of an inclusion of the cost of a healthy ecosystem. For instance, the inclusion of clean air in a cost-benefit-analysis or when conducting impact assessments for new infrastructure projects. Haze has already caused and will cause more economic damage in the future. Fires in Indonesia have damaged almost 10 million hectares of forest and grassland, affecting approximately 300 million people through the ASEAN states (Abberger, 2003). The total cost of fires may never be known but estimates for losses range between 4.5 billion USD to around 9.3 billion USD internationally "just" for the 1997 fires (Tan, 2005). Economic damages arose mainly from the destruction of crops and timber, a decline in tourism and foreign investment, and health care costs, the latter of which was estimated at around 164 million USD (Nazeer and Furuoka, 2017, 79).⁶ It is further estimated that the cost to control Indonesian forest fires is approximately 1.2 billion USD (Nazeer and Furuoka, 2017, 79). Overall, according to Elliott (2003) "Indonesia's main concern, is that the value of the natural resources (land and forests) is considered more critical than protection of the environment."

Similarly in the Mekong region, economic interests enjoy remarkable primacy, and the development of the river basin's resources tend to be regarded by governments mainly in terms of resource exploitation to advance national economic growth (Goh, 2004, 7). Or, as often stated by the former Lao Vice-Minister for Energy and Mines, hydropower is important because it is clean, cheap and renewable. According to the Lao government, the Xayabouri

5 Personal Interview, May 2013, Vientiane, Lao PDR.

6 For more details on the costs which arose from the 1997 forest fires in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore see Chang and Rajan (2001, 663).

Dam is expected to bring 130 million USD a year in royalties and taxes.⁷ However, costs in regards to environmental and social impacts are not available or considered by the government in any cost-benefit-analysis.

Estimated impacts of the Xayabouri Dam include the loss of biodiversity, a change in the ecosystem, and the reduction of fish. A highly controversial point is the use of fish ladders on the Xayabouri Dam, as proposed in the first draft of the dam. Fish experts argue that these ladders would not work due to the high diversity of fish in the Mekong, including different sizes and high numbers of fish, as well as the height of the dam (Orr et al., 2012). It is estimated that around 2,100 people would be resettled by the project and that more than 202,000 people living on the river banks in close proximity to the dam site would be affected through loss of income and food security, including loss of agricultural land, loss of opportunities of gold panning and lack of access to forest products (International Rivers, 2011). Besides the contribution to fisheries, river dependent agriculture brings around \$4.6 billion in rice paddy growth and up to \$574 million in riverbank gardens per year (International Rivers, 2011). Besides the impact on biodiversity, fish stocks and food security, another problem of the proposed dam is that the actual cost of the already existing revenues from a "healthy" Mekong River is not counted, and social and environmental damages as well as the necessary money for mitigation and compensation are missing from any calculations. This means that the actual cost is unknown and cannot be weighed against the income generated through the dam investment. Another key issue is that the costs and benefits will not only be unevenly distributed between the people within Laos, but also between the riparian countries in the Lower Mekong (Kuenzer et al, 2012). This means that the main beneficiaries in Laos will be the elite, politicians and private companies, whereas the burden will be at the local level where income is reduced due to less fish stocks, reduced agricultural productivity and hardship due to relocations.

Conclusion

Regional organizations are increasingly challenged by, and need to respond to, transboundary and global environmental problems. Ever more frequently, environmental issues that begin as matters of national concern rapidly become transboundary in scope. For instance, the current surge for large hydropower development projects on the Mekong River impact on water and food security across national boundaries. Similarly, transboundary haze pollution is an almost annual occurrence in Southeast Asia; haze originates from peat and forest fires mostly in Indonesia, with Malaysia and Singapore suffering the worst of its effects.

7 Personal Interview, June 2013, Vientiane, Lao PDR.

Focusing on how power and influence are distributed and exercised within various levels of governance as well as the preferences of individuals and groups who lay claim to power, this chapter has highlighted that although there is a regional agreement to deal with haze pollution on the ASEAN level that is not existing for transboundary water management, the key challenges between the two remain the same, as was highlighted in the two case studies of Indonesia and Laos. In both cases, these challenges are: patron-client relationships; imbalance within the government agencies; lack of political will; and a lack of consideration of the cost of a healthy environment. Key findings include that economic interests dominate among the riparian states in the Lower Mekong, and that Laos and other countries tend to confine their cooperation to infrastructural development rather than consultation or management of potential adverse transboundary impacts of upstream development. Likewise, the regional nature of the haze has resulted in a concentration of haze mitigation activities at the ASEAN level; however, these initiatives continually fail to effectively mitigate haze.

Overall, the chapter argues that these failures are due to the ASEAN style of regional engagement that prioritizes the maintenance of national sovereignty as opposed to shared regional interests. Some of the environmental challenges faced by ASEAN are linked to its culture and principles of non-interference and non-binding decision-making. Other problems include the general lack of concrete instruments that are able to translate the regional commitments on an ASEAN level into national policy and its implementation. While ASEAN is an umbrella for the region, environmental matters and guidelines do not influence the member countries strongly as these procedures and guidelines are often implemented slowly and are not monitored thoroughly.

Environmental goals and the sustainable management of natural resources will only be realized if assertive action is taken to address the institutional and political problems by the individual countries to improve governance and provide necessary enforcement resources. An emphasis must focus on all levels and agencies within the government, including at the national level as well as subnational levels which are often central in implementing and enforcing policies on the ground and often lack the appropriate man power, skills and funds to drive change.

As showcased in the two case studies of Laos and Indonesia, it is equally important to focus on both levels of governance—national and regional—but also more importantly on the interface of the two. Further research in this area would provide a more detailed understanding of the interface of the two levels of governance and the reciprocal influence they have on each other. Whereas the government agencies, policies and enforcement mechanism are key, other stakeholder and drivers can have a positive impact on developments, for instance through capacity building and awareness raising. However, unless effective measures are taken to address these concerns, preventing future resource depletion and environmental degradation seem unlikely, further encouraging corruption and patron-client relationships.

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Moments of Change? Negative Revenue Shocks and Political Regimes

Delgerjargal Uvsh

The political science literature has extensively explored the relationship between natural resource dependence and political regimes, but the literature focuses primarily on one aspect of resource dependence—what happens when countries get a positive revenue shock in the form of natural resource windfall income. By comparison, we know little about how political and economic actors deal with negative revenue shocks, which are an integral part of resource dependence given the volatile nature of commodity prices. We may expect, on the one hand, a reversal of the “resource curse”—when the level of resource revenues decreases it may open opportunities for democratization and destabilization of authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, political and economic actors may sink deeper into the “curse” by trying to compensate for lost revenues by increasing their income from unlawful means, which in turn could entrench authoritarian tendencies and undermine democracies. This paper empirically tests the effect of negative shocks to various types of natural resource revenues on changes in regime type between 1961 and 2016. Results from a first-differences model suggest that the average short-term effect of negative revenue shocks on democracy is positive, though the magnitude is not large. More generally, when oil and gas revenues change in either direction, democracy scores improve, implying a positive correlation between resource shocks and democracy. These findings imply that the dynamics, not just levels, of resource dependence are important and that both positive and negative shocks to resource revenues can be beneficial for a country’s democratization prospects in the short term.

Introduction

The relationship between natural resource abundance and regime type has long intrigued political scientists. Abundant scholarship shows that natural resource wealth is often associated with lower level of democracy (Tsui, 2011), smaller likelihood of transition to democracy (Wright et al., 2015), and higher resilience of authoritarian leaders (De Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Resource wealth may also make authoritarian leaders more repressive by incentivizing them to decrease media freedom (Egorov et al., 2009) and expend more on the military (Wright et al., 2015). Endowment from mother nature could similarly prove to be detrimental to democracies. Resources can decrease the quality of political candidates (Brollo et al., 2013) and reduce demands for government accountability (Ross, 2004).

Most studies on the political “resource curse” assume that natural resource dependence affects regime outcomes through the positive revenue shocks that political and economic actors experience due to windfall income from natural resource exploitation. Consequently, many studies theoretically and

empirically focus on how and under what conditions an increase in unearned revenues may affect regime types. In comparison, we know little about how negative revenue shocks or a decrease in natural resource income impacts political incentives. Further, the underlying assumption behind many of the cross-country quantitative studies is that the dynamics of the relationship between resource reliance and political regimes are the same in the case of both negative and positive shocks and, thus, reductions in windfall revenues may lead to a reversal of the undesirable effects brought on by positive shocks. The validity of this assumption is of scholarly interest and has important implications for policy aimed at remedying the maladies of resource dependence.

This chapter examines the effect of negative revenue shocks on changes in political regimes between 1961 and 2016 using a first-differences model with country-level fixed effects. While doing so, it tests whether positive and negative revenue shocks have symmetric effects on political regime changes, as is assumed by numerous studies. I distinguish between shocks to revenues from different types of natural resources and search for evidence of differential effects across democracies versus autocracies to achieve a more nuanced picture of the examined relationship.

I find consistent, statistically significant, and positive effect of negative revenue shocks on the likelihood of democratic changes in the regime, though the overall magnitude of this effect is not large. This effect is particularly robust for negative shocks to oil and gas and oil income and sometimes for income from metals. Revenues from coal do not seem to lead to improvements in democracy scores. Further, oil revenues are significantly associated with better Polity scores in democracies, while in authoritarian countries they are not. Only declines in metals revenues are weakly and positively associated with improved democracy scores in authoritarian regimes.

The results also show that the effects of negative and positive shocks are both positive and similar in magnitude. In other words, when we consider the dynamic changes in resource dependence, rather than its levels, positive revenue shocks appear to contribute to improvement of Polity scores. This positive effect is magnified during times of revenue decline in some cases.

More broadly, the implication of the chapter is that when we consider the dynamic changes in resource dependence, there is hardly a sign of a political “resource curse” as far as regime changes are concerned. If anything, changes in resource income may lead to “resource blessings” and provide opportunities for democratization and improvement of existing democratic regimes. These findings contribute to a large scholarship on the political economy of resource dependence by adding to efforts to examine the dynamic effects of resource dependence. As such, this chapter has noteworthy implications for policy aimed at mitigating the political consequences of resource dependence.

The following section lays out the theoretical background and expectations for how negative shocks to natural resource revenues may affect political regimes. The third section discusses the empirical strategy. I interpret the results from the empirical analyses in the fourth section. The fifth and final section discusses the findings and their implications and concludes.

Theoretical background

How may decline in natural resource revenues affect regimes? Although the answer to this question is not immediately clear from the literature, we can deduce several possible channels. Negative shocks to natural resource revenues may lead to democratic improvements in both authoritarian and democratic countries. Extensive research on the effect of overall economic shocks shows that such shocks contribute to change in political regimes by eroding the bargaining power of authoritarian leaders and improving the positions of opponents in the government (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997). Hard times also may lead to changes in policy orientation, as they challenge the existing coalitions in and around those in power (Gourevitch, 1986). Economic difficulties can lead to economic policy changes, because they allow reformist leaders to package tough policy reforms with those that are absolutely necessary in one agenda and sell to those who were previously against reforms (Rodrik, 1996). Therefore, large negative shocks can make leaders more open to the idea of change and thus lead to positive changes in the regime.

The fact that shocks to resource revenues in heavily resource-dependent countries go hand-in-hand with economic changes may also be important for democratization. When prices of resources fall, a reverse-Dutch disease takes place. At times of high prices, high volumes of exports result in more demand for local currency and consequently its appreciation, making domestic industry in the tradable sector less competitive in international markets (Friedman, 2006). Conversely, if a negative revenue shock is caused by low resource prices, then local currency may depreciate improving the competitive advantage of the tradable sector. Further, negative shocks to the resource sector that are large enough may relocate quality workforces back into the non-resources sector. Such reversal can have notable political effects. It may change the composition of domestic business elites, elevating leading economic actors in the tradable and non-resource sectors as potential competitors against the incumbent or possible coalition members. The leader may be incentivized or forced to open up and improve the regime by including these new elites.

Negative shocks to natural resource income can also increase popular demand for political changes and openness. Countries that are highly dependent on revenues from natural resource exports experience overall income shocks in the service and other related sectors as well as in their public sector investment during times of declines in resource prices. Individuals and actors

in affected sectors may demand that the government compensate for these income shocks or alternatively be replaced. In addition, sustained revenue shocks may force governments to compensate for lost revenues through increasing taxes reversing the tax eviction effect of resource booms (Bornhorst et al., 2009). Experimental evidence shows that increase in taxation raises demand for government accountability (Paler, 2013).

Finally, negative revenue shocks can reduce resources in the hands of incumbents and therefore their ability to repress challengers and buy off societal support, increasing the likelihood of a change in power. If positive revenue shocks increase the value of being in office (Robinson et al., 2006), we may expect negative shocks to decrease the rent from holding power. As a result, the incumbent may become willing to make compromises.

Negative revenue shocks, however, can perpetuate “the resource curse” and entrench incumbent governments in both authoritarian or democratic regimes. Foreseeing the possibility of societal demands for redistribution and political openness as well as emergence of potential challengers, the incumbent may reallocate resources to secure allies for repression, such as the military (Wright et al., 2015), and centralize political authority as a pre-emptive strategy.¹ Moreover, political and institutional maladies associated with high levels of resource revenues, such as corruption, could allow incumbent leaders to compensate for lost revenues and reward their allies effectively during negative revenue shocks. Corruption as an equilibrium and informal institution can become entrenched. Once a polity has experienced high levels of corruption, an environment conducive to corrupt behavior can become a frequency-dependent equilibrium, as political and economic actors become unable to improve their payoffs by changing their strategies independently and not engaging in corruption (Manion, 2004). The fact that corruption is particularly prevalent in authoritarian countries (Montinola and Jackman, 2002) could compound regime durability, especially for authoritarian countries. Therefore, there are theoretical reasons to expect high regime persistence in resource-dependent countries, even after their direct dependence on resources decreases significantly as a result of negative revenue shocks.


These theoretical considerations indicate that the effect of negative revenue shocks on regime changes is ambiguous—it can either be positive or negative. A quick look at the descriptive data confirms the ambiguity of the relationship. Figure 1 depicts the temporal distribution of considerable regime

¹ Continuing political centralization in Russia could illustrate this logic. Some scholars describe the arrests and replacement of numerous sub-national government leaders as a reaction to the negative revenue shocks that Russia experienced as a result of oil price decline since 2015 and Western sanctions.

changes (>30 percent decrease or increase in Polity IV scores) against the world price of oil, a resource that is most important in terms of the rent it generates and its trade volume. The number of countries that experienced worsening of regimes declined and the number of countries that saw improvement of their regimes increased contemporaneously with the significant oil price decline in the 1980s, which presumably resulted in large negative shocks to resource revenues. Subsequent oil price increase in the 2000s, however, did not coincide with observable changes in patterns of regime change.

Figure 2 visually presents the distribution of four broad regime types based on V-DEM project classifications (Mechkova et al., 2017)² across time against the world oil price. A decline in the number of closed authoritarian regimes, the most autocratic type in this classification, happened at the same time as the 1980s oil price drop. However, the number of electoral authoritarian regimes appears to have increased during the same period and continued on, though at a slower rate, during the boom in the 2000s. Similarly, the number of electoral and liberal democracies continued to rise since the late 1970s, despite the oil price dynamics.


Figure 1. Temporal distribution of considerable regime changes (>30 percent decrease or increase in Polity IV scores) against world oil price fluctuations



Source: Author’s calculation based on Polity IV data.

2 According to this classification, electoral democracy holds elections with at least one real opposition party and has a high level of institutional guarantees, but has significant election irregularities. Liberal democracy should satisfy the fulfillment of liberal principles in addition to electoral democracy criteria. Electoral autocracies fail in regards with one or more of the criteria of electoral democracies, but subject the chief executive to de facto multiparty elections. Closed autocracies do not satisfy the latter criterion.

Figure 2. Temporal distribution of broad regime types based on V-DEM classifications against world oil price fluctuations



Source: Author's calculation based on V-DEM data.

Two empirical issues arise from the literature on the relationship between natural resources and regimes. First, the dynamics of resource dependence, particularly negative changes, are often not explicitly discussed in the extant literature. Many empirical analyses focus on how the levels of natural resource dependence relate to regimes and regime changes (Ross, 2015). Therefore, there is an empirical need for the analysis in this chapter. Second, the implicit assumption behind the econometric studies on the relationship between resource income and regimes is that positive and negative revenue shocks have symmetrical effect on the outcome. In other words, they assume that whatever happens during a resource boom is reversed during a resource bust. This chapter empirically examines the validity of this assumption by including a measure of positive revenue shocks in the model.

Empirical strategy

My objective is to identify the average effect of negative shocks on unearned revenues from various sources on changes in Polity scores. A secondary goal

is to examine the effect of positive revenue shocks in order to explicate whether the effect of the two types of shocks are symmetrical. In an ideal condition, I would randomly assign negative and positive revenue shocks to countries and compare the regime changes in the treatment and control countries. Although shocks to unearned revenues are largely dependent on global commodity prices and thus are often argued to be exogenous (e.g. Ahmed, 2012), I go a step further. Specifically, I turn to a non-experimental approach estimating a version of a first-differences model with country-fixed effects on panel data of countries around the world between 1961 and 2016.³

$$Y_{i,t} - Y_{i,t-1} = \beta(R_{i,t} - R_{i,t-1}) + \theta(X_{i,t}) + \lambda_i + E_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

Y denotes the outcome of interest, while R stands for resource revenues, the main independent variable. Variable X is a set of control variables. Subscript, i, is the country and t is the year. Country fixed effect is denoted by λ_i . $E_{i,t}$ is the error term clustered at the country level. Given that my theoretical interest includes the potential asymmetry between the effects of negative and positive revenue shocks, I include both positive and negative revenue shocks in the model. As a result, Equation 1 can be rewritten as follows:

$$Y_{i,t} - Y_{i,t-1} = \beta_1 (R^+_{i,t}) + \beta_2 (R^-_{i,t}) + \theta(X_{i,t}) + \lambda_i + E_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

$(R^+_{i,t})$ measures the magnitude of positive revenue shocks and is equal to $R_{i,t} - R_{i,t-1}$ if $R_{i,t} - R_{i,t-1} > 0$ and 0 otherwise. Similarly, $(R^-_{i,t})$ measures the magnitude of negative revenue shocks and is equal to $|R_{i,t} - R_{i,t-1}|$ if $R_{i,t} - R_{i,t-1} < 0$ and 0 otherwise.

The advantage of a first-differences model combined with fixed effects is that it estimates the effect of *changes* in the independent variable on *changes* in the dependent variable holding other relevant variables constant. Therefore, it would allow me to assess the short-term effects of negative revenue shocks on changes in Polity scores exploiting within-country variation.

The main dependent variable is year-to-year changes in the Polity IV score. Polity IV score is a standard measure of political regimes in political science literature. It combines various measures of political competitiveness, openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the constraints on the chief executive (Marshall et al., 2017). Following Haber and Menaldo (2011), I normalize the Polity scores to run from 0 to 100 before differencing them.

The independent variable of interest is negative changes in the per capita income from natural resources. Resource revenues are expressed in per capita basis, rather than as percentage of GDP. Using GDP as the denominator

3 The long time series minimize potential concerns for Nickell bias.

of the independent variable is inappropriate, because it may introduce bias. Take two countries that experience the same amount of shock to their natural resource rents in time $t-1$, but one is wealthy and has diverse economy and the other is poor and dependent on resources. Because the GDP of the poorer and more-dependent country in t would shrink accordingly with the shock in $t-1$, the magnitude of the shock will appear smaller for this country in comparison to its wealthier counterpart, the GDP of which has not changed much as a result of the shock. This may tilt the results of the analysis for a Type II error.

I measure natural resource income using data from various sources. The measures of per capita income from overall natural resource revenues are calculated using data from the World Bank (2016). The World Development Indicators database from the World Bank provides measurements of *Total Natural Resource Rent as % of GDP*, but this measurement includes rent from forestry. Given that the effects of point-source resources (oil, gas, and minerals) and diffuse resources (agriculture, fishery, and forestry) on a country's political and economic institutions may differ (Leite and Weidmann, 1999), I deduct *Forestry Rent as % of GDP* from the *Total Natural Resource Rent as % of GDP*. Then using *Total GDP* and *Total Population* values, I compute the *Total Resource Rent* in USD.⁴

This measure of natural resource income, however, provides only an aggregate proxy for resource revenues. In order to get a more nuanced picture and examine whether shocks to different types of point-source resources produce differential effects on regimes, I use measures of per capita income from key resources separately. Ross and Mahdavi (2014) provide panel data on *Income from Oil and Gas* as well as *Income from Oil*, both on per capita basis. The data on *Income from Coal* and *Income from Metals*⁵ are adopted from Haber and Menaldo (2011).

These measures of natural resource income have the advantage of wide temporal and spatial coverage, but they do not directly measure the government's unearned revenues, which is the theoretical independent variable of interest. To overcome this problem, the International Centre for Taxation and Development developed a new dataset on natural resource revenues. Its main shortcoming is that it only covers some years since 1980, though spatial coverage is rather high (148 countries). Nonetheless, I use data from this dataset in the analysis. The measurements of *Total Tax Revenues as % of GDP* and *Total Non-Tax Revenues as % of GDP* are available from this dataset. Using values of *Total GDP* and *Total Population* for each observation, I compute the *Total Non-Tax Revenue per capita*.

4 This procedure results in 120 observations that have non-positive, though small, values for Total Resource Rent. The results are robust to exclusion of these observations.

5 This variable includes most major industrial and precious metals, such as Antimony, Bauxite, Chromium, Copper, Gold, Iron Ore, Lead, Manganese, Mercury Molybdenum, Nickel, Silver, Tin, Tungsten, and Zinc.

The per capita income from various resources are differenced year to year in order to construct the independent variables. If the annual difference in a country's per capita income is positive, then it is considered a positive shock. Conversely, a negative annual difference is considered a negative shock. Both variables are log-transformed. To facilitate log-transformation of negative shocks, I take the absolute value of the negative shocks and add 1.

I control for a number of country-level factors that may affect changes in regimes. First, I control for *Polity score in t-1* to capture potential persistence of regimes at various levels of Polity and to account for the theoretical possibility of mean-reverting tendency in regimes.⁶ The level of overall resource reliance is also controlled for, since high levels of resource revenues before the shock may allow incumbent governments to continue to hold onto power even in times of negative shocks to resource revenues. In contrast, relatively resource-poor regimes may be susceptible to even a small amount of revenue shock. Therefore, I include *Total Resource Dependence in t-1* as a proxy of pre-existing importance of a given type of resource revenues in the model. Further, *GDP per capita in t-1* is included to take account of the idea that regime changes, particularly democratic changes, are possible only at certain levels of income (Lipset, 1959). Civil war is another variable that the model includes. Ongoing civil wars may make regime changes more likely and thus need to be controlled for. Since civil wars can also result from the treatment or the revenue shock, I include an indicator variable of whether there was an ongoing civil war with ≥ 1000 battle death casualties in the previous year.

Political corruption can increase the incumbent's desire as well as the ability to hold onto power and consequently forestall democratic transitions or improvements. I measure political corruption by the Political Corruption Index of V-DEM data, which corresponds to how pervasive political corruption is. Another important factor for regime change is the level of inequality. Higher level of inequality may increase popular demand for democracy; at the same time, it may disincentivize elites from opening up the regime and democratizing, as they perceive inequality as need for redistribution (Dunning, 2008). Inequality is measured by the Egalitarian Democracy Index of the V-DEM dataset and it proxies for the extent to which the ideals of egalitarian democracy are achieved. Lastly, regime change is not a singular process that happens within individual countries, but rather democratization and regime change may spill over to neighboring countries (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). Thus, I control for the percentage of democracies in countries' geographic and cultural region.⁷ All variable sources and summary statistics are included in Table 1.

6 Democracy scores tend to return to an equilibrium value for a country (Acemoglu et al., 2008).

7 Including indicator variables denoting whether a country is located in the Middle East or Sub-Saharan Africa is common for econometric analysis of regime change and durability. In my analysis, these indicator variables are collinear with the country fixed effects and thus do not explain any variation.

Table 1. Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Source
Polity IV score	54.601	36.940	0.000	100.000	Marshall et al. (2017)
Δ in Polity IV score	0.401	8.260	-90.000	80.000	Computed by the author
Total Resource Rent (in USD, lagged)	46024.384	182372.741	-1408.893	2837570.750	Computed from World Bank (2016)
Log (Positive Δ in total resource rent)	2.986	3.799	0.000	14.347	Computed by the author
Log (Negative Δ in total resource rent)	1.654	3.198	0.000	13.870	Computed by the author
Income from oil and gas (per capita, lagged)	716.690	3413.909	0.000	70179.969	Ross and Mahdavi (2014)
Log (Positive Δ in oil and gas income)	0.858	1.796	0.000	10.511	Computed by the author
Log (Negative Δ in oil and gas income)	0.594	1.559	0.000	9.941	Computed by the author
Income from oil (per capita, lagged)	583.663	2984.165	0.000	67454.211	Ross and Mahdavi (2014)
Log (Positive Δ in oil income)	0.754	1.692	0.000	10.427	Computed by the author
Log (Negative Δ in oil income)	0.511	1.456	0.000	9.856	Computed by the author
Income from coal (per capita, lagged)	22493.316	69602.254	0.000	819789.625	Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Log (Positive Δ in coal income)	1.228	2.760	0.000	12.250	Computed by the author
Log(Negative Δ in coal income)	0.925	2.417	0.000	11.979	Computed by the author
Income from metals (per capita, lagged)	61742.246	160479.248	0.000	2592402.000	Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Log (Positive Δ in metals income)	2.566	3.830	0.000	14.098	Computed by the author
Log (Negative Δ in metals income)	1.656	3.273	0.000	13.029	Computed by the author
Total non-tax revenue (per capita, lagged)	874.130	2431.731	-88.483	32548.613	Prichard et al., 2018
Log (Positive Δ in non-tax revenue)	1.666	1.987	0.000	9.247	Computed by the author
Log(Negative Δ in non-tax revenue)	0.458	1.261	0.000	9.277	Computed by the author
Log(GDP per capita, lagged)	8.076	1.533	4.752	11.641	World Bank (2016)
Indicator variable for civil war (lagged)	0.083	0.275	0.000	1.000	Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Political Corruption Index (lagged)	0.507	0.346	0.000	1.000	Coppedge et al. (2017)
Egalitarian Democracy Index (lagged)	0.340	0.245	0.032	0.891	Coppedge et al. (2017)
Regional democratic diffusion (lagged)	0.401	8.261	-90.000	80.000	Haber and Menaldo (2011)

Notes: When the total resource rent is computed by the author, 120 observations end up with non-positive resource rent. The results of the regressions, however, do not change when these observations are dropped. In the original dataset, some country-years contain negative, though small, values for non-tax revenues as % of GDP. These observations are Benin in 1981, El Salvador in 1996, Guatemala in 1998–2000, Togo in 1999, and Tunisia 2000–2007. As of the time of writing, I was not able to clarify the origin of this discrepancy and thus left the observations in the sample. Results remain robust to dropping these observations.

Country fixed effects in first-difference equations control for a number of country-specific and time-invariant changes. These fixed effects also absorb within-unit correlations of the error terms, though perhaps not all of it. The sample includes all countries that had populations of more than 500,000 in the year 2010 between 1961 and 2016. Countries that have become independent during the study period are included starting from the year of their independence. The data is unbalanced due to missing data on some of the variables.

Results

Table 2 shows the baseline results of the models that estimate the relationship between positive/negative revenue shocks and changes in Polity scores, while controlling for lagged *Polity score* and *Total resource dependence*. Columns differ in their main independent variables, i.e. the type of natural resource income that experienced shocks. The effect of negative revenue shocks is consistently positive and statistically significant, except in the case of direct measurement of overall non-tax government revenues. The magnitude of the effects is highest for oil revenue shocks and the oil and gas combined revenue shocks. Similarly, oil and oil and gas revenue shocks have the highest level of statistical significance along with total resource rent shocks. Negative shocks to coal and metals income appear to produce smaller positive effects at lower level of statistical confidence.

Table 2. Baseline results: Effects of negative revenue shocks on Polity IV score changes

Dependent variable	Δ in Polity IV					
Revenue source	Total resources	Oil and gas	Oil	Coal	Metals	Non-tax rev.
Negative shock	0.248*** (0.056)	0.484*** (0.117)	0.501*** (0.122)	0.237** (0.108)	0.143* (0.084)	0.210 (0.144)
Positive shock	0.234*** (0.056)	0.447*** (0.097)	0.482*** (0.105)	0.089 (0.101)	0.076 (0.079)	0.182 (0.133)
Polity _{t-1}	-0.089*** (0.008)	-0.070*** (0.007)	-0.071*** (0.007)	-0.080*** (0.008)	-0.080*** (0.008)	-0.121*** (0.012)
Resource dependence _{t-1}	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	4.584*** (0.507)	3.513*** (0.349)	3.649*** (0.362)	4.097*** (0.555)	4.057*** (0.605)	7.893*** (0.785)
N	5771	7530	7393	6149	6145	3712
Countries	157	166	162	160	160	145
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Errors clustered (country)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Interestingly, positive shocks to all types of natural resource revenues are associated with increases in Polity scores. Same as negative revenue shocks, the effects are largest for oil and oil and gas income at a high level of statistical significance. For total natural resource rent, the effects are smaller, though still highly significant. This result stands in contrast to the resource curse literature that argues that windfall from natural resource revenues harm democracies. The effect of overall dependence on natural resources is practically nil in these models.

Table 3 displays the results of the full models that include all control variables. In these models, the effect of negative revenue shocks is again consistently positive, although the magnitude of the coefficients is consistently smaller and at lower statistical significance in these models than in the baseline models. The coefficient of negative shock to coal income altogether loses its significance. Again, positive revenue shocks are associated with an increase in Polity scores, but only for oil, oil and gas, and total resource income.

Table 3. Full models: Effects of negative revenue shocks on Polity IV score changes

Dependent variable	Δ in Polity IV					
	Total resources	Oil and gas	Oil	Coal	Metals	Non-tax
Negative shock	0.172** (0.070)	0.335** (0.169)	0.384** (0.168)	0.134 (0.101)	0.132* (0.078)	0.167 (0.199)
Positive shock	0.157** (0.066)	0.350** (0.135)	0.364** (0.137)	0.068 (0.099)	0.094 (0.071)	0.185 (0.179)
Polity _{t-1}	-0.171*** (0.020)	-0.174*** (0.017)	-0.173*** (0.017)	-0.176*** (0.017)	-0.175*** (0.017)	-0.205*** (0.022)
Total resource dependence _{t-1}	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
GDP per capita _{t-1}	-0.056 (0.640)	-0.416 (0.533)	-0.404 (0.513)	-0.144 (0.508)	-0.138 (0.498)	-1.414* (0.753)
Indicator for civil war _{t-1}	0.465 (0.673)	0.514 (0.673)	0.479 (0.677)	0.514 (0.679)	0.504 (0.678)	-1.248 (0.820)
Political corruption index _{t-1}	4.561*** (1.353)	4.081** (1.320)	4.082** (1.324)	4.452** (1.344)	4.283** (1.344)	2.990 (1.950)
Egalitarian democracy index _{t-1}	17.158*** (3.966)	20.313*** (3.199)	20.298*** (3.210)	20.775*** (3.260)	20.419*** (3.204)	18.720*** (4.295)
Regional democratic diffusion _{t-1}	0.136*** (0.020)	0.127*** (0.022)	0.126*** (0.023)	0.131*** (0.022)	0.131*** (0.022)	0.109*** (0.028)
Constant	1.462 (4.952)	3.878 (3.971)	3.779 (3.829)	1.723 (3.869)	1.525 (3.813)	15.577** (5.842)
N	4466	5198	5196	5056	5056	2696
Countries	152	154	154	154	154	140
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Errors clustered (country)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4. Full models: Effects of negative revenue shocks on Polity IV score changes in democratic countries (normalized polity score ≥ 50)

Dependent variable	Δ in Polity IV					
	Total resources	Oil and gas	Oil	Coal	Metals	Non-tax
Negative shock	0.239** (0.098)	0.274 (0.192)	0.434** (0.211)	0.099 (0.096)	0.059 (0.121)	0.130 (0.194)
Positive shock	0.219** (0.090)	0.255 (0.159)	0.302* (0.179)	0.055 (0.103)	0.083 (0.112)	0.170 (0.175)
Polity _{t-1}	-0.267*** (0.056)	-0.244*** (0.053)	-0.244*** (0.053)	-0.251*** (0.055)	-0.254*** (0.056)	-0.304*** (0.064)
Total resource dependence _{t-1}	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
GDP per capita _{t-1}	1.452 (1.178)	0.017 (0.831)	0.024 (0.815)	0.262 (0.821)	0.232 (0.837)	0.866 (1.082)
Indicator for civil war _{t-1}	-1.007 (1.217)	-0.914 (1.103)	-0.943 (1.108)	-0.987 (1.117)	-0.960 (1.119)	-2.058 (1.327)
Political corruption index _{t-1}	3.040 (2.646)	2.800 (2.434)	2.776 (2.426)	3.022 (2.543)	2.988 (2.551)	0.234 (2.507)
Egalitarian democracy index _{t-1}	17.347** (6.772)	22.516*** (5.845)	22.293*** (5.844)	23.054*** (6.052)	23.264*** (6.138)	7.810 (4.812)
Regional democratic diffusion _{t-1}	0.160*** (0.031)	0.169*** (0.030)	0.168*** (0.030)	0.172*** (0.031)	0.173*** (0.031)	0.101** (0.033)
Constant	-1.100 (10.531)	7.526 (7.203)	7.504 (7.098)	5.736 (7.440)	6.003 (7.324)	14.419 (9.289)
N	2512	2848	2848	2742	2742	1632
Countries	121	123	123	123	123	109
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Errors clustered (country)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The coefficients on the control variables are also noteworthy. In both baseline and full models, higher levels of Polity scores are correlated with a decrease in changes in the following period. Political corruption has a large, positive, and statistically significant effect on Polity score changes in the next period across all models. Inequality and regional democratic diffusion both have positive effects on regime change, though the magnitude of the effects is considerably larger in the case of the former than the latter.

The main goal of the analysis has been to identify the average short-term effects of negative and positive revenue shocks and, thus, all regime types are included in the sample. In additional analysis, I ask: are the dynamics of natural resource dependence different for democracies and autocracies? I examine these potential differential effects by running the same model on smaller subsamples of authoritarian and democratic countries (Tables 4 and 5). Negative shocks to total resource rent and oil income are more likely to

be associated with positive changes in Polity scores in democracies than in autocracies, as implied by the loss of statistical significance of the negative revenue shock coefficients in regressions for authoritarian countries. Positive shocks to only oil revenues are correlated with an increase in Polity scores in autocracies. Higher values of egalitarian democracy index and regional diffusion of democracy seem important for improvement of Polity scores in both types of regimes. Remarkably, political corruption seems to have a differential effect on the likelihood of better Polity scores; they do not matter in democratic regimes, but do in authoritarian regimes.⁸

Table 5. Full models: Effects of negative revenue shocks on Polity IV score changes in authoritarian countries (normalized polity score <50)

Dependent variable	Δ in Polity IV					
Revenue source	Total resources	Oil and gas	Oil	Coal	Metals	Non-tax
Negative shock	0.190* (0.109)	0.403 (0.302)	0.460 (0.280)	0.396 (0.296)	0.197* (0.112)	0.422 (0.420)
Positive shock	0.156 (0.097)	0.408 (0.253)	0.364** (0.137)	0.189 (0.235)	0.067 (0.104)	0.333 (0.369)
Polity _{t-1}	-0.140** (0.044)	-0.107** (0.040)	-0.105** (0.040)	-0.108** (0.042)	-0.106** (0.042)	-0.197** (0.064)
Total resource dependence _{t-1}	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
GDP per capita _{t-1}	0.413 (0.664)	0.370 (0.869)	0.343 (0.846)	0.941 (0.773)	0.693 (0.764)	-1.420 (0.942)
Indicator for civil war _{t-1}	1.955 (1.184)	1.778* (1.016)	1.734* (1.014)	1.759* (1.028)	1.819* (1.032)	0.106 (1.341)
Political corruption index _{t-1}	5.182** (2.176)	3.625* (2.090)	3.612* (2.091)	3.937* (2.156)	3.690* (2.106)	2.092 (3.825)
Egalitarian democracy index _{t-1}	48.250*** (12.263)	32.980** (12.327)	33.281** (12.254)	33.634** (12.625)	32.314** (12.607)	65.787** (20.835)
Regional democratic diffusion _{t-1}	0.198*** (0.033)	0.139*** (0.037)	0.139*** (0.037)	0.141*** (0.037)	0.138*** (0.037)	0.249*** (0.056)
Constant	-10.224** (4.965)	-6.863 (6.072)	-6.753 (5.860)	-10.583** (5.311)	-9.188* (5.336)	3.510 (6.340)
N						
Countries	1954	2350	2348	2314	2314	1064
Country-fixed effects	104	105	105	105	105	81
Errors clustered (country)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Heteroskedascity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

⁸ Results of the baseline model for the two types of regimes are available upon request.

I check the robustness of the results with a jackknife test for each model excluding one country at a time from the sample. The results of the baseline and the full models with adjusted standard errors do not differ from the results of the main analyses, except in the baseline model on shocks to total resource revenue the coefficient of *Polity in t-1* flips sign to positive. These results suggest that, overall, the regression coefficients are not influenced by experiences of outliers.⁹

Conclusion

This chapter takes on the task of examining whether there is a significant relationship between negative revenue shocks and political regime changes in a cross-national setting. A secondary goal of this chapter is to ascertain whether the effects of negative and positive revenue shocks, if any, are symmetric as assumed in the current literature on the “resource curse.”

The estimated results from a first-differences model on Polity scores suggest that generally natural resource revenue declines are associated with positive changes in political openness. Particularly shocks to oil revenues and combined oil and gas revenues have, on average, significant and positive short-term effects on Polity scores. Oil revenues are significantly associated with better Polity scores in democracies, while in authoritarian countries the statistical significance of this relationship goes away.

The empirical set-up of the paper provides some assurance that the relationship between negative revenue shocks and institutions is not only correlational, but also potentially causal. A first-differences model with country fixed effects removes concerns about endogeneity deriving from omitted variables, as it exploits variations within a country. Endogeneity due to simultaneity cannot be directly ruled out, but theoretically it is improbable that annual changes in Polity IV scores can affect resource revenues, which are often dependent on exogenous factors such as global commodity prices and demand.

Is the assumption of symmetry regarding the effects of positive and negative shocks to resource revenues empirically valid? Negative revenue shocks are associated with positive effects on regimes on average, as implied by studies that find a political and economic “resource curse.” However, in the empirical setting of this chapter, I find that positive resource shocks are associated with a “blessing,” rather than a “curse.” Positive and negative shocks have similar effects on regime changes, both in magnitude and direction. Therefore, negative and positive shocks to natural resource revenues do not produce opposing symmetrical effects.

9 Detailed results of these analyses are available upon request.

The broader implications of this chapter are two-fold. First, considering the dynamics of resource dependence is crucial for research on resource dependence. Given the volatility of global commodity prices, natural resource revenues change considerably within short periods of time. Such volatility is argued to cause economic and financial problems in resource-rich countries. However, it appears that a decline in resource revenues may not be harmful to political openness. In fact, it may serve as moments of change. Second, the strong and positive short-term effects of both positive and negative revenue shocks found in this chapter suggest that institutions, particularly political regimes, can change and adapt to shocks rather quickly. This is encouraging not only for resource-rich economies, but also for other countries as other types of revenue shocks are ubiquitous.

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Buying Votes with Rents: The Politics of Economic Populism and Clientelism in Natural Resource Dependent Democracies

Boldsaikhan Sambuu

Why do some countries misuse their natural resource wealth while others manage theirs successfully? What role does electoral competition play in either ameliorating or exacerbating the natural resource curse? Informed by qualitative cases of resource dependent democracies, including Mongolia, Ghana, and Botswana, this chapter posits that political parties are more likely to buy votes with resource rents via economic populism and clientelism when they face strong electoral competition and where voters are largely impoverished. Empirically, the chapter uses expert-survey data from the V-Dem project to test its key theoretical propositions. It finds that resource wealth is not necessarily a curse, but a double-edged sword: while resource dependence is positively associated with programmatic party-voter linkages when electoral competition is minimal, it makes parties more clientelistic when strong competition interacts with pervasive poverty. By examining how resource wealth affects the quality of a key democratic institution, i.e. political parties, the chapter attempts to broaden the existing body of knowledge on the natural resource curse. In so doing, it connects two large and disconnected literatures: one that accounts for the natural resource curse and the other for party-voter linkages of accountability.

Introduction

The idea that natural resource wealth can be harmful rather than beneficial for economic development and good governance is known as the “resource curse” (Auty, 1993; Sachs and Wagner, 1995; Gylfason, 2001; Humphreys et al., 2007; Ross, 2015). The emerging scholarly consensus suggests that resource wealth is not necessarily a curse; instead, how a nation manages the rents generated from resource extraction largely determines whether it avoids or suffers from poor outcomes (Iimi, 2007; van der Ploeg, 2011). Experts, thus, urge resource dependent nations to adopt counter-cyclical spending policies to offset the volatility of earnings (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2007), to prioritize long-term investments that reduce dependency on raw commodities, and to boost human capital formation to enhance productivity (Humphreys et al., 2007; van der Ploeg, 2011).

The efficacy of these policy recommendations is supported by evidence from the few countries that have avoided the curse, namely Botswana and Norway, where much of the resource rents are saved into investment funds and

used for long term, public goods that produce recurring benefits (Mehlum et al., 2006; Lewin, 2011). However, numerous other countries have squandered their natural wealth, often by engaging in economic populism and clientelism. For instance, the oil producing states of Mexico, Venezuela, and Nigeria went bankrupt in the 1980s due to pro-cyclical spending and over-borrowing (Humpreys et al., 2007). Most recently, Ghana and Mongolia borrowed substantially and went on spending sprees during short-lived resource booms. The two mineral rich democracies were recently rescued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Despite frequent policy recommendations and abundant historical lessons, why do some countries squander their natural resource wealth via economic populism and clientelism while others are able to invest theirs in productive public goods? In answering this broad research question, I assume that clientelism or non-programmatic party-voter linkages lead to poor resource governance and mismanagement. In the context of a natural resource rich democracy, a political party that spends resource rents on public goods that improve the state's education and health services, or a party that saves current resource revenues for future productive investments can be considered more "programmatic" than a party that prioritizes current consumption in order to win votes. A party that buys votes with rents through cash distribution, gifts, or public-sector jobs can be described as "non-programmatic" or "clientelistic." Hence, the chapter specifically addresses the question: whether and under what conditions does resource wealth lead to non-programmatic party linkages?

I argue that natural resources have a conditional effect on party-voter linkages. Resources may undermine programmatic linkages and bolster clientelism when political parties face strong electoral competition and where poverty among voters is widespread. Conversely, resources can strengthen programmatic linkages when either competition or poverty is negligible, or both. Intense electoral competition means that marginal votes gained or lost can swing an election one way or another. In this context of high political uncertainty, parties face a corrosive incentive to buy votes with resource rents to obtain and secure each and every vote available. Hence, competition establishes the motivation for and rents provide the means with which parties engage in vote-buying. Moreover, parties' response to intensifying electoral competition also depends on the economic status of voters. Where constituencies are predominantly made up of affluent citizens, a party's attempt to buy votes would be too expensive and otherwise ineffective. Where poverty is pervasive, parties expect vote-buying with rents to be a feasible and effective electoral strategy.

Empirically, I analyze the expert-survey data on party-voter linkages from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. The results from a cross-nation-

al regression analysis support my main argument. Resource dependence is positively correlated with programmatic party-voter linkages if electoral competition is minimal; but it is inversely associated with programmatic linkages where electoral competition is strong. This implies that for developing countries, resource wealth constitutes a double-edged sword. Resource wealth could strengthen programmatic parties as long as electoral competition remains minimal. Nonetheless, it can lead to heightened clientelism when intense party competition interacts with pervasive poverty.

The chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literatures on the natural resource curse and points out that it has not paid adequate attention to the effects of natural resources within democracies. Next, the chapter sketches out a general theoretical framework describing how natural resource dependence and party-voter linkages in a resource dependent democracy could systematically vary with political competition and poverty. This framework is then empirically tested in the next section, which presents the data sources, model specifications, and results. The last section concludes.

Literature review

The literature on the natural resource curse connects resource wealth to a variety of economic, social, and political maladies. In particular, it posits that certain point-source natural resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals, may inhibit economic development and good governance (Isham et al., 2005; Boschini et al., 2007). Although numerous cross-national econometric studies corroborate the negative effects of resource dependence or abundance, the specific causal mechanisms through which these effects materialize have not been conclusively established. Earlier studies emphasized the purely economic mechanisms related to the “Dutch Disease” (Corden and Neary, 1982; Gelb et al., 1988; Auty, 1993), while the more recent studies identify rent-seeking as a key mechanism that links resources to slow growth and poor governance. Some scholars stress the importance of checks and balances and institutions that constrain executive power (Tornell and Lane, 1999; Mehlum et al., 2006). Others argue that institutions themselves are endogenous to natural resources, whereby resources can engender corruption and erode institutional quality over-time (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Isham et al., 2005; Bulte et al., 2005).

A key issue confronting the recent studies is that they tend to employ broad measures of institutional quality, such as the Polity IV indicator of executive constraints. These conventional measures may refer to many overlapping aspects that assess a country’s overall performance on governance: bureaucratic competency, rule of law, extent of corruption, checks and balances, and

protection of property rights. Ahmadov and Guliyev (2016) point out that the use of such indicators makes it difficult to identify exactly which particular institutions—whether democratic political institutions or merely institutions of higher quality—are important for mitigating the curse.

Moreover, current research seldom considers the possibility that regime differences across countries might condition the effects of resources. Thus, they tend to overlook questions regarding how natural resource curse operates in already established democracies as opposed to autocracies. Given that most resource rich countries in the past were autocracies with poor institutions, previous studies were preoccupied with whether resource wealth leads to authoritarianism (Ross, 2001; Dunning, 2008) and poor state-society linkages (Karl, 1997). Yet, resource rich countries, on average, have become more democratic since the last commodities price super-cycle of the 1980s (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009), and several already existing democracies, including Mongolia, East-Timor, and Ghana, have recently discovered substantial mineral wealth. This emerging new political-economic context calls for a renewed understanding that addresses how resource wealth could affect governance within democracies.

In responding to these gaps in the literature, I explicitly theorize about the effects of resource dependence on a domestic political institution in a democracy. This means my scope is limited to democratic countries only and that my theory is informed by a contextual background where free and fair elections are taken for granted, where competition between parties is genuine. I also attempt to unbundle the broad measures of institutional quality by examining a single dependent variable: the types of linkages between parties and their constituents.

Theoretical framework

Following the discovery of the Jubilee oil fields in 2007, the Ghanaian parliament passed legislation requiring 30 percent of oil rents to be saved into the Ghana Petroleum Funds, designed to counteract against oil price fluctuations (Sovereign Wealth Institute, 2017). Being aware of the potential risks of the natural resource curse, the Ghanaian parliament set strict rules that placed large caps on withdrawals from the funds. Yet, the government circumvented those restrictions when it borrowed over \$2 billion from abroad by using future oil revenues as implicit collateral. It, then, squandered much of the borrowed money by way of clientelistic spending. For instance, the government increased public-sector wages by as much as 50 percent (Collier, 2017). When oil prices dropped, Ghana had to seek a financial bailout from the IMF to avoid defaulting on its sovereign debt in 2015 (IMF, 2015).

In a remarkably similar fashion to Ghana, successive Mongolian governments borrowed substantially in sovereign bonds from international financial markets during a mining boom that lasted from 2004 to 2012. Most of the moneys were spent on various white elephant projects and economically populist vote buying schemes. This debt fueled by public spending brought the country to a brink of financial catastrophe. By 2017, Mongolia also had to request financial assistance from the IMF to prevent a looming debt crisis (Saker, 2017). Why do some democracies like Mongolia and Ghana misuse their resource rents, despite the widespread awareness of the natural resource curse and the various policy prescriptions to mitigate its negative effects?

Electoral strategies in the context of natural resources

A large amount of natural resource wealth decreases a state's budgetary constraints given that a substantial amount of rents from resource extraction often accrues to the government through taxes, royalties, and interest payments. An incumbent government presiding over a resource boom will likely use the state revenues, swollen by resource rents, in a variety of ways to win reelection. To somewhat simplify, the spending choices available for the ruling party can be classified into two distinct and broad categories of electoral strategies, comprised of a clientelistic strategy on one hand and a programmatic strategy on the other hand (Stokes et al., 2012).

With a clientelistic strategy, the incumbent party may spend resource rents to provide private goods (material gifts, cash, and jobs) for its own core constituents and for uncommitted poor voters in exchange for their support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). With a programmatic strategy, the incumbent may utilize resource revenues to provide public goods to a broader set of voters. Programmatic spending of resource rents may involve investing into the infrastructure, reforming the bureaucracy, or improving the state's health, education, and other social services. The party may also campaign on a promise to save current resource rents into stabilization or sovereign wealth funds that would generate long-term and recurring benefits for the current and future generations.

In theory, an opposition party could face the same set of electoral strategies as the ruling party i.e., programmatic platform vs. clientelistic vote buying. In practice, however, the opposition might lack access to state resources, especially to resource rents, if such rents accrue to the government's fiscal accounts and spending decisions are subject to the ruling party's approval. In that case, the opposition cannot use resource rents to shore up electoral support, which creates a disparity of economic resources between the parties where the opposition is at a disadvantage. Since it cannot compete via conventional clientelistic strategy on an even footing, the opposition may instead

resort to a separate election strategy that can be called “economic populism” to counter the incumbent’s advantage derived from clientelism.

In the broadest sense, economic populism is defined as a “bias towards excessive current consumption and white elephant public spending” (Collier, 2017, 217). As an electoral strategy, it entails publicly pronounced formal campaign platforms that generously promise “delayed” benefits to a wide segment of voters. Although economic populism targets the same group of poor voters as does clientelism, it may also make promises aimed at garnering support from relatively affluent voters. Compared with clientelistic material inducements, the benefits promised to voters under an economically populist strategy may include much greater spoils from resource extraction, whether in terms of direct cash distribution, dividend payments, or stakes in the state-owned extractive companies. These are “delayed” benefits in the sense that they are to be delivered to voters if and when the party making such promises does actually win the election. This implicit contingency (if and when) represents a defining feature of economic populism that makes it similar to clientelism (Hicken, 2011).

Economic populism may also seem similar to a programmatic strategy because both involve formal platforms that target large segments of the electorate. Yet, the similarities are only superficial. Programs usually entail certain substantive policy and ideological ends that aim at enhancing the general welfare of citizens (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Hence, programs provide long-term and lasting benefits that usually survive election cycles (Stokes, 2005; Kitschelt and Kselman, 2012). In contrast, the single shot and near instantaneous benefits promised by economic populism rarely constitute anything more than a mere attempt to buy voters.

As a strategy designed by an opposition lacking access to patronage and state revenues, economic populism specifically intends to counter the incumbent’s advantage from using clientelism. As such, economic populism’s prime target is the same group of poor voters, who are thought to be easily induced with material incentives, upon which clientelism also targets. In essence, lacking the means with which to buy votes right away, a populist opposition could ask voters for their support now in exchange for greater material payments in the near future provided that the party is elected into office. As an illustration, consider Mongolia’s presidential election which took place in June 2017. The opposition Democratic Party (DP) candidate, Khaltmaagyn Battulga, frequently urged voters throughout his campaign not to sell their vote to his opponent Miyegombyn Enkhbold, whose ruling Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) had taken control of nearly all branches of government in a parliamentary election held a year earlier. Battulga pleaded with voters to “just pocket the money, and vote for me, instead... I will cancel your debt” (Sambuu, 2017).

When do parties choose economic populism and clientelism over programs?

Given the set of electoral strategies described so far, I expect the ruling party in a resource dependent democracy to adopt a clientelistic electoral strategy when electoral competition is intense and if there are many poor voters. Intense competition would imply that rival parties maintain relatively equal standing with the electorate, where marginal votes gained or lost can swing the entire election one way or another. In this context of high electoral uncertainty, parties are likely to give up on less promising voters (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) and concentrate on those voters who are uncommitted (swing) or otherwise can be easily persuaded to switch sides. Since poor voters are marginally less expensive than affluent voters in the sense that the former can be swayed relatively easily with material incentives than the latter (Robinson and Verdier, 2002; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes et al., 2012), the incumbent would be incentivized to resort to clientelism when it is threatened by a strong opposition at the polls. Hence, while the presence of a strong opponent motivates the incumbent to buy votes, the availability of substantial resource rents provides it with the means to do so.

Furthermore, the incumbent's response to intensifying electoral competition would also depend on how many poor voters it can afford to buy off through clientelism, and whether that can make up for the loss of support from the non-poor voters, who might be turned off by vote-buying. In terms of the cost of clientelism (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012), I expect that a certain fraction of the non-poor voters is always highly averse to clientelistic practices in any setting. In contrast, clientelism's benefits vary in accordance with the total number of poor voters who might be willing to sell their votes, as well as the amount of resources available to be spent on them. Hence, the benefits an incumbent expects to receive from clientelism are more likely to exceed the costs whenever the rate of poverty and the amount of resource rents are large. In short, given intense competition, the incumbent party would resort to clientelistic spending of resource rents when it has access to large amounts of such rents and if there are many poor voters willing to sell their votes.

As described previously, when the incumbent uses resource rents for clientelism, the opposition is placed at a disadvantage. The opposition's best strategy in a hotly contested election where its opponent relies on clientelism is to opt for economic populism. Depending on the size or attractiveness of the "delayed" benefits promised to voters, an economically populist electoral strategy could be effective in neutralizing the incumbent's advantage with poor voters. For the strategy to be effective at enticing voters to forgo their immediate material gains in exchange for even larger near future benefits, the opposition's promise must be credible to voters. Here, a large amount of resource wealth lends credibility to the party's promise.

Given the opposition's choice of economic populism as a counter strategy to clientelism, the incumbent would be forced to make similar populist promises if it anticipates that substantial number of voters, enough to swing the election, might defect to the opposition party. Once both parties have converged on the same strategy of economic populism, then neither side can gain anything from back-tracking, resulting in an equilibrium where the election is effectively reduced to a contest of who can promise the most spoils from resource extraction. Such economically populist contests, once emerged, can continue as long as the resource boom lasts. Over time, political parties' previously held ideological commitments might gradually lose their salience to most voters. After repeated rounds of such elections, voters might internalize the new norm that elections are mainly about extracting the most spoils from the state rather than choosing from policy alternatives.

Lack of meaningful policy alternatives means that economic populism erodes the key quality of elections as an effective mechanism of democratic accountability. This is because voters may not be able to punish politicians for policy failures or reward them for success if they are tempted by material inducements financed by resource rents. Moreover, parties may not be able to accurately interpret voter behavior since economic populism could make it difficult to determine why voters voted or did not vote for a particular party, e.g., did a party lose voters because of policy failures or because the rival party promised more money? Even if one envisions elections as not about accountability but rather as opportunities for voters to select good types of political leaders (Fearon, 1999), then an election where all major parties pursue similar, if not identical, economic populist schemes would make it difficult for voters to distinguish the good candidates from bad ones. Even when they can identify good candidates, voters may still be tempted by material inducements that compel them to compromise their true political preferences.

A close election during a resource boom in a context of high poverty reduces political parties' time-horizons, making programmatic utilization of resource revenues rather impractical as a policy choice and as an election strategy. Intense competition imposes high uncertainty on parties regarding the future. When there are many poor voters, a ruling party that is not sure about whether it will keep its job cannot afford to invest resource rents in programs whose benefits may materialize only in the long run. In this situation, it is politically expedient for the incumbent to utilize resource rents to buy support. Given the incumbent's vote buying with rents, it is rational for the opposition to choose economic populism, and the opposition's choice of economic populism, in turn, could provoke the incumbent to do the same provided the conditions described above.

Electoral competition in Mongolia illustrates how economic populism could emerge in a natural resource dependent democracy. Since 1990, Mon-

golia has held eight consecutive parliamentary elections, producing several peaceful transfers of power between the two dominant political parties. A sharp policy division over economic issues, namely the extent of neoliberal free-market reforms, dominated the first four elections that were held prior to the mining boom. During this time, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)—the former communist party—ideologically positioned itself as a socialist adversary to “shock therapy” reforms that the new opposition forces, collectively called the Democratic Party (DP), all fervently supported. While the MPRP used a combination of patronage and programmatic election strategies, the DP lacked the means with which to distribute clientelistic goods and hence relied solely on a center-right programmatic appeal for votes. This rise of robust multipartism with broadly programmatic parties espousing distinct and coherent policy choices has been identified as one of the key reasons for Mongolia's successful democratic consolidation. Fish (1998, 135) described Mongolian party system as “one of the postcommunist region's most mature party systems.”

Nonetheless, from the early 2000s, a shift from programs toward economic populism coincided with the emergence of the mining industry as the only economic game in town. In stark contrast to the earlier elections, elections during the mining boom (2004–2012) were essentially reduced to who can promise the most cash to voters. For instance, in the 2008 parliamentary elections the opposition DP promised to provide 1 million tugriks or roughly \$855 in the form of what the party called “Erdeniin huvi” or “Wealth Share.” If elected into office, the DP's election platform stated that the party will distribute the money to every citizen. The incumbent MPRP responded by outbidding the DP with a pledge of 1.5 million tugriks or about \$1,282 (Uradyn, 2009). In the next parliamentary elections of 2012, both parties promised shares from the state-owned Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi, one of Mongolia's largest mines. This deprogrammatization of parties occurred as Mongolia became increasingly dependent on mining rents and as political competition between the major parties intensified. Furthermore, persistent and substantial level of poverty among the voters, which emerged in the early 1990s, contributed to the rise of economic populism that transformed Mongolia's electoral competition from a contest of ideas to a source for economic mismanagement.

When do parties choose programmatic spending of resource rents?

An incumbent party presiding over a resource boom would pursue programmatic spending of rents under two conditions. First, the party is likely to adopt programmatic spending when it is confident in its ability to maintain power even if the opponent attempts to buy voters via economically populist promises. This scenario is likely when there is little political competition as in a dominant party system or when the opposition is highly fractionalized as in a mul-

tiparty system with a hegemonic incumbent party. In either context where the incumbent party does not face real competition, it has fewer electoral incentives to buy off political support even if poverty is widespread. The absence of competition provides the incumbent with much-desired flexibility in the choice of fiscal policy, thereby expanding the party's time horizons. Second, the incumbent and the opposition would both prefer programmatic spending of rents when the electorate is generally comprised of affluent voters even if electoral competition between them is intense. Where there are many affluent voters who are averse to vote buying, political parties are more likely to respond to intensifying competition by emphasizing their distinct programmatic commitments (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

Botswana is a widely cited success story in the literature that typifies the first scenario. Like Mongolia, Botswana is a sparsely populated, arid, and land-locked democracy. At independence in 1966, it was one of the poorest nations in Africa with an annual per capita income of \$70 in constant 2000 USD. During the first years of independence, more than 60 percent of its current government expenditures consisted of foreign aid; there were only 12 kilometers of paved roads, and the economy was largely agrarian (Lewin, 2011). Over the subsequent decades, Botswana achieved a remarkable level of economic development largely based on export of diamonds. Although its agrarian economy was transformed into one that is heavily dependent on mining, it achieved sustained economic growth, averaging about 7 percent annually, between 1966 and 1999 (Lewin, 2011). Currently, Botswana's per capita GDP is well over \$7,000 at constant 2000 USD, making it an upper-income country.

While mineral dependency in many other countries has led to slow growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995), violent civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and authoritarianism (Ross, 2001), Botswana enjoyed political stability and economic prosperity because its leaders managed resource revenues wisely. The ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has never lost an election in the country's democratic history, was able to spend diamond rents on programmatic and public goods. The BDP was able to do so because the party has not been seriously threatened by a strong political rival even though the vast majority of Botswana's voters were poor. Without electoral incentives to buy political support, the BDP used the country's mining rents for improving the citizen's education, health, and human capital. In fact, education has been the largest recipient of public expenditures, consistently accounting for nearly half of the total government budget (Hjort, 2006). The BDP also invested heavily into infrastructure; and most importantly, it saved diamond revenues in sovereign wealth funds, which helped the country keep consistent current account surpluses and maintain a healthy balance of payments.

Norway, another commonly cited example of a successful mineral rich democracy, illustrates the second scenario. When oil and gas were first discov-

ered in the North Sea in the mid-1960s, Norway was already a highly developed country with a per capita GDP of nearly \$28,000 in constant 2000 USD, according to World Development Indicators. Mineral production took off from the mid-1970s and over the next decades, the petroleum sector has come to account for as much as half of the total exports and about 15 to 20 percent of the total GDP. Norway is often lauded for its prudent management of oil rents, especially for the famous revenue saving fund called the “Government Pension Fund.” This fund was set up in 1990 to invest the surpluses of rents from the petroleum industry. Today, it has a total worth of over \$1 trillion or \$192,000 per Norwegian citizen (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2017).

Although Labour has historically been the largest political party in Norway, it has not been able to dominate the political landscape single-handedly like the BDP has in Botswana. By and large, Norway’s elections since the mid-twentieth century have been characterized by strong party competition. Since 1961, no party has ever formed a majority government on its own, and hence minority or coalition governments have been the rule. Between 1981 and 2005, the period during which the petroleum industry first emerged and later matured, political power has alternated between various minority governments led by Labour and center right Conservative coalitions. Despite such electoral fractionalization, Norwegian political parties abstained from economic populism and clientelism given that the rate of poverty has been marginal, and the constituencies have been composed of middle-class voters who were averse to vote-buying.

Empirical analysis

Based on the theoretical framework developed in the previous section, I formulate and test the hypothesis that holding all else constant, an increase in resource dependence is associated with a decrease in programmatic party-voter linkages when party competition is intense. Resource dependence indicates lack of economic diversification and hence also proxies for underdevelopment. Highly industrialized and economically developed countries are seldom dependent on natural resources whereas the opposite is the case for developing countries. Therefore, resource dependence, by definition, is itself an interaction of natural resources and economic development.

To empirically test whether the relationship between programmatic linkages and resource dependence varies systematically with political competition in democracies, the following statistical model is developed:

$$Programmatic_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Resources_{it} + \beta_2 * Competition_{it} + \beta_3 (Resources_{it} * Competition_{it}) + \beta_4 * Controls_{it} + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Here, i indexes countries and t years. *Programmatic* stands for programmatic linkages between a country's major political parties and voters. *Resources* indicates the extent to which a country is dependent on natural resource rents. *Competition* is a measure of electoral competitiveness between a country's major political parties. *Controls* stands for control variables. To control for possible trends over time in the regressors as well as to account for any year specific unobserved factors that might induce contemporaneous correlation among the cases, I make use of δ_t which denotes time fixed effects. Based on my hypothesis, I expect β_3 to be negative. This means that resource dependence is more likely to deprogrammatize political parties when party competition is intense. At the margins, the total effect of *Resources on Programmatic* can be estimated by:


$$\frac{\partial \text{Competition}_{it}}{\partial \text{Resources}_{it}} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 * \text{Competition}_{it}$$

I use a time-fixed effect model because party-voter linkages, while varying significantly from country to country, do not change much within countries from year to year. This can be seen from Figure 1, which shows that much of the variation in the dependent variable, Programmatic Linkages, comes from cross-national differences. (Note the much wider range on the Y-axis as compared to the X-axis). Since party-voter linkages for an average country changes very little, if at all, over the entire period under investigation, a country-fixed or random effects model may not be appropriate. Moreover, the time-fixed effects model allows me to account for time-common resource shocks like booms and busts in the world commodities prices that may affect the key independent variable.

A total of 97 countries over a period of thirty years between 1980 and 2010 were included in the analysis. The time span of 1980–2010 was selected primarily due to data availability for some of my key control variables. Countries were selected based on whether they were considered democracies, according to Boix et al. (2014), who define a polity as democratic if its leaders are elected through free and fair elections and if the majority of the population is enfranchised.

The dependent variable, *Programmatic*, is the “Party Linkages” index from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017). This variable is based on country expert surveys that ask the question, “among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?” For any given country, it measures the type of “goods” political parties offer in exchange for electoral support and varies from 0 to 4 on an interval scale. Higher scores indicate parties are more programmatic.

Figure 1. Variation of the dependent variable, party-voter linkages of accountability



Source: Party-voter linkages index from the varieties of democracy (V-Dem).
 Notes: See Appendix A for the complete list of countries with country name abbreviations.


For the 97 democracies included in my dataset, over the period between 1980 and 2010, the average score for *Programmatic* was 2.60 while the median was 2.80, suggesting a slightly negatively skewed distribution. The lowest score in the whole sample was 0.54 for Venezuela in 2004. In contrast, the Netherlands consistently received the highest score of 3.96, which remained unchanged during the whole period.

My main independent variable, *Resources*, is the “Total Natural Resource Rents” indicator from the World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2011). This variable measures the total amount of rents generated by natural resource extraction as a fraction of GDP. The total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents, and forest rents. The estimate of rents for each commodity is calculated as the difference between the world price of that commodity and the cost of extracting it. The resulting difference is then multiplied by the total units of that commodity produced by a country within a calendar year. Because it is calculated by dividing the total natural resource rents accrued to a country within a year by

the GDP of that country in the same year, it assesses the degree of economic dependence on natural resources rents.

High resource dependence means either the numerator—the amount of resource rents—is very large or the denominator—overall economic development measured by GDP—is relatively low, or both. Among the sample of democracies included in my dataset over the entire period under investigation, resource dependency and economic development were negatively correlated ($r = -0.50$). This negative relationship, visualized in Figure 2, is consistent with my assumption that resource dependence indicates low levels of economic diversification or industrialization, hence also proxies for underdevelopment. The average resource dependence for the whole data sample was 5.34 percent. The least resource dependent democracy was Israel, whose total rents from natural resources constituted less than 0.002 percent of its GDP. On the other hand, Trinidad and Tobago was the most resource dependent democracy with resource rents accounting for over 68.56 percent of GDP in 2006. Resource dependence is also negatively correlated with the dependent variable *Programmatic* with $r = -0.45$.

Figure 2. Resource dependence and economic development among democracies in 2010



Source: Total resource rents and the GDP data are from World Development Indicators (WDI).
Notes: See Appendix A for the complete list of countries with country name abbreviations.

The key conditioning variable is *Competition*, which comes from Vanhanen Tatu's "Measures of Democracy" dataset (Vanhanen, 2014). This variable measures the degree of electoral competitiveness between political parties. It is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes won by the largest party (the party that wins the most votes). In my dataset, *Competition* varies from a minimum of 7.8 percent to a maximum of 70 percent, with an average of 53.61 percent. A higher percentage indicates higher level of party competition. Depending on their importance, either parliamentary or presidential elections, or both, were used in the calculation.

GDPpc is the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita in constant 2005 US dollars. This variable is used to control for the direct effect of economic development on party-voter linkages. *GDPsq* is the squared term of *GDPpc*. It is used to control for the curvilinear relationship between development and linkages, described by previous literature. Following Kitschelt and Kselman (2012), I use *Democracy Stock* variable to control for the effects of accumulated democratic experience on party linkages. Based on Gerring et al. (2011), this variable operationalizes democratic experience by adding up a country's total score on Polity IV index of democracy beginning in 1900 with 1 percent annual depreciation rate in order to give more weight to recent democratic experience. The variable is normalized to vary from 0 to 1 with higher score suggesting larger accumulated democratic experience. To separately account for the effect of current quality of democratic institutions from the accumulated historical experience with democracy, I also include the contemporaneous Polity IV index of democracy. Systemic and institutional uncertainties might make political parties less inclined to pursue programmatic linkages. Hence, my analysis contains the Polity IV index of "Regime Durability," which measures the number of years passed since the most recent regime change. Moreover, I include several economic variables that were used by Kitschelt and Kselman (2012) to account for the level of economic uncertainty or macro-economic instability that might complicate political parties' efforts to build programmatic linkages. These are the current account balance, net foreign direct investment, and total merchandise trade. I also use politico-geographic dummies to control for potentially region-specific variation. Lastly, I control for ethnic fractionalization and total population size. Political institutional variables, such as different electoral systems or type of governments, i.e. presidential or parliamentary, are not included in my analysis. This is because previous studies, including most notably Keefer (2007), have determined that these variables do not explain cross-national variance of party-voter linkages. A complete list of countries can be found in *Appendix A*. The variable descriptions and their sources are available in *Appendix B*. *Appendix C* contains descriptive statistics of all variables.


Results

Table 1 contains results from a series of linear OLS regression analysis. Columns 1–3 display the baseline models where the two independent variables, along with the controls, are regressed on the dependent variable without an interaction term. Model 1 shows the individual effect of resource dependence on programmatic linkages when political competition is excluded, and model 2 displays the effects of political competition when resource dependence is absent. Model 3 estimates the effects of each independent variable when controlling for the other.

We can see that the main independent variable, *Resources*, is negatively associated with programmatic linkages, on average. The negative and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) coefficient of resource dependence on programmatic linkages in model 1 remains unchanged in model 3. The conditioning variable, *Competition*, is positively associated with programmatic linkages in all baseline models, although the estimated coefficients are statistically significant only at $p < 0.1$. The main model shown in column 4 disaggregates the impact of *Resources* on programmatic linkages by including the interaction of *Resources*Competition*. First, we can observe that the direct effects of *Resources* and *Competition* on programmatic linkages are both positive and statistically significant in this model. The model estimates that if *Competition* were zero, each additional percentage of *Resources* would be associated with an average increase of 0.017 points on the dependent variable, suggesting more programmaticism. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of *Competition* implies that each percentage increase in the vote share of minor parties (hence more competition) is associated with an increase of 0.005 points in the dependent variable when *Resources* is held at zero.

However, the interaction between *Resources* and *Competition* shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient with $p < 0.01$ (row 3, column 4). This means that political competition plays an important intervening role in determining the effects of resource dependence on party-voter linkages. Natural resource dependence is more likely to have a negative effect on party-voter linkages when electoral competition is high. Figure 3 illustrates the marginal effects of resource dependence on programmatic linkages at different levels of party competition. Whereas the downward sloping, solid line shows how the marginal effect of *Resources* changes in accordance with the observed range of *Competition*, the upper and bottom gray shades indicate the 95 percent confidence interval (CI).

Figure 3. Marginal effects of resource dependence on programmatic linkages at different levels of party competition




Note: The middle-solid line shows the marginal impact of a 1 percent increase of Resources on Programmatic Linkages at varying levels of political completion. The upper and lower bounds of the gray shades are 95 percent confidence intervals.

Table 1. Time-Fixed Effects Regression Analysis

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Resources	-0.006*** (0.002)		-0.006*** (0.002)	0.017* (0.009)
Competition		0.003* (0.001)		0.005*** (0.002)
Competition*Resources				-0.0004*** (0.0002)
GDPpc	-0.416** (0.169)	-0.261 (0.168)	-0.369** (0.171)	-0.257 (0.176)
GDPpcSqr	0.053*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.049*** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.011)
PolityIV	0.041*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.011)	0.037*** (0.011)
Democracy Stock	0.462*** (0.165)	0.376** (0.165)	0.451*** (0.165)	0.447*** (0.165)
Regime Durability	0.001 (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Trade	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
Current Account	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
FDI	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Population	0.006 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.005 (0.014)	0.001 (0.014)
Ethnicity	-0.306*** (0.086)	-0.359*** (0.084)	-0.302*** (0.086)	-0.322*** (0.086)
Post-Communist	0.697*** (0.063)	0.715*** (0.063)	0.691*** (0.063)	0.697*** (0.063)
Middle-East/Africa	0.671*** (0.055)	0.733*** (0.054)	0.682*** (0.056)	0.698*** (0.056)
Advanced	0.035 (0.086)	0.084 (0.086)	0.048 (0.087)	0.096 (0.088)
Asia/Pacific	0.518*** (0.066)	0.525*** (0.067)	0.507*** (0.067)	0.541*** (0.068)
Observations	1,931	1,942	1,931	1,931
R ²	0.653	0.652	0.654	0.655
Adjusted R ²	0.645	0.643	0.645	0.647
F Statistic	236.859*** (df = 15; 1885)	236.439*** (df = 15; 1896)	222.434*** (df = 16; 1884)	210.437*** (df = 17; 1883)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 4. The Effect of Resource Dependence on Programmatic Linkages at Different Levels of Competition



Note: Y-axis shows the predicted value of the dependent variable, Programmatic Linkages, and X-axis displays the main independent variable, Resource Dependence. Top, middle, and bottom lines each correspond 10, 54, and 70 percent of political competition, respectively.

We can see that the marginal effect of resource dependence becomes statistically significant once the level of competition surpasses roughly 49 percent. Because *Competition* is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes gained by the largest party, 49 percent corresponds to the combined vote share of all minor parties. It is not unusual for the combined vote share of all opposition parties to surpass 50 percent. A political party can and does win elections without receiving the absolute majority of votes, especially when the opposition is fragmented. The histogram of political competition in the bottom of Figure 3 also suggests that the interaction term is not statistically significant at lower levels of competition simply due to lack of sufficient number of observed cases. The interaction term is statistically significant where the great majority of the cases are observed.

In this analysis, I have controlled for other important determinants of party-voter linkages. In line with Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2012), my results confirm the existence of a positive and curvilinear effect of economic devel-

opment on programmatic linkages as evidenced by the statistically significant coefficient of *GDPsqr* in all models. The estimated coefficient of *Regime Durability* variable in the main model is also statistically significant and positive. This suggests that regime stability is positively associated with programmatic linkages. In addition, the *Democracy Stock* variable has a positive and significant coefficient, which means that increasing accumulated democratic experience leads to programmatic linkages. This result verifies the findings of Keefer (2007). The coefficients on regional dummy variables indicate to what extent each region is different from Latin America.

To elucidate the substantive meaning of the interaction term, I now refer to a two-way interaction plot displayed in Figure 4. In this plot, I hold all variables not involved in the interaction at their means; and then show the predicted values of the dependent variable on the Y-axis and resource dependence on the X-axis. The three lines each indicate the impact of resource dependence on programmatic linkages at different levels of the moderating *Competition* variable. The middle line corresponds to the impact of *Resources* on *Programmatic* when *Competition* is held at its mean (54 percent). The top line indicates the effect of *Resources* when *Competition* is very low: in this case 10 percent. The bottom/solid line illustrates the relationship between programmatic linkages and resource dependence when competition is at 70 percent, the highest value observed in my data sample.

We can see that when electoral competition is low, resource dependence is positively associated with programmatic linkages, as indicated by the steep upward trending top line. However, it must be noted that this relationship is not statistically significant as discussed earlier. When competition is held at its mean value, the predicted impact of resource dependence becomes noticeably negative as shown by the slightly downward descending middle line. In the case of highly competitive political environment, the model predicts that resource dependence will have significantly negative impact on programmatic linkages as illustrated by the steep downward sloping bottom line. These estimated results support my hypothesis: resource dependence de-programmatizes political parties in countries where electoral competition is high.

Conclusion

Although natural resource wealth presents opportunities for developing countries to accelerate economic development, too often such opportunities are missed. In this chapter, I show how and why natural resource rents are often mismanaged. I argued that strong electoral competition coupled with high poverty compels political parties to misuse natural resource wealth through clientelism and economic populism. I illustrated the conditional effects of resources on programmatic party-voter linkages through illustrative cases and statistical analysis.

With low levels of economic development where poverty is widespread, natural resources create extreme dependence on rents. High resource dependence deprogrammatizes political parties in countries where parties face intense electoral competition. However, where electoral competition is negligible, resource dependence can strengthen programmatic linkages. For a country that already enjoys high levels of economic development, natural resources neither creates resource dependence, nor causes political parties to become more clientelistic.

The chapter's main finding implies that natural resources are not necessarily harmful for governance in democracies that are either economically developed or politically less competitive. Even for poor democracies, resources may even strengthen programmatic parties if political competition is minimal. Yet, for poor democracies that feature high electoral competition, resources are likely to contribute to clientelistic or economically populist spending. Hence, developing democracies with abundant resources are advised to keep electoral competition less intense if they are to avoid the resource curse.

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Appendix A. Country List

Country	Abbreviation	Country	Abbreviation
Albania	ALB	Madagascar	MDG
Argentina	ARG	Malawi	MWI
Australia	AUS	Mali	MLI
Austria	AUT	Mauritius	MUS
Bangladesh	BGD	Mexico	MEX
Belarus	BLR	Moldova	MDA
Belgium	BEL	Mongolia	MNG
Benin	BEN	Mozambique	MOZ
Bolivia	BOL	Nepal	NPL
Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	Netherlands	NLD
Botswana	BWA	New Zealand	NZL
Brazil	BRA	Nicaragua	NIC
Bulgaria	BGR	Niger	NER
Burundi	BDI	Nigeria	NGA
Canada	CAN	Norway	NOR
Central African Republic	CAF	Pakistan	PAK
Chile	CHL	Panama	PAN
Colombia	COL	Papua New Guinea	PNG
Costa Rica	CRI	Paraguay	PRY
Croatia	HRV	Peru	PER
Czech Republic	CZE	Philippines	PHL
Denmark	DNK	Poland	POL
Dominican Republic	DOM	Portugal	PRT
Ecuador	ECU	Romania	ROU
El Salvador	SLV	Russia	RUS
Estonia	EST	Senegal	SEN
Finland	FIN	Serbia	SRB
France	FRA	Sierra Leone	SLE
Gambia	GMB	Slovakia	SVK
Georgia	GEO	Slovenia	SVN
Germany	DEU	South Africa	ZAF
Ghana	GHA	South Korea	KOR
Greece	GRC	Spain	ESP
Guatemala	GTM	Sri Lanka	LKA
Guinea-Bissau	GNB	Sweden	SWE
Honduras	HND	Switzerland	CHE
Hungary	HUN	Thailand	THA

Appendix A (continued)

Country	Abbreviation	Country	Abbreviation
India	IND	Timor-Leste	TLS
Indonesia	IDN	Trinidad and Tobago	TTO
Ireland	IRL	Turkey	TUR
Israel	ISR	Uganda	UGA
Italy	ITA	Ukraine	UKR
Jamaica	JAM	United Kingdom	GBR
Japan	JPN	United States	USA
Kenya	KEN	Uruguay	URY
Latvia	LVA	Venezuela	VEN
Lesotho	LSO	Zambia	ZMB
Liberia	LBR		
Lithuania	LTU		
Macedonia	MKD	Total number of countries 97	

Appendix B. Description of Variables and their Sources

Variable	Description	Source
Programmatic	An index that measures the main or most common form of linkage of major political parties to their constituents.	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset 7.1
Resources	Total natural resource rents as a fraction of GDP. The total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents, and forest rents. The estimate of rents for each commodity is calculated as the difference between the world price of that commodity and the cost of extracting it. The resulting difference is then multiplied by the total units of that commodity produced by a country within a calendar year.	World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset.
Competition	The percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections.	Tatu Vanhanen's "Measures of Democracy" dataset (Vanhanen, 2014).
GDPpc	The natural logarithm of per capita Gross Domestic Product in constant 2005 US dollars.	World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset.
Polity IV	The autocracy/democracy scale of Polity IV	Polity IV
Democracy Stock	Accumulated democratic experience, calculated by summing up a country's total score on Polity IV index of democracy beginning in 1900 with 1 percent annual depreciation rate.	Gerring et al. (2005)
Regime Durability	Regime durability measured as the years passed since the most recent regime change.	Polity IV
Trade	Merchandise trade as a share of GDP.	World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset.
Current Account	Current account balance.	IMF
FDI	Foreign direct investment, net inflows as a percentage of GDP.	World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset.
Population	Natural logarithm of population size in 1000's	Gleditsch (2002)
Ethnicity	Ethnic fractionalization measured as the probability that two randomly selected people from a country will not share.	Alesina et al (2003)
Post-Communist	Dummy variable coded 1 for all former communist countries.	Self-coded
Middle East/Africa	Dummy variable coded 1 for countries in the Middle East and Africa.	Self-coded
Advanced	Dummy variable coded 1 for OECD countries.	Self-coded
Asia Pacific	Dummy variable coded 1 for Asia and the Pacific regions.	Self-coded

Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	n	Min	q ₁	\tilde{x}	\bar{x}	q ₃	Max	s	IQR	#NA
Year	2049	1980.0	1991.0	1998.0	1997.2	2004.0	2010.0	8.4	13.0	0
Programmatic	2049	0.5	1.7	2.8	2.6	3.6	4.0	1.0	1.9	0
Competition	2049	7.8	47.0	54.6	53.6	62.7	70.0	11.9	15.7	0
Resources	1982	0.0	0.7	2.2	5.3	6.3	68.6	8.3	5.6	67
Resources (log)	1982	0.0	0.5	1.2	1.3	2.0	4.2	1.0	1.5	67
GDP (log)	2022	4.9	7.3	8.5	8.5	10.1	11.1	1.6	2.8	27
Current Account	2025	-54.8	-5.3	-2.2	-2.3	0.8	45.6	6.6	6.1	24
FDI	1984	-16.1	0.6	1.6	2.9	3.6	87.4	4.6	3.0	65
Trade	2015	9.1	36.7	50.6	56.9	73.0	180.9	28.8	36.3	34
Stock	2039	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.2	0.4	10
Regime	2046	0.0	7.0	17.0	32.0	44.0	201.0	37.6	37.0	3
Polity IV	2034	-5.0	7.0	9.0	8.3	10.0	10.0	1.9	3.0	15
Ethnicity	2024	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.2	0.4	25
Population (log)	2043	6.4	8.4	9.2	9.4	10.5	14.0	1.4	2.2	6

The Influence of International Relations on Democratization, 1972–2005

Mathias De Roeck and Ronan Van Rossem

World polity theory argues that international relations foster the diffusion of democracy. The theory, however, faces difficulties accounting for the global stagnation of democracy from the mid-nineties on. This chapter claims that the structure of a complex system of international dependency ties in which countries are embedded determines chances for democracy. Where during the Cold War, the international system was quite rigid, and democracy conditional upon East-West orientation, after the Cold War a short period of Western hegemony quickly gave way to globalization which prompted the diversification of dependency ties. This challenged the supremacy of the democratic script not only by exposing countries to new models of political governance (i.e. market authoritarianism) but also by allowing a balance against Western pressure to democratize. The chapter tests this argument by relying on a multidimensional dataset of dependency ties among countries for the period 1972–2005 and an alternative measure of democracy. The chapter finds that embeddedness in dependency networks with democratic partners stimulates democratization while embeddedness in dependency networks with authoritarian partners impedes it. Yet, the chapter also finds that the positive effect of dependency networks with democratic partners on democratization declines significantly after the Cold War, and that this is related to the rapid rise of the People's Republic of China in international trade.

Introduction

With The Third Wave of democratization liberal democracy seemed to become the dominant model of political governance worldwide (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1991).¹ As more and more countries became democratic, many analysts believed others would quickly follow suit. Yet from the mid-nineties onwards it soon transpired that the global spread of democracy did not affect all countries equally. Not only were adoption rates of democracy lower in this period, many states also developed relatively stable hybrid regimes and others remained purely authoritarian (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 2002). This chapter seeks to explain why democratization stalled in the post-Cold War era.

1 Huntington (1991, 15) defines a “wave of democratization” as “a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction.”

According to world polity theory (WPT), global democratization results from countries' growing integration in international organizations. International integration exposes countries to rationalized scripts of political governance and facilitates the diffusion of Western models, including democracy (Meyer et al., 1997). The underlying mechanism of these processes of democratization is what Powell and DiMaggio (1991) call normative isomorphism. States adopt democracy because they seek status and legitimacy in an increasingly interconnected world society. While the world polity model goes a long way in explaining institutional *homogenization*, it faces limits when it comes to accounting for institutional *divergence* (Beckert, 2010). Deviations from democratic scripts are depicted as temporary and informal and not as substantial or meaningful in their own regard.

The structural model offers an alternative view on the environment-democracy nexus. The model refutes both the mechanisms as well as the content of the world polity. Regarding the mechanisms, the structural model emphasizes not only the highly structured nature of the international system, but also that it primarily should be seen as a power-dependency network (Galtung, 1971; Van Rossem, 1996). Rather than a "world of Durkheimian or Simmelian integration," countries integrate in a hierarchical system of interdependent activities (Meyer et al., 1997, 175). They establish dependencies (i.e. ties that are costly to break) in search for (im)material resources and thereby become vulnerable to demands and pressures of partner states. Such a view is consistent with open systems theory, resource dependency theory and other relational theories of power. Democracy is most likely to diffuse when powerful democratic partners coerce dependent states to adopt democratic models. Concerning the content of the world polity, the structural model conceives cultural expectations not as a given. Instead, models of appropriate behavior are widely contested and shaped by the preferences and interests of the most powerful states (Krasner, 2009). The normative context is therefore perpetually in flux.

This chapter argues that the overall structure and content of dependency ties impacts the democracy diffusion process in important ways, explaining why democratization stalls from the mid-nineties on. During and in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, international resources were highly concentrated. Countries belonged to the communist East or democratic West and had few alternatives. It was a bipolar international order. While Western powers indeed supported various dictatorships in order to contain communism, incentives for doing so declined with the gradual weakening of the Soviet Union (USSR) from 1979 on (Cohen, 2015, 83; Mann, 2013, 113). The eventual collapse of the USSR and the start of a short unipolar period made Western pressure to democratize profound. As a result, Central and Eastern European states democratized and became part of the European Community; states south of the Sahara organized elections by default and in Latin America

political liberalization occurred in several long-standing dictatorships.² These changes even led some scholars to identify a distinct fourth wave of democratization (McFaul, 2002).

From the mid-nineties on, however, the post-Cold War order entered a new and increasingly multipolar and global era. Materially, for many dependent states, the rapid rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and other regional powers in world affairs implied a diversification of dependency ties and alternatives to Western resources (Jenkins, 2012; Mason, 2017; Taylor, 2014). Between 1989 and 2006, for instance, bilateral trade between China and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) increased exponentially—a trend that only continued afterwards (Taylor, 2009; Tull, 2006).³ Furthermore, the rise of China and other regional powers also quickly restored the legitimacy of market authoritarianism at the expense of Washington Consensus institutions (Halper, 2010). All this not only undermined Western hegemony in international affairs, it also stimulated core power competition in the (semi-)periphery. This, in turn, offered dependent states opportunities to decouple from the Western democratic script and most likely took away incentives in the West to promote democracy abroad (Cooley, 2015).

This chapter contributes to the literature on democracy diffusion in two ways. First, the chapter presents the international environment as a multidimensional power network in which countries not only trade, but also engage in political and military exchange (Mann, 2013). By focusing almost exclusively on spatial (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; O'Loughlin et al., 1998) political (Pevehouse, 2002; Wejnert, 2005) or economic (Beck et al., 2006; Li and Reuveny, 2003) networks of international exchange, many previous studies fell short of taking into account the inherently multiplex character of the international environment. Secondly, the chapter pays explicit attention to the structure of dependency ties in international relations to explain democratization. Most of the studies cited above by and large ignored these complex structures. Although world-system analysis indeed provides a major exception, this type of analysis is restricted because it mainly focuses on trade relations (Balaev, 2009; Bollen, 1983; Clark, 2012). This article also goes beyond Torfason and Ingram's (2010) study on democracy diffusion by investigating how globalization, and the rise of China in particular, challenged democratization across the globe.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section briefly discusses the world polity model of democratization. The second section introduces the

2 As Levitsky and Way (2015, 50) explain: "lacking resources, external allies or reliable coercive institutions, many of autocracies fell into severe crisis after 1989. The result was widespread 'pluralism by default,' in which competition occurred because "governments lacked even rudimentary means to suppress opposition challenges."

3 For Latin America, see Jenkins (2012).

structural perspective and formulates concrete hypotheses as per the (conditional) impact of integration in dependency networks with democratic and authoritarian partners on democratic change. The third section contains the empirical analysis, while the final section concludes.

International relations and democratization: The world polity model

WPT focuses on the homogenization of nations. The theory argues that international integration exposes countries to a uniform cultural environment where normative scripts of modern state behavior determine domestic institutions, culminating in global institutional convergence. Most, if not all, of these scripts originate from Western Enlightenment thinking. The “taken-for-grantedness” of Western models results from Western centrality in the international system, due to capitalism and Christianity, and an emphasis on progress and justice. The notion of liberal democracy is one of the (leading) normative scripts in the global system (Torfason and Ingram, 2010).

For WPT, international governmental (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are the prime carriers of democratic scripts. These organizations expanded dramatically after World War II and together they constitute the skeleton of world society. Countries are exposed to and influenced by international culture by forging ties with these organizations. This means that the more numerous, and the more countries these organizations incorporate, the more likely that democracy gets spread. Wejnert (2005, 67), for instance, finds that links to IGOs are critical predictors of democratization. She states that “once diffusion predictors were added to the model, the significance of development predictors faded.” Other studies came up with similar results (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Pevehouse, 2002). In a similar vein, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) demonstrate that citizens’ participation in INGOs positively affects government respect for human rights. The more citizens join INGOs, the less likely leaders are to violate the rights of their citizens.

Interestingly, for WPT, democracy diffusion does not result from international structures (Strang and Meyer, 1993). The international system is an associational environment where cultural integration generally outstrips international hierarchy. Democracy diffusion is best described as a process of cultural enactment and an outcome of normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The international environment is made up of rules of appropriate behavior and provides specific blueprints of democratic action. States adhere to global norms and democratic scripts “in order to be regarded as legitimate members of world society” (Krücken and Drori, 2009, 15). By adopting democratic models, countries seek to secure their role and status in the international state-system (Simmons et al., 2008).

International relations and democratization: The structural perspective

The structural perspective differs from WPT in several respects. Most importantly, the structural perspective conceives the international system not as an associational but as a power-dependency network. States are embedded in systems of interdependent activities in which they exchange (im)material resources. For Galtung (1971, 85), these interaction structures are both vertical and feudal. Vertical means that (inter)national consequences of interaction are largely unequal. For some, it implies the export of raw commodities and resource depletion. For others, it means the import of raw *materials* and the production and export of processed goods. The feudal component suggests this interaction structure is self-perpetuating. Winners of the system will try to protect it, while losers generally have to accept it. Because states need other states to obtain (im)material resources to satisfy national demands, the outcome is an international network of dependency and power relations (Krasner, 2009, 129). Dependency exists when the costs of breaking-up an exchange relation are substantial. This model considers the international environment as a coercive system structured by the control of resources (Van Rossem, 1996).

The structural perspective also has a profoundly different view on the cultural content of international relations. First, it takes a realist position and considers states as sovereign and rational actors and as primordial units in international affairs. States are driven by two logics of action, i.e. *logics of consequences and logics of appropriateness* (Krasner, 2009, 213). Logics of consequences is state action based on maximizing national interest, like the need to secure resources abroad. Logics of appropriateness, on the other hand, is action based on normative considerations. It is part of a country's self-image, i.e. what a country considers right and moral. There is little dispute that these two logics of state action oftentimes clash. More important, however, is that logics of action not only determine national behavior, but also expectations vis-à-vis dependent states. Respect for human rights and democracy, for instance, are part and parcel of US foreign policy. This suggests states are not only subject to the environment, but also give it form and substance. As such, states, much more than I(N)GOs, act as diffusion agents. They are the prime carriers of normative scripts and actively project these templates abroad. Their reach, however, depends on the scope of international connections and the extent to which they can attract dependencies. I(N)GOs are only relevant to the degree they follow state-driven principles. Hence, the structural model presents democracy diffusion as a relational and coercive process that operates in accordance with socio-structural realities.

From the reasoning above, one can draw alternate inferences on democracy diffusion than the ones made by WPT. Rather than global, democracy scripts are embedded in dependency networks with democratic partners. These net-

works create the local environment for dependent states. Relationships with democratic partners offer partner states leverage for democracy. When this leverage is translated into outright pressure to democratize, the costs of not adopting democracy for dependent states go up. Dependent states run the risk of losing status or to be excluded from important resource flows in case of resistance. These mechanisms have indirectly been tested in earlier studies. Boix (2011), for instance, finds that an alliance with the US positively affects democratization, while Gunitsky (2014) shows that US trade engenders democratization in times of hegemonic transitions. Goodliffe and Hawkins (2017), furthermore, demonstrate democratization is more likely when trade and politico-military partners are democratic. This leads to a first hypothesis:

H1. Embeddedness in dependency networks with democratic partners increases the likelihood of democratic transition.

Embeddedness in dependency networks with authoritarian partners, in contrast, will have a profoundly different effect on democracy diffusion, albeit for similar reasons. In this case, authoritarian models make up the local environment for dependent states and leverage will mainly be used to impose authoritarianism. Boix (2011), for instance, found that an alliance with the USSR reduced the risk of democratic transition. For Soviet leaders, state socialism, and not democracy, was considered rightful behavior.⁴ Similarly, Gunitsky (2014) shows that an increase in the global power of authoritarian regimes (i.e. Nazi-Germany and the USSR) undermines democratization. All this indicates that logics of action are different in dependency networks with autocratic compared to democratic partners, prompting the following hypothesis:

H2. Embeddedness in dependency networks with authoritarian partners decreases the likelihood of democratic transition.

The impact of dependency networks with democratic partners, however, varies over time and space. Everything depends on the concentration of (im) material resources and state interests. When resource concentration is high, dependent states are left with only few alternatives, making leverage for democracy profound. This was mostly the case during and in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the international system was characterized by “a balance struck between the two superpowers which depended upon a nested system of geopolitical leverage whose units were tied to the superpowers” (Cohen, 2015, 9).⁵ While far from perfect, ultimately, the system was guided by the rule “if you stay off my satellites, I will stay off

4 State socialism is commonly defined as “a system of political and economic management which seeks to replace the market by an equally comprehensive structure based on collective (and hence in practice on state) action” (Clapham, 1992, 15).

5 i.e. the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

yours” (Galtung, 1971, 89). Thereby, two modes of governance were dominant. The Soviet bloc endorsed state socialism, whereas the West cultivated liberal democracy. Both blocs were not equal in strength, however. The USSR controlled large parts of Central and Eastern Europe, maintained stable relations with several client states and became more proactive in the Third World after Stalin. Yet the USSR never (really) matched US power.⁶ The Soviet economy was weak. Economic growth fell from 3 percent in 1970–75 to 1.8 percent in 1980–85, accompanied by rising mortality rates, national debt and weak technological progress, among others (Mann, 2013, 182). Economic hardship together with military setbacks in Afghanistan and US assertiveness made Soviet leaders internationally more hesitant. The failure of state socialism in several Soviet satellites also stood in stark contrast with the success of liberal democracy in the West.⁷ Hence, the socialist model quickly lost appeal, while liberal democracy gained ground. This was made painstakingly clear with the eventual collapse of the USSR. According to Levitsky and Way (2015, 50), the fall of the USSR meant a “virtual perfect storm for dictatorships worldwide.” Many state leaders were left no other option but to orient towards the West. This created strong pressure for democracy, leading to a spike in levels of democracy worldwide.

The post-Cold War order did not give liberal democracy a free pass, however. It did not mean the end of history as proclaimed by Fukuyama (1992). What is interesting is that during this period important structural shifts took place. Starting from a short “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer, 1990), in which US power was unprecedented and pressure for democracy vast, the international system rather quickly developed into a multipolar and global order as a result of globalization. According to Halper (2010, 27) the “post-Cold War transition to a global market brought about two new developments: new sources of wealth beyond the West and new ideas about capitalism without democracy.”

Even though the liberal democratic model remained popular, it started to lose appeal from the mid-nineties on (Kagan, 2008). This is so because, for one, the model became closely associated with institutions related to the Washington Consensus.⁸

6 According to Kissinger (2014, 313) “the US, despite its divisions and vacillations, had preserved the essential elements of a situation of strength; over two generations it had built an informal anti-Soviet coalitions of every other major industrial center and most of the developing world.”

7 Mann (2013, 182) puts it as follows: “Capitalism was a success and the Soviet cadres knew it. Their historic aspiration for world leadership sagged. If socialism was not superior to capitalism, its existence could not be justified.”

8 Washington Consensus institutions mostly refer to the economy, i.e. cutting government spending, imposing high interest rates, safeguarding a stable currency and opening-up for domestic capital markets, among others. We agree with Halper (2010, 55), however, that “the power of the market lay in economic freedom, but economic freedom could only exist in the context of political freedom, where the individual was free to choose how to live, what to buy, and what to produce. Thus put, economic and political freedoms were two parts of the same whole.”

All too often, these institutions could not meet the concerns of (semi-)peripheral states. In some cases, like Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Washington Consensus institutions caused severe human suffering (Mann, 2013, 201–214). In others, they impeded economic prosperity (Stiglitz, 2002). Vreeland (2003), in this regard, finds a negative correlation between IMF assistance and economic growth for this period, while Peerenboom (2008) demonstrates that countries receiving various types of Western support were worse off in 2000 than in 1990. All this stood in stark contrast with the success of market authoritarianism in bringing about development (Mann, 2013, 169; Kurlantzick, 2013, 64–76).⁹ China's market authoritarian development model, for instance, guided millions of ordinary people out of poverty in a relatively short span of time, and also Asian Tigers quickly developed as a result of this market authoritarianism (Leftwich, 1995).¹⁰ According to Gore (2000, 789), East Asian development models outcompeted Western ones because “in terms of their performance and according to the criterion of economic growth, they work(ed) spectacularly well.” Unsurprisingly, these models inspired leaders around the world, as they allowed them to rule and deliver without relinquishing power. State elites were therefore incentivized to forge closer ties with East Asian states, and China in particular.¹¹ This shift, in turn, contributed to authoritarian influence. One of the core features of Chinese foreign policy is respect for state sovereignty and the absence of pressure to democratize (Taylor, 2009).

Materially, liberal democracy was challenged by the dispersal of resources beyond the West. In this regard, Pieterse (2011, 25) identifies a “reconfiguration of the world economy,” in which emerging societies act “as development role models” and provide “stable markets, loans, aid and security, with China

9 Market authoritarianism can be understood as a model of governance in which economic liberalization is combined with political closure.

10 Leftwich (1995, 401–410) defines a developmental state as “states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the center to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives.” The author also argues that only “few developmental states have sustained democratic or quasi-democratic politics, like Singapore, Botswana and Malaysia” and that (semi-)democratic developmental states are mostly guided by “the dominance of a single party.”

11 Cambodian politicians, for instance, see in market authoritarianism an alternative to what is sometimes perceived as shaky democracy (Kurlantzick, 2013, 127). Likewise, Iranian officials visit China to “look for ideas on how to loosen grip on the economy without losing political control (Higgins, 2007).” In 2006, the Mongolian President furthermore explained that “under the China model, you get the benefit of 10% annual growth, a middle class, and leaders with a job for more than four years” (Halper, 2010, 129). And also in SSA, according to one analyst, “China is the living proof of successful alternatives to Western models. Physically and intellectually exhausted by two decades of economic reform driven by Western governments, China represents the hope that another world is possible, in which bread comes before the freedom to vote” (Taylor, 2009, 23).

as a leading force.” Given the size of its population, there is little dispute the PRC has a giant economy. In addition, China also quickly developed a global footprint. Between 1990 and 2009, the country became one of Africa’s largest trading partners (De Grauwe et al., 2012). In 2001, China also founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), thereby creating a strategic and increasingly economic partnership between Asian states (Henderson, 2008). In addition, economic ties between China and Latin America have been growing with China taking up a more proactive role within the World Trade Organization (Jenkins, 2012). Importantly, many of these shifts were not limited to China alone. On the one hand, notwithstanding its undiversified economy, Russia gradually reclaimed its role as a global power. On the other hand, various regional powers, such as Turkey, Iran and Venezuela, also gradually changed the global system by fostering regional integration and stimulating bilateral cooperation (Vom Hau et al., 2012). All these shifts further expanded the reach of authoritarian influence.

Thus put, globalization coincided with increased opportunities for dependent states. This does not mean, however, these states “bandwagoned” against the West. On the contrary, at present, many dependent states still hold cordial ties with the West. Western countries, for instance, remain important trade partners for many SSA states (De Grauwe et al., 2012). By the same token, states in Latin America still value their relationship with the West, with dependent states instead making use of “strategic hedging” or “balancing” (Tessman, 2012; Waltz, 2000). They sought to improve their maneuverability by aligning with other states but refrained from confronting traditional partners directly. The ultimate purpose was resource diversification. Resource diversification undermines partner dependency and benefits national autonomy and leverage. Most likely, it also obfuscates Western incentives to promote democracy, as this may imply losing an ally. Studies, for instance, show that countries set up regional organizations in reaction to the pervasiveness of Western scripts and interests in IOs. Likewise, examples abound of states changing partnerships when relationships do not pay off or when pressure to democratize becomes too profound.¹² For Boyle (2016, 42), post-Cold War coalitions “are neither exclusive nor static, but rather exceptionally fluid and responsive to the changing interests of their members.” This leads to a third and final hypothesis:

12 The reaction of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on accusations of alleged human rights violations by the US is a case in point. Duterte was not only harsh in his response, but also quick in shifting to China—a move China welcomed. This doesn’t mean, however, that cordial US ties no longer play a role in the foreign policy of the Philippines. The US, for instance, still guarantees national security. Another example is Belarus after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Although both countries remain close partners, Belarus became much more suspicious of Russia’s benevolent intentions in its near abroad. As a corollary, Lukashenko approaches the West for resources.

H3. The impact of dependency networks with democratic partners on democratic transition decreases in the post-Cold War era when countries establish trade ties with authoritarian states.

Empirical analysis

Data

(i) Dependent variable

The dependent variable in this study is democratic transitions, conceptualized as movements from a closed to a more open type of political regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 6). While several standard measures for democratic transitions are readily available, this study proposes an alternative measure of democracy (and thus, democratic transitions). It does so out of theoretical concerns. Many existing indicators of democracy are based on purely procedural definitions of democracy, equating democracy with the mere organization of elections. This study goes beyond this one-sided view and conceptualizes democracy as a multidimensional concept. Drawing upon democratic theory, this chapter distinguishes between three dimensions of democracy, i.e. *(i)* political participation and competition *(ii)* respect for human rights and *(iii)* institutional constraints on the executive. Together, these three dimensions constitute the heart of the democracy concept.¹³ The first dimension, political participation and competition, encompasses the idea of democracy as rule by the people (Schumpeter, 1942). The second dimension takes into account the notion of democracy as respect for civil liberties and human rights (Paine, 1963). The third and final dimension, institutional constraints, approaches democracy as a system of separating powers (Madison, 1952 [1788]; Montesquieu, 1748). The three dimensions of democracy are incommensurable and together regulate the *access to* and exercise of political power.

Our measurement relies on data taken from V-DEM (v. 6.2). We recombine V-DEM data in a unique way based on our three-dimensional understanding of democracy. For each dimension, multiple indicators are selected and combined through a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The use of multiple indicators for each dimension improves measurement validity. CFA also avoids relying on arbitrary and oftentimes complex aggregation rules in order to weigh indicators as to optimally measure the concepts of concern (Bollen, 1989).

13 This observation led to an entire new research agenda on the comparative measurement of democracy, driven by the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-DEM, see Coppedge et al. 2015). While V-DEM also presents a multidimensional conceptualization and measurement of democracy, we believe it still falls short in important respects. For instance, V-DEM includes indices of economic well-being in the definition of democracy. This not only goes beyond democratic theory, but also has important empirical consequences, in that countries that are politically closed but economically successful (like Rwanda and China) still are given democratic credentials. This is one of the reasons for coming up with an alternative approach.

The procedural dimension of democracy is measured by five indicators. A suffrage indicator (*Suffrage*) is constructed by multiplying de jure suffrage rights with de facto implementation. De jure suffrage rights measure the share of adult citizens with a legal right to vote. De facto suffrage rights measure the percentage of legally entitled citizens prevented from doing so. By combining these two measures, we control for practical deficiencies during elections. A second indicator measures the presence and quality of parliamentary and executive elections (*Free_Fair_Elections*). Both indicators are measured at the election-year level. A country-year structure was obtained by extrapolating information from the latest elections to the next election year. Values, however, decline by factor two (*Suffrage*) or by one unit (*Free_Fair_Elections*) after four years, preventing bias from countries postponing or withdrawing from elections. Three further indicators provide information on political parties. One indicator measures whether political parties are banned from the political process (*Party_Ban*). Another indicator indicates to what extent opposition parties are independent from the incumbent regime (*Opposition_Aut*). A third indicator reveals barriers on forming a party (*Party_Formation*).

Four indicators serve as indicators for human rights. One captures freedom of discussion (*Fr_of_Discussion*). Another provides information on the freedom of expression (*Fr_of_Expression*). Also included are indicators on freedom of religion (*Fr_of_Religion*) and on government respect for private property (*Fr_of_Property*). These four indicators measure the extent to which the government respects the exertion of civil rights.

Institutional constraints, finally, is measured by five indicators. One measure estimates the likelihood a legislative body conducts an investigation in case of unconstitutional activities by the executive (*Legislature_Invest*). Second is an indicator that emphasizes whether executive branch officials are routinely questioned by the legislature (*Legislature_Questions*). Missing values for these two indicators occurred when the legislature was closed down or aborted. Since this is valuable information, data was imputed from other sources in V-DEM. An executive oversight variable (*Executive_Oversight*), furthermore, indicates whether bodies other than the legislature check executive power (*like an ombudsman or a general prosecutor*). Two additional indicators code whether a high (*HC_Independence*) and lower court (*LC_Independence*) create judicial constraints on the executive. The three dimensions of democracy are latent variables explaining variation in the indicator variables. They are predicted by factor scores using the regression method.¹⁴

14 The CFA path diagram (not shown) shows that the three dimensions of democracy are strongly correlated, varying from $r = 0.82$ for civil liberties and institutional constraints, to $r = 0.86$ for institutional constraints and political participation and competition to a high of $r = 0.94$ for political participation and competition and civil liberties. Although the correlations among the dimensions are quite strong, they are not that strong that it would support a one-dimensional model of democracy. The goodness of fit indices of a three-dimensional model outperform those of a one-dimensional model.

Making use of k-means cluster analysis on the three dimensions of democracy, the chapter differentiates between three types of political regimes, i.e. autocracies, hybrid regimes and democracies. The strength of the cluster method is that categories are based on empirical information rather than theoretical priors. So doing, it ensures that regime categories have empirical referents.¹⁵

While cut-points may look arbitrary, they are no less arbitrary than other popular typologies. Typologies are also based on multiple rather singular dimensions of democracy.¹⁶ Democracies are countries with high average scores on all three dimensions of democracy. In 2005, examples are the United States, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Georgia and Zambia. Autocracies have low average scores on the three dimensions and in 2005 include countries such as The People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, China, Cuba and Sudan. Hybrid regimes, finally, have intermediate scores on the three dimensions of democracy and, in 2005, include countries such as Rwanda, Armenia, Morocco, Jordan and Belarus. Interestingly, a closer look at the regime clusters shows the increasing salience of hybrid regimes over time. This is consistent with the argument that also after the Cold War, many regimes, and not only stable autocracies, remained at risk of democratic transition.

Democratic transitions, finally, are movements to a more open regime type. We count a total of 116 democratic transitions between 1972 and 2005. About 55 transitions are transitions from autocracy to hybrid regimes; whereas 25 transitions are from autocracy to democracy and 36 from hybrid regimes to democracy. These transitions are listed in Table 1. A transition is coded with the crisis of the previous regime and proceeds to an establishment and consolidation phase. Regime categories are considered substantial if they last longer than three years. This implies that we only speak of a democratic transition when a political system remains (relatively) open for more than three years. Regimes lasting no longer than three years are considered transitional. Transitions occurred in about 3.8 percent of eligible country years ($N = 3,046$).

15 Some existing typologies, like the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy, create categories with only few empirical referents (Skaaning et al., 2015). One may wonder about the added value of some theoretical categories if they are only rarely observed in the real world.

16 Geddes et al. (2014), for instance, classify a country as democratic the moment there are direct and "reasonably" free and fair elections with ten percent of the population entitled to vote. Boix et al. (2013) identify democracies when executive and legislative elections take place and a majority of adult men has the legal right to vote. Cheibub et al. (2009) and Polity IV, furthermore, only look at contestation and do not include information on political participation. What these typologies share is a preference for only one dimension of democracy, and a tolerance for low levels of participation, which makes them different from the typology presented in this chapter.

Table 1. Democratic Transitions in the International System, 1972–2005

Country	Transition Years	Transition From/To	Country	Transition Years	Transition From/To
Afghanistan	2003–2004	A>H	El Salvador	1991–1992	A>H
Albania	1990–1992	A>D	El Salvador	1994–1995	H>D
Algeria	1989–1990	A>H	Fiji	1992–1993	H>D
Angola	2004–2005	A>H	Gabon	1989–1990	A>H
Argentina	1972–1973	A>H	Gambia	1996–1997	A>H
Argentina	1982–1984	A>D	Georgia	2003–2004	H>D
Azerbaijan	1999–2000	A>H	Ghana	1978–1979	A>H
Benin	1989–1990	A>D	Ghana	1991–1993	A>D
Bhutan	1997–1998	A>H	Greece	1973–1975	A>D
Bolivia	1981–1982	A>H	Guatemala	1985–1986	A>H
Bolivia	1984–1985	H>D	Guinea	1991–1992	A>H
Brazil	1978–1979	A>H	Guinea-Bissau	1993–1994	A>H
Brazil	1985–1986	H>D	Guyana	1996–1997	H>D
Bulgaria	1989–1990	A>D	Haiti	1989–1990	A>H
Burkina Faso	1990–1991	A>H	Honduras	1979–1980	A>H
Burundi	1980–1981	A>H	Honduras	2002–2003	H>D
Cameroon	1988–1989	A>H	Hungary	1988–1990	A>D
Cape Verde	1990–1991	H>D	Indonesia	1997–1999	A>D
Central Afr. Rep.	1986–1987	A>H	Iran	1990–1991	A>H
Chad	1995–1996	A>H	Iraq	2003–2004	A>H
Chile	1988–1990	A>D	Jordan	1988–1989	A>H
Colombia	1990–1991	H>D	Kenya	2001–2002	A>H
Comoros	1989–1990	H>D	South Korea	1979–1980	A>H
Republic of Congo	1990–1992	A>D	South Korea	1987–1988	H>D
Croatia	1999–2000	H>D	Lebanon	2004–2005	H>D
Czech Republic	1989–1990	A>D	Lesotho	1972–1973	A>H
Djibouti	1991–1992	A>H	Lesotho	1990–1992	H>D
Dominican Rep.	1977–1978	A>H	Liberia	1984–1985	A>H
Dominican Rep.	1997–1998	H>D	Liberia	2003–2004	H>D
Ecuador	1977–1979	A>D	Macedonia	2001–2002	H>D
Egypt	1980–1981	A>H	Madagascar	1991–1992	H>D
Malawi	1999–2000	H>D	Lebanon	2004–2005	H>D
Malaysia	1989–1990	A>D	Lesotho	1972–1973	A>H

Table 1. (continued)

Country	Transition Years	Transition From/To	Country	Transition Years	Transition From/To
Maldives	1991–1992	A>H	Lesotho	1990–1992	H>D
Mali	1977–1978	A>H	Liberia	1984–1985	A>H
Mali	1997–1998	H>D	Liberia	2003–2004	H>D
Mauritania	1977–1979	A>D	Macedonia	2001–2002	H>D
Mexico	1980–1981	A>H	Madagascar	1991–1992	H>D
Mongolia	1989–1991	A>D	Serbia	1999–2000	H>D
Morocco	1976–1977	A>H	South Africa	1993–1994	H>D
Mozambique	1989–1990	A>H	Spain	1976–1978	A>D
Nepal	1989–1991	A>D	Sudan	1984–1985	A>H
Nicaragua	1983–1984	A>H	Suriname	1986–1987	H>D
Nicaragua	1989–1990	H>D	Taiwan	1986–1987	A>H
Niger	1988–1990	A>D	Taiwan	1992–1993	H>D
Niger	1999–2000	H>D	Tajikistan	1997–1998	A>H
Nigeria	1978–1979	A>H	Tanzania	1991–1992	H>D
Nigeria	1997–1999	A>D	Thailand	1979–1980	A>H
Pakistan	1985–1986	A>H	Thailand	1992–1993	H>D
Panama	1989–1990	A>D	Togo	1990–1991	A>H
Paraguay	1989–1992	A>D	Tunisia	1979–1980	A>H
Peru	1977–1978	A>H	Turkey	2001–2002	H>D
Peru	1980–1981	H>D	Uganda	1979–1980	A>H
Peru	2000–2001	H>D	Uganda	1995–1996	H>D
Philippines	1985–1987	A>D	Uruguay	1984–1985	A>D
Poland	1988–1990	A>D	Vietnam Dem. Rep.	1995–1996	A>H
Portugal	1973–1974	A>D	Yemen	1990–1991	A>H
Romania	1989–1990	A>D	Zambia	1991–1992	H>D

(ii) Independent variables

Dependency enters the analysis by operationalizing the international system as a multiplex power system. What is measured is not association (e.g. whether or not there is interaction), but dependency (e.g. whether or not there is an asymmetric interaction). The study distinguishes between three types of dependency networks, i.e. economic, political and military ones.

Economic networks measure trade dependencies. Data for import and export flows is obtained from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and the

Correlates of War (COW) Bilateral Trade Dataset (Barbieri and Keshk, 2012; International Monetary Fund, 2015a). Missing data on import flows is estimated from export flows and vice versa. A dependency is coded when import or export flows exceed one percent of the focal country's GDP. The rationale is that a trade flow of 1 percent of a country's GDP is substantial. The loss of these flows may have major ramifications on a country's economy and have serious spillover effects to other sectors (Van Rossem, 1996). GDP data is taken from World Bank World Development Indicators and completed from various sources (International Monetary Fund, 2015b; United Nations, 2017; World Bank, 2017).

Political networks are operationalized by looking at the network of diplomatic relations and shared IGO memberships. Data is collected from the Europa World Yearbook (Europa Publications, 1972–2005) and the COW IGO dataset (Pevehouse et al., 2004). For diplomatic relations, a dependency is coded each time country A has diplomatic representation in country B. This is so because countries with limited resources will only establish embassies in those countries politically important to them. Countries with international ambitions, in contrast, will use political networks to expand their influence (Van Rossem, 1996). IGO connections, furthermore, are measured as the ratio of joint memberships between two countries to the total number of IGO memberships of the focal country. A dependency exists when the ratio is higher than 50 percent. While this cut-point may look arbitrary, the logic is that influence is most likely to take place when shared IGO memberships are substantial. In the analysis section of the chapter however, we will experiment with more and less restrictive forms of political (and economic) exchange and thus different cut points.

Military networks, finally, are measured by three networks. Data on military alliances is taken from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP) and extended to 2005 (Gibler, 2008; Leeds et al., 2002). This network differs from other networks because it is profoundly symmetric. Dependency exists, but is reciprocal. Military allies need each other to secure geostrategic ambitions. Trade in major conventional weapons systems and the presence of military troops, on the other hand, are again asymmetric networks. A dependency is coded when a country purchases major weapon systems or receives troops from another country. Data for trade in weapons systems is taken from SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute—SIPRI, 2016), whereas data on military troops is coded manually from the Military Balance (The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Various Years). Average correlations between these three networks for the 1972–2005 period are low, supporting the view that countries are embedded in a set of multiplex international interactions.¹⁷

17 The correlation for the economic and political network (1972–2005) is $r = 0.165$, for the economic and military network $r = 0.198$ and for the political and military network $r = 0.282$.

Democratic and authoritarian influence variables are measured making use of ego-network analysis as the proportion of democratic and authoritarian states in a country's local dependency network in year $t-1$. By making use of proportions, the variables take into consideration the changing composition of the international system.¹⁸ Regime data is taken from the classification presented above. We do not look at influence resulting from hybrid regimes as these regimes are mainly subjects rather than drivers of political change. In cases where the dependency relations were absent, the variables were coded as zero, as this indicates the absence of democratic/authoritarian influence. Some general patterns can be observed from the ego-network analysis. First, as for political and military networks, more and more countries became dependent upon democracies and less on autocracies over time. This shift is driven by two dynamics, i.e. states deciding to align with (Western) democracies and existing partners becoming more democratic themselves. Second, for the economic network, the descriptions suggest that reliance on democracies declined over time, albeit to a small extent. Third, the analysis also shows that international embeddedness became more diversified and less Western over time.

Several other focal variables are added to the analysis to test the hypotheses. *China trade dependence* ($t-1$) is a dummy variable that gets the value of one the moment a country becomes trade dependent on China. The decision to focus on trade, and not on other networks, is because China's international expansion is by and large an economic story. Therefore, one may expect that the strongest effects come from this network. Whereas in 1972 only 12 countries (out of a total of 184) were trade dependent on China, this number swelled to 150 (of 212 countries) in 2005. A similar logic is applied for authoritarian trade dependence. Finally, a *post-Cold War* variable is coded one for all years after 1989.

(iii) Control variables

The list of potential correlates of democratization is long. The analysis includes those variables identified by Ulfelder and Lustik (2007, 358) as the most important "risk factors" of democratic transition. Ulfelder and Lustik selected these variables after a meta-analysis on an extensive dataset of potential explanations of democratization.

A first set of variables deals with *economic factors*. For Lipset (1959), economic well-being leads to class formation and national consciousness, creating increased demands for democracy. This thesis, however, remains subject of debate (for an overview, see Haggard and Kaufman, 2016). A logged GDP per capita variable is included to control for economic wealth. Other scholars find a clear link between economic crisis and democratization (Haggard and

18 The number of countries ranges from 185 in 1972 to 212 in 2005.

Kaufman, 1995; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Economic crises exacerbate divisions within the regime and may trigger mass protest, opening a window of opportunity for democratization. A *level of economic growth* variable controls for this effect (World Bank, 2017). Resource curse theory, furthermore, posits that *natural resources* have pernicious effects on democratization (Ross, 2001; Ulfelder, 2007). Natural resources allow the regime to buy off elite support, bolster the repressive apparatus of the state and distort the connection between state and society. We control for this theory by adding a variable measuring the percentage of GDP relying on natural resource rents to the model (World Bank, 2017). Another strand of research looks at variation in *state power* and democracy (Andersen et al., 2014). Strong authoritarian states are believed to undercut democratization. They penetrate far into society and take away incentives to revolt. If necessary, these states also possess the means to crush democratic demands. State power is measured by looking at the capacity of governments to extract resources from the national output (Kugler and Tammen, 2012). Some students argue that *democratic experience* impacts democratic transitions. Previously developed democratic institutions are part of a country's institutional stock and therefore loom as a foundation of democracy (Ulfelder and Lustik, 2007). We control for this effect by including a variable that cumulates previous experience with democracy (in number of years). Teorell (2010), furthermore, points out that *peaceful protest* is more likely to lead to democracy than violent protest, in that it maximizes societal participation. Peaceful protest is measured as the total number of peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people opposing government policies in a given year (Banks and Wilson, 2015). According to Ulfelder and Lustik (2007), *leadership change* may engender democratization, given the fragility of leadership change in authoritarian regimes. A new chief executive variable is equal to 1 the first 5 years a new leader assumes office. Political geographers, finally, stress spatial aspects of democracy diffusion (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Starr, 1991). Being geographically close to democracies facilitates the flow of liberal ideas, strengthens democratic forces and increases the likelihood democracy becomes observed and emulated. We control for this effect by including a *spatial lag of democracy*. Two countries are spatially connected when they are separated by 400 miles of water or less (Correlates of War Project, 2016). All variables are lagged one year to address the risk of simultaneity. The correlation table (not shown) shows independent variables are not linear combinations of one another.

Analysis and results

Model 1 in Table 2 analyzes the impact of embeddedness in democratic networks on the relative risk of democratic transition for the period 1972–2005. As in all subsequent models, we use event history analysis (with a cloglog

specification of the hazard) and include age-linear, age-squared and age-cubed to control for temporal dependence. Error terms, furthermore, are homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated.¹⁹ Missing values are imputed making use of multiple imputation (Honaker et al., 2011). The model shows that political dependency on democratic partners has a significant and positive effect on the relative risk of democratic transition. With every one unit change in the proportion of democratic partners in the political network, having a network with all democracies versus one without, the cloglog of the hazard of democratic transition changes with 2.759 units ($p < 0.05$). Analysis of marginal effects, furthermore, indicates that, keeping all other variables at their mean, a one instant change in the proportion of democratic partners in political networks changes the probability of democratic transition with 10 percent ($p < 0.01$). This is a rather strong effect. The coefficients of democratic partners in trade ($\beta = 0.458$; $p = 0.238$) and military networks ($\beta = 0.199$; $p = 0.540$) are also positive, but not statistically significant. In all, the results generally support *H1*.

Model 2 in Table 2 conducts a similar type of analysis, but now gives attention to dependency networks with authoritarian partners. While model 2 indicates that embeddedness in networks with authoritarian partners has a negative effect on democratization for economic and a positive effect on democratization for political networks, the coefficient is only statistically different from zero and negative for the military dependency network. Model 2 shows that, *ceteris paribus*, a one unit change in the proportion of authoritarian partners in the military network reduces the cloglog of the hazard of democratic transition with 0.655 units ($p < 0.05$). In marginal terms, and again keeping all other variables at their mean, we find that a one instant change in the proportion of authoritarian partners in military networks lowers the probability of democratic transition with 2 percent ($p < 0.05$). The findings endorse *H2*, although the evidence is not that strong.

19 According to Coppedge (2013, 282–284), controlling for past experience with democracy is a specification fix for heteroscedascity, whereas serial autocorrelation is fixed by explaining “change in democracy rather than its level”.

Table 2. Conditional Effects of Democratic Alters in Economic, Political and Military Dependency Networks on the Relative Risk of Democratic Transition, 1972–2005

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4 (Post-Cold War)
Age Linear	0.414*** (0.143)	0.438*** (0.143)	0.406*** (0.142)	0.563*** (0.206)
Age Squared	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Age Cubed	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Post-Cold War (89+)	0.363 (0.242)	0.624* (0.342)	1.851* (1.001)	
Democratic Partners (Economy Network)	0.458 (0.388)		0.112 (0.474)	0.305 (0.693)
Democratic Partners (Political Network)	2.759** (1.325)		5.388*** (1.728)	-0.133 (1.911)
Democratic Partners (Military Network)	0.199 (0.325)		0.515 (0.433)	-0.235 (0.503)
Autocratic Partners (Economy Network)		-0.765 (0.521)		
Autocratic Partners (Political Network)		0.731 (1.114)		
Autocratic Partners (Military Network)		-0.665** (0.333)		
Democratic Partners * Post-Cold War (Economy Network)			1.017 (0.812)	
Democratic Partners s * Post-Cold War (Political Network)			-5.202** (2.271)	
Democratic Partners * Post-Cold War (Military Network)			-0.741 (0.644)	
China Trade Dependence				-0.758** (0.358)
Economic Growth	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.031* (0.019)
GDP per Capita (logged)	-0.025 (0.116)	0.087 (0.111)	-0.054 (0.115)	-0.228 (0.162)
Natural Resources	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.017** (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.011)

Table 2. (continued)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4 (Post-Cold War)
State Power	0.233 (0.211)	0.201 (0.207)	0.242 (0.212)	0.572* (0.324)
Domestic Protest	0.062* (0.036)	0.070** (0.035)	0.056 (0.036)	0.041 (0.088)
New Chief Executive	0.326 (0.199)	0.385* (0.198)	0.326* (0.198)	0.378 (0.285)
Previous Democracy Experience	0.019 (0.021)	0.030 (0.020)	0.029 (0.021)	0.063*** (0.023)
Spatial Lag of Democracy	-0.141 (0.260)	-0.159 (0.266)	-0.162 (0.263)	-0.212 (0.378)
Constant	-6.035*** (0.925)	-5.592*** (1.083)	-6.573*** (1.026)	-4.093*** (1.365)
Observations	3,046	3,046	3,046	1,221
Countries	132	132	132	107

Standard Errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. All independent variables are lagged one period.

Model 3 in Table 2 investigates the conditional effects of embeddedness in dependency networks with democratic partners according to the time period: before and after the Cold War. The model shows that, consistent with H1, during the Cold War, the more democratic partners in economic ($\beta = 0.112$; $p = 0.814$), political ($\beta = 5.388$; $p < 0.01$) and military ($\beta = 0.515$; $p = 0.235$) networks, the higher the relative risk of democratic transition. The opposite holds for authoritarian partners (results not shown), which is consistent with H2.²⁰ Interestingly, the conditional models, interacting the effects of democratic partners with a dummy for the Cold War, show that diffusion effects change drastically after the Cold War. Whereas democratic influence in trade and military networks remains statistically indifferent from zero, model 3 indicates that after the Cold War, the effect of higher proportions of democratic partners in political networks becomes much lower ($\beta = 0.186$; $p < 0.01$), *ceteris paribus*. Wald tests for the interaction terms reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. The findings partially support H3. After the Cold War, the positive impact of embeddedness in political dependency networks with democratic partners on democratic transitions decreases.

H3, however, is to some extent double-barreled. We attributed the reason for the declining impact of democratic embeddedness on democratization

²⁰ During the Cold War, the more authoritarian alters in economic ($\beta = -0.138$; $p = 0.819$), political ($\beta = -4.251$; $p < 0.01$) and military ($\beta = -0.967$; $p < 0.05$) networks, the lower the hazard of democratic transition.

after the Cold War to globalization. It is in this period that non-Western authoritarian powers, and China in particular, gain influence. This creates alternatives for states in case democratic pressure becomes too profound and takes away incentives among democracies to promote democracy abroad. To further investigate H3, we estimate one additional model. Doing so, we restrict the sample to the post-Cold War period, as this is the period under concern, and restrict the analysis to the trade network. The theoretical section already highlighted the swift and remarkable rise of China (and other countries) in international trade after the Cold War.

Model 4 in Table 2 regresses trade dependency on China on the risk of democratic transition.²¹

The results indicate that the hazard of democratic transition for countries trade-dependent on China is 0.5 times the hazard for countries that are not trade-dependent on China, again controlling for all other variables in the model. Countries trade-dependent on the PRC have a 50 percent lower hazard to transition to democracy than those who do not depend on the PRC ($\beta = -0,758$; $p < 0.05$). The model also does not report any significant effects coming from dependency networks with democratic partners in this period. In three subsequent models (results not shown), furthermore, we investigate whether the effects of democratic dependency in the post-Cold War period vary by trade dependency on China. The assumption is that once a state relies on China for economic resources, state leaders will be less susceptible to influence and democratic states will refrain from putting pressure for democracy to avoid losing an ally. While none of the conditional effects reach conventional levels of statistical significance, what the analysis suggests is that dependency on democratic partners positively affects democratization (albeit much lower than during the Cold War period), but that the effect turns negative once this goes together with trade dependency upon the PRC. In all, these findings give additional support to H3.

A few words are in order regarding the coefficients of control variables. First, the relationship between natural resources and democratization is statistically significant and negative, which is consistent with resource curse theory. It shows that countries with a relative abundance of natural resources are less likely to transition to democracy. Natural resources are unearned incomes and have the ability to spoil 'natural' dynamics between state and society. Second, just like Teorell (2010), we find a positive relationship between domestic and non-violent protest and chances for democracy. National

21 In a first step, we also found that trade dependence on autocracies, *ceteris paribus*, negatively affects democratization. The analysis [results not shown] estimates the hazard of democratic transition for those countries trade dependent on autocracies to be 0.08 times the hazard of countries that are not trade dependent on autocracies ($\beta = -2.521$; $p < 0.05$). Put differently, with every one-unit increase in authoritarian trade dependence, the hazard of democratic transition declines with 92%. We believe, however, that these results are for a large part driven by the presence of China in this category, and therefore decide to focus on the latter.

protests seem to provide a powerful tool for democracy. Just as for natural resources, however, the findings are not robust for time period and democracy diffusion variables. The models furthermore report that democratic transitions are more likely after the Cold War, and that also in this period, economic growth, previous experience with democracy and higher levels of state power are associated with higher risks of democratic change (whereas this was not so during the Cold War). While the relationship between economic growth and democratization is beyond the scope of this study, the fact that effects differ by time period may inspire future research. The models also show that the arrival of new leaders in office and previous experience with democracy are beneficial for democratization.

We finally experimented with variants of the dependent and independent variables (not reported) to test for the robustness of the results. To ensure findings are not driven by the coding of democratic transitions, another transition measure is taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2016). Polity IV ranks countries on a 21-point scale [-10 to +10] based on institutional authority patterns. A democratic transition is coded when there is a three points or greater increase in this score over a period of three years or less. Using this transition variable does not change the findings of this study in any major way. Political ($\beta = 2.586$; $p < 0.01$) and military ($\beta = 0.894$; $p < 0.01$) dependency on democracies foster, whereas military dependency on autocracies ($\beta = -1.787$; $p < 0.01$) undermines democratization. Likewise, we find that the effect of dependency on democratic partners declines or becomes insignificant after the Cold War and that in the same period trade dependency on China lowers chances for democracy, *ceteris paribus*. We fail to replicate, however, the negative effect resulting from economic dependency on autocracies after the Cold War ($\beta = -0.801$; $p = 0.499$) and find that also in this period, trade dependency on China undermines the small but still positive effect resulting from political dependency on democracies ($\beta = -3.103$; $p < 0.01$).

Second, it is possible that findings are partly driven by the different cut-points for coding a dependency. To investigate this possibility, we re-estimate the models using alternative cut-points. For the economic network, we rescale a dependency at 0.5 and 2 percent of a focal country's GDP (whereas it was 1 percent before). For the political network, we recode the IGO network by setting the ratio of joint memberships at 36 percent (the mean, whereas it was 50 percent before). No cut-points were used for the military network. The results by and large support earlier findings. Noteworthy, however, is that when setting the cut-point for trade networks at 0.5 percent, the signs for trade dependency on democracies and autocracies become borderline significant ($p < 0.11$) and consistent with H1 and H2. After the Cold War, we also report a positive effect of trade dependency on democratic partners on the relative risk of democratic transition, albeit that the effect disappears when controlling for China trade dependency. The analysis also shows that the positive effect of democratic partners in the political network turns negative when a country is trade dependent on China, again when setting the cut-point at 0.5 percent.

Finally, it is possible that some control variables were omitted from the model. When indicators for civil and international war, urbanization, UK colony, foreign aid per capita and military rule (taken from the V-DEM dataset and WDI) are added to the analysis, the coefficients remain in their expected directions and significant at conventional levels. Overall, the analyses suggest that democracy (autocracy) diffuses through democratic (authoritarian) dependency networks, but that after the Cold War, this trend becomes more complex as a result of globalization. Thereby, the findings suggest that especially the rise of China in international trade puts a spell on democratization worldwide.

Conclusion

The results of this chapter cast new light on the relationship between international relations and democratization. Against the world polity model of democracy diffusion, which emphasized a positive link between international relations and democratization, this chapter put a structural model of democracy diffusion. This was inspired by the observation that adoption rates of democracy declined in the post-Cold War period. During this period, many regimes either became stalled in a “gray zone” in-between democracy and authoritarianism or remained purely authoritarian. As we have argued, the world polity model faces limits when it comes to explaining why democratization stalled from the mid-nineties on.

The structural model of democracy diffusion provided the main contribution of this chapter. Briefly, the structural model looks at shifts in power-dependency relations between states and points out that these types of dynamics are key for understanding democratization processes around the world. Not only these dynamics disclose the types of leverage and pressure faced by dependent or peripheral states, they are also constantly in flux and their impact varies across time and space depending upon the concentration of resources in world affairs. By making use of a global and multidimensional dataset on dependency relations between states between 1972 and 2005, and a new way of conceptualizing and measuring democracy, this chapter demonstrated that political dependency upon democratic partners propels whereas military dependency upon authoritarian partners undermines chances for democracy. The chapter also showed that the impact of political dependency on democratic partners declined over time and during the post-Cold War period and that during this period trade dependency on China and other non-Western autocracies also impeded chances for democracy.

All these findings are closely in line with the coercive mechanisms described by the structural model. What is more, they also offer a rather unique insight as to why democratization stalled from the mid-nineties on. True, dependency offers democratic and authoritarian partners alike the power and leverage to export their model abroad and increase the costs of non-adoption

in the periphery. It bears emphasis, however, that this logic mainly applies to bipolar and especially unipolar systems. In such contexts, maneuverability for peripheral states is relatively limited and pressures for one model or another relatively profound. All this however changes in a multipolar or increasingly global world. Such a context provides new opportunities for dependent states and is characterized by a diversification of resources. This diversification, in turn, takes away Western leverage for and most probably also appetite to promote democracy abroad. In addition, it provides new impetus for authoritarianism and offers dependent states alternatives in case it falls out with the West. Our analysis suggests the post-Cold War order became a more favorable environment for autocrats worldwide.

Future research should take stock of the findings presented in this chapter. One way of doing so is by looking at how the mechanisms described in this chapter unfold in particular countries. Another way is by extending the analysis beyond the timeframe of this chapter. Indeed, there is little doubt that the dynamics sketched out in this chapter only grew stronger over time. With the recent Belt and Road Initiative, for instance, China's influence became truly global. Similarly, countries such as Russia and Turkey increased their weight on the global stage. It would be interesting to know more about what these important global shifts imply for democratization in various places. Likewise, it would be useful to investigate whether these shifts are in any way related to why at present so many countries are falling back on democracy. Furthermore, researchers may also consider designing more sophisticated research designs to study global system dynamics or developing an interest for research questions that put the focus away from democracy to other institutional models. Whatever the case, we hope that this chapter will inspire scholars to further investigate the complex link between international relations and democratization.

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The October 1 Catalan Referendum Turns into a Struggle for Democracy

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The Catalan referendum on the October 1, 2017 became a massive site of protest as the Spanish government outlawed the vote. Citizens mobilized to defend the right to vote, bringing democracy to the centre of the struggle. This chapter addresses the questions: how did the Catalan secessionist movement turn into a movement for democracy? What form does citizen participation take, and how do they promote democracy? This chapter claims that citizen participation made the celebration of the referendum possible, in a massive protest of non-violent civil resistance. In a context of crisis of the nation-state system and severe critiques of representative democracy both at national and European levels, the Catalan referendum becomes a relevant example of ways through which civil society actors engage in promoting democracy. This chapter is based on participant observation of four polling stations in two different municipalities during the October 1 referendum. The observations reveal an important organization of citizens, mainly through the Committees in Defence of the Referendum that transformed into Committees in Defence of the Republic after the October 1 referendum, becoming sites of engagement in democratic promotion.

Introduction

The Catalan referendum in October 2017 was an event which moved beyond the territorial question and turned into a struggle for democracy. The event sparked mass mobilization and citizen participation in order to protect and make the vote possible in response to the Spanish state outlawing the referendum. This chapter analyzes the role of civil society in promoting democracy through observations of the October 1 referendum. The interest of the event lies in the fact that it amplified the scope and meanings of the Catalan secessionist movement, putting the idea of democratic deepening at the heart of the protests.

The Catalan secessionist movement challenges both the Spanish democracy and that of the European Union at a time of global crises around the nation-state system and representative democracy. The events in Catalonia are a consequence of transformations taking place worldwide, but at the same time they trigger new forms of citizen participation and democratic engagement as well as actions favoring democratic promotion stemming from civil society actors.

This chapter addresses the questions: how did the Catalan secessionist movement turn into a movement for democracy? What forms does citizen participation take, and how do they promote democracy? This chapter makes

the claim that the grassroots mobilization is what makes the celebration of the referendum possible as a massive protest event of non-violent civil resistance. The organization and mobilization of civil society is what ultimately enabled the referendum on October 1 to eventuate. By doing so, the protest challenged the state and its conception of democracy based on the law and the Constitution. To highlight the limited conception of democracy (according to protesters) of the state, prefigurative politics takes centre stage. Inclusion, pacifism, assemblies, collective decision-making, self-management, politics of care, emotions... the quality of democracy is an essential aspect for the deepening of democracy. There is a collective effort by the participants to actually to embody the new republic they aspire to build.

In recent decades there has been a proliferation of referendums across the world, many of them directed towards constitutional change. However, according to Tierney (2013), in processes of constitution-framing and changing, there tends to be a prevalence of what he calls an elite focus. This focus on representative institutions fails to grasp and understand processes of citizen engagement in constitutional decision-making in times of growing disaffection with elite politics. This chapter focuses on grassroots movements, i.e. civil society actors that engage in the organization of a referendum. The role of civil society has been overlooked even though it is an important element to better understand the new phenomena of referendum proliferation.

The first part of the chapter discusses the relationship between democracy and civil society in the light of changes at the global level (the crisis of the nation-state and the crisis of representative democracy). It also reviews the long struggle of social movements for the deepening of democracy and the role of the referendum in current democracies. The second part is centred on the Catalan referendum and is based on the observation made on October 1. Finally, concluding remarks are made with indications for future research.

Civil society and democracy

Context of global transformations

The context where mobilizations like the Catalan secessionist movement take place is a period of structural systemic transformation. According to Wallerstein (2013) “we are in the midst of a structural transition from a fading capitalist world-economy to a new kind of system” that we still don’t know how it will be. This context is defined by multiple overlapping crises (financial, economic, environmental, democratic...). Bauman (2012) refers to this situation as a transition or “interregnum” between two periods not just merely a conjunctural crisis. In this scenario of instability civil society actors appear with the idea of democracy: whether it is against dictatorships or against the existing liberal democracies.

In democratic contexts, transformation in democracy fuelled by neoliberal globalization challenges the liberal conception of democracy. Della Porta (2013, 24) points out the move of power from parties (and representative institutions) to the executive, from the nation-state to international governmental organizations, and from the state to the market have “contributed to the shifts towards a neoliberal conception of democracy, based upon an elitist vision of electoral participation for the mass of the citizens and free lobbying for stronger interests, along with low levels of state intervention.”

The fundamental principles of nation-state democracy (territoriality, majority principles and use of coercive power) do not apply globally. At the same time, economic globalization reduces the capacity of state intervention affecting its own legitimacy (Della Porta, 2013). In the international arena the “growing number, power and visibility of international organizations challenge the very principle of legitimation of liberal democracies as representing the will of their citizens,” lacking electoral accountability but also transparency and citizen participation (Della Porta, 2013, 29). In this context of crisis of representative democracy, civil society actors engage in democratic experiments or innovations.

The decline of the nation-state order raises concerns over the loss of state sovereignty and the separation of politics and power. This has consequences for decision-making which takes place in bodies that are not accountable, transparent and which lack citizen control. According to Bauman and Bordoni (2014), real power is located in the global flow of capital which is problematic as it is separated from politics that continues to operate at a national and local level.

Following a similar argument, Subirats (2013) states that market and economic power has globalized while political institutions, and the power that emanates from them, are still anchored in the territory. The state is just one more actor and usually not the most powerful. The collision of its policies with private interests generates the problem of democratic deficit which is difficult to solve for an actor that has seen its capacities diminishing.

Offe (2011) reviews the conclusions of different prominent democratic theorists who consider us to be in the midst of a second transformation of democracy. The first being the transition from direct democracy to party-dominated representative, mass democracy. According to Offe’s (2011) review, scholars have focused on the current “crisis of democracy” caused by “economic globalisation and the absence of effective supranational regulatory regimes; the exhaustion of left-of-centre political ideas and the hegemony of market-liberal public philosophies, together with their anti-statist implications; and the impact of financial and economic crises and the ensuing fiscal starvation of nation-states which threatens to undermine their state capacity” (Offe, 2011, 457).

Some symptoms that Offe (2011) points out are the decline in electoral turnout, the decline in citizen's trust in politicians, the increase in apathy, cynicism and a sense of powerlessness, disaffection, disenchantment, disappointment, the sense of the people being disempowered by elites and depoliticization, to mention a few. However, people remain democrats or, in Dalton's words, "frustrated democrats" (Offe, 2011, 458). In this environment of distrust towards politicians and mainstream politics, social movements dispute the traditional actors' place. So, the system of democratic representation is contested and waves of social movements appear as a consequence of this crisis of governance and democracy (Bauman and Bordoni, 2014).

Social movements have strikingly signalled the crisis of representative democracy, its failure or possible renewal. The questioning of representative democracy is long and enduring. Keane (2009, 13) considers that "the era of representative democracy is passing away, that a new historical form of "post-representative" democracy has been born, and is spreading throughout the world of democracy."

Keane (2009) explains that a clear symptom of this historic change is the way democracy is currently defined and valued. It is more considered in a pragmatic way, as a weapon for use against concentrations of unaccountable power. It involves public scrutiny and control of decision makers, whether they operate in the field of state or interstate institutions, non-governmental or civil society organizations (businesses, trade unions, sports associations, etc.) (Keane, 2009).

Another important contextual aspect is that global transformations are fostered by the information revolution. The new social movements are movements of the information age. This revolution has profound impacts on politics and power (Nye, 2013). A multiplicity of actors, besides governments, are influencing the agendas of international organizations as compared to a few decades ago and, at the same time, new challenges are appearing like government control through these same information technologies. This is rapidly transforming the nature of power and influencing world politics (Nye, 2013).

Castells (2009) uses the concept of network society to analyze the beginning of the 21st century society built around digital networks of communication. In this new organizational and technological context he argues that power relations are dramatically transformed. Communication is completely altered in what Castells (2009) calls mass self-communication creating new political forms from a hierarchical model to a swarm model. Here, the strength of the collective or multitude and its capacity to self-organize is enhanced. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) use the concept of rhizome inspired by the Web to refer to this new context. In this environment, technological tools become important elements in the organization, internal and external communication, and spread of news beyond traditional media.

All these aspects mentioned are the structural conditions where the popular process of the October 1 referendum unfolded. Moreover, the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2008 propelled a deep political crisis in Spain that, together with the deployment of austerity measures, led to a deep questioning of socioeconomic and political institutions including those of the nation-state. As McAdam (2002) and Tilly (2007) point out, great structural changes like economic and political crisis produce new collective action expressions like the one we are observing.

Social movement's struggle for democracy

Civil society actors, mainly progressive social movements, have long struggled for the deepening of democracy and the inclusion of its participatory conception. The history of social movements and the various waves of protests have widened the concept of democracy, stressing the importance of participation. Criticism of liberal democracy has been expressed by different social movements that have theorized and experimented with other forms of democracy, widening its liberal conception. Particularly, the labour movement has “put forward different conceptions of democracy from the liberal one, emphasizing collective and social rights over individual (negative) freedom as well as participation by citizens over delegation to politicians” (Della Porta, 2013, 37). Direct, horizontal, self-managed conceptions of democracy were put into practice in protest campaigns. During the 19th and 20th century, the working class conquered the right of citizenship and became members of the political community organizing in political parties. The “masses” enlarged the rights to dissent and the open, direct, horizontal and participatory dimension of democracy (Della Porta, 2013).

Demands for an extension of political participation were present in the movements of 1968. They innovated with their internal practices following their non-authoritarian frame. During the 1970s and 1980s the new social movements criticized party politics and searched for alternatives to liberal democracy based on self-management. Their discussions had an influence on the state and translated into reforms based on increased political participation in public institutions and political recognition of the right to dissent (Della Porta, 2013).

Wainwright (2012) stresses the importance of the women's movement in developing new thinking in creating alternatives from below. She highlights the rejection of hierarchies and the efforts to build horizontal or networked organizations during the 1960s and 1970s. These previous movements also attempted to break with the institutions and their narrow definition of democracy.

These social movements' pressure for democratization threatened the authorities that used the expression “excess of democracy” showing how the ruling class feared the mob, “a fear of intelligent and organised opposition,

which was hence less easy to counter” (Wainwright, 2012). The grounds for these fears lay in the distinctive nature of those movements and projects, in their “ways of organising (combining autonomy and co-operation, creating the participatory conditions for the genuine sharing of knowledge), the alliances they built (across the traditional divides of economics, culture, labour and community) and their vision (beyond state versus market, individual versus social), they held out in practice the possibility of an alternative, participatory and co-operative political economy” (Wainwright, 2012).

The deliberative model based on participation was developed by successive social movements (the Global Justice Movement in 1999, the Occupy movement and the anti-austerity movements being the latest). Anti-austerity movements challenged the existing conception of democracy in the EU. Disaffection with existing democracies was the main cause of the networked protest events. The shared perception that democracy isn’t working and the critique that societies suffer from democratic deficits (measured as the ability to influence decisions that affect citizen’s lives) raised questions on the need to build substantive democracy at the European level.

Deliberative democracy focuses on the importance of “preference (trans) formation during discursive process oriented to the definition of the public good” (Della Porta, 2013, 61). Communication, dialogue, rich and shared flows of information and knowledge and reaching consensus in the pursuit of general interest are core features of this concept (Della Porta, 2013). In this model, reciprocal listening and the recognition of the plurality of perspectives are important features. However, different opinions are expected to be bridged by the common will of finding a solution to common problems.

Participation and deliberation are democratic qualities in tension with those of representation and majority decisions. The liberal conception looks at the public institutions as the only democratic arena. Actors carrying conflictual interests are seen as anti-systemic (Sartori, 1976). Deliberative democracy goes beyond the traditional criticism of liberal democracy as not sufficiently including citizens. Here democracy is not a way of counting votes but a way to form preferences through inclusive and open dialogue. It is profoundly different to the vision that legitimates representative democracy based on the principle of majority decisions (majority wins). It is the opposite of a democracy of experts or professionals that are elected to govern that must not be disturbed until new elections arrive (Della Porta, 2013). Deliberative democracy, as will be indicated in the following section, offers principles to overcome the referendum’s problematic aspects regarding democratic quality.

This long history of social movement’s pressure to deepen democracy and ameliorate its quality puts the event the paper is focusing on, the Catalan referendum, in a wider context. This protest event learns from this historical process and represents an example of citizen participation in promoting democracy, in this case, through the celebration of a referendum made possible by the mobilization of thousands of people all over Catalonia.

Referendums and citizens

The global changes mentioned together with civil society actors' pressure for more participation give some insights to the increase of public demand for referendums. At the same time, political scientists have long detailed the loss of trust and disaffection with mainstream politics of which the decline in party membership and electoral turnout are clear signs. Citizen disaffection is linked to the elite monopolization of policy-making, the influence of business in the political process, etc. (Tierney, 2013).

Moreover, globalization has also contributed to citizen disaffection as power has moved from states to transnational corporations. Representative democracy's loss of power has impelled the use of direct democracy instruments like referendums. According to Tierney (2013, 2193) "the proliferation of the referendum [...] should be seen in this light; that is, not necessarily as a short-term phenomenon, but potentially as but one aspect of a broader and potentially long-term move towards more direct forms of citizen engagement in constitutional matters, particularly as the technological facility to provide such engagement develops."

Despite growing interest in referendums, there is a general assumption that they are democratically problematic. Within political theory there are three main objections. The first one is the elite control syndrome that refers to the manipulation that may occur from the organizers of the referendum. The second criticism is the deliberation deficit that signals the lack of reflection and real discussion of the issues being voted upon. The third objection is the majoritarian danger indicating that referendums represent a model of majoritarian decision-making that puts minorities at risk. Although instruments of direct democracy do present perils as the ones briefly mentioned, some scholars have tried to overcome them through solutions provided by deliberative theory (Tierney, 2016). Tierney (2016) proposes the creation of a nexus between deliberation and referendums or what he calls 'deliberativereferendums' that brings attention to the potential of the referendum as a site for popular deliberation.

Key principles drawn from the theory on deliberative democracy are signalled by Tierney (2016) as a guide to overcome objections to referendums. These are the popular participation, public reasoning (reflection and discussion), inclusion and parity of esteem and consent in collective decision-making (Tierney, 2016).

Other scholars, like Qvortrup (2018, 62), taking into consideration the problems associated with referendums, points out that "research [...] seem[s] to suggest that referendums and initiatives have a policy effect and that representatives in states with provisions for direct democracy are more responsive to the voters' preferences. What is more, the research suggests that direct democracy has an effect on public policy outcomes." It would seem then that contrary to the bad press associated with referendums, they do have more

positive than negative effects on the democratic process and can be a check to a representative democratic system (Qvortrup, 2018).

Regarding current global tendencies on referendums, scholars such as Della Porta et al. (2017) and her colleagues introduce the concept of “referendums from below” to highlight the international trend on celebrating referendums “that are no longer devices used by institutional actors to retrospectively legitimize technocratic decisions but are rather, participatory processes generated by grassroots mobilizations which pre-date the actual vote by years of civil society agitation.” According to Della Porta and her collaborators, the Scottish and Catalan referendums fall under this category despite the fact that they developed in completely different ways. In Scotland, for example, citizens had the right to decide while in Spain a constitutional amendment was required and the celebration of a referendum itself would require a constitutional amendment provided in Article 168, the hardest amending process of the Spanish Constitution. This makes the Catalan case different as there is the problematic issue of the right to decide, the democratic boundary problem pointed out by political theorists and, crucially, the question of who precisely are the people that have the right to decide.

The Catalan referendum was not permitted in Spain as it was against the Spanish Constitution (1978) that establishes in Article 2 that “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” Moreover, article 1.2 establishes that “National sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people, from whom all State powers emanate.” In the Spanish case, there was no possibility to change these provisions so in front of a strong popular and institutional demand for the celebration of the referendum, civil disobedience pushed for changing the rules of the game and lastly made the referendum possible.

The President of the Government of Spain, Mariano Rajoy (2017), responded to the situation of October 1 by saying that “no referendum on self-determination has been held in Catalonia today.” Moreover, he added that “all of the people of Spain have been able to observe today that our rule of law remains strong and valid, that it responds to those who break the law, that it reacts to all those who wish to subvert it, and that it acts with all legal instruments available to tackle any form of provocation effectively and calmly. We have not witnessed any form of referendum today, but rather a mere spectacle; one more episode in a strategy against democratic co-existence and the law” (Rajoy, 2017).

Furthermore, Mariano Rajoy (2017) insisted on the illegality of the referendum and the attack to democracy that it meant: “The government, as you know, maintained at all times that this referendum would not be held and those who sought to push through this challenge have known this for many months. [...] They knew that the referendum was illegal, inadmissible and impossible, but

they opted to push on regardless and promote a veritable attack on the rule of law and our democratic model [...]; a premeditated and conscious attack to which the State has reacted firmly yet calmly. The referendum that sought to wipe out the Spanish Constitution and declare independence for part of our country without counting on the opinion of the people of Spain has simply not taken place.”

Catalan referendum

The October 1, 2017 Catalan referendum was to be remembered as the revolution of the smiles. Some referred to it as the hugs day, as the same scenes were repeating in every polling station: people hugging to each other in a joyful and cooperative ambience. In sharp contrast, police brutality and the injured and beaten people became the image of the day that spread worldwide. Use of force by the Spanish Police and Spanish Civil Guard left the country in shock. The day remains in the collective memory of many Catalans as a great accomplishment but also a painful remembrance.

But something highly remarkable took place on the October 1 beyond police violence: the massive peaceful mobilization of thousands of people all over Catalonia to defend the referendum, a major act of popular and institutional disobedience. And it was this mobilization that ultimately made the referendum possible through participation and self-organization.

Methodology

The description that follows is based on a qualitative analysis using the data collection method of participant observation. Notes were taken on four polling stations in two different municipalities in Catalonia (Cardona and Manresa) during the October 1 referendum. Information was collected using an observations guide made by six aspects that should be given attention: 1) participation, 2) forms of participation, 3) repertoires of protest and symbols, 4) collective identity, 5) emotions, 6) discursive elements and slogans.

Regarding the first aspect, participation, it was observed who was participating (characteristics of the participants, numbers, variation in numbers), and exclusions (who was excluded in the event). For the second aspect, forms of participation, attention was made to check whether participation was active or passive, the presence of leaders, decision-making processes, organization forms (vertical or horizontal), types of organization (assemblies) and infrastructure (social networks, WhatsApp, Telegram, etc.). The third aspect, repertoires of protest and symbols refer to whether there were occupations, sits-in, demos, general strikes, etc. For the fourth element, the collective identity, two aspects were observed: exterior borders (against who or what?) and interior borders (who are we? What binds us together? The values and principles present in the event). The fifth element, emotions, refers to what kind of

mood was there during the event, were there any changes regarding emotions and what was this dependant on? Finally, the sixth aspect, the discursive elements and slogans, refers to the main chants and words that protesters used.

All these aspects were noted down in a notebook all day long in the different polling stations that were visited. The notes were confronted with the information that appeared in social media during that day and in the press to check for deviant aspects in the observation. The following analysis is the result of this observation.

A popular mobilization defending the right to vote

As has been mentioned, the Spanish government stated that the referendum was against the law and a repressive strategy was deployed to prevent it. The response from the state escalated the previous days of the vote. Ballot boxes, voting papers and leaflets were seized, newspaper offices and printing houses were raided, websites referred to the referendum were shut down, public debates were prohibited, fourteen Catalan government officials were arrested, the headquarters of one independentist political party and some regional government offices were raided by Spanish Police without any court orders. Moreover, more than 700 mayors collaborating with the referendum were investigated and threatened to be arrested by Spain's state prosecutor.

The deployment of 12,000 Spanish Police officers to Catalonia to impede the celebration of the referendum showed that the threat of the use of force and intimidation was the main strategy deployed by the state. It was intended to generate a climate of "war" and fear but it actually contributed to the feeling of being occupied and to the growing sense of alienation from the state.

This response of the Spanish state on the previous days of the referendum provoked the unintended consequence of amplifying its support. Huge grassroots mobilizations for independence had been going on since 2010 but the October 1 event qualitatively overcame previous protests.

The question at stake (whether Catalonia should be an independent state or not) was displaced by the struggle for the defence of political liberties, fundamental rights and democracy enlarging the participation beyond the core independentist groups. People self-organized to defend the polling stations the Friday before the vote and for the whole weekend. The sites were occupied and assemblies organized to prepare the defence of the site under the threat that they would be sealed by the police.

The mobilization was an act of citizen's empowerment defending the right to vote, the main element of a democratic system. The novelty is the massive engagement in the celebration of a referendum. The defence of this instrument of direct democracy was based on the basic idea of granting citizens a direct say which, confronted by the state reaction, became a powerful idea. The struggle for democracy was back to the streets, prefiguring a real democ-

racy and giving importance to processes, to democratic quality, as could be observed in the occupied polling stations.

Self-organization

The referendum was possible thanks to the grassroots mobilization of thousands of people all over Catalonia on October 1, but also during the previous weeks and months. Thousands of anonymous people hid the ballot boxes and electoral papers at home. Collective intelligence made an illegal referendum possible, even if many ballot boxes and electoral papers had been seized. Self-organization of thousands of people that brought the ballot boxes and electoral papers to the polling stations, constituted the electoral boards, and defended the sites made the vote a reality.

A clandestine type of organization and network communication was put into place to build the event and escape censorship. Hackers replicated the blocked official website from the Catalan government. Public schools that were the site of the polling stations launched the initiative “open schools” organizing activities during the weekend for parents and children and keep the schools open. Self-organization had also institutional support from the Catalan government.

On October 1, WhatsApp, Telegram and also Twitter overflowed. They were used as a channel to exchange information and keep track of the evolution of the referendum. Internal communication was essential to remain informed about the needs of each polling station and whether people should move to one or another to defend them.

In spite of repression and police violence, seizure of ballot boxes and closure of 319 polling stations (of a total of 2,315), 2.2 million people participated in the referendum (a participation of 43.03%): 90.18% voted for the “yes,” 7.83% for “no,” and 1.98% were blank votes (Catalan Government, 2017).

Diversity and inclusiveness

October 1 was a mobilization characterized by diversity. Those who were non-politicized, of all ages, and men and women (who had an important presence) joined in an open and respectful space. It is worth mentioning the participation of senior citizens, especially women, who enthusiastically took up the first ranks in defending the polling stations and remained in the frontline even during police raids. In a sudden change of values (in our societies aged people are seen as non-productive and are kept aside in residences) they became important people, admired for their determination, fearlessness and commitment. Corridors were made among the protesters to facilitate the vote of the elderly that were going to vote. These corridors not only had a facilitation meaning: it was a collective greeting and salute. And by doing so, they were given the label of authority.

It was a highly inclusive space defending the right to vote and the right to self-determination. Committees in Defence of the Referendum that spread all over Catalonia were created to make the vote possible and ensure a high turnout. The main organization launching the initiative was the CUP (Popular Unity Candidacy), the anti-capitalist party supporting the Catalan government, but immediately became a diverse space. Participation and mobilization were the central aspects. Among their concerns there was the necessity to campaign for the “No” to independence in order to ensure the participation of everyone.

Neutrality was strictly respected in the polling stations and when results were given, both the “Yes” and the “No” received the applause of the people gathered there. The case of a boy going to vote wrapped in a Spanish flag showed how deep the commitment for inclusiveness was as he received the applause of the crowd. A few people also walked by the polling stations with Spanish flags. None of them was shouted at or even pointed at.

October 1 was not an identitarian mobilization. There was a deep sense of belonging to the neighbourhood, the city, or even Catalonia, but it was in an open sense. Among the participants there were both Catalan and Spanish speakers as well as people who were born in other parts of Spain, outside Catalonia. There were also people who had recently migrated to Catalonia from Morocco or Latin America, to name a couple of examples. This reality contradicts the narrative of a nativist-type movement that is sometimes wrongly used to describe the Catalan mobilization. This was not an exception on that day. The main civil society organizations promoting and organizing the independentist movement (Òmnium Cultural and Assamblea Nacional Catalana) were both participating in the mass pro-refugees demonstration “Volem Acollir” on February 18, 2017.

The inclusiveness and diversity of the mobilization challenge the discourse about the existence of a social fracture, a central element in the elite’s narrative regarding the Catalan question. The applauses and welcome to those thinking differently, the tolerance and peaceful co-existence, puts this narrative into question.

Symbolic elements: Flowers and tractors

There were mainly two symbolic elements in the protest: flowers and tractors. The flowers (carnations), as a symbol of peace, were given to the police, left on the tables and windows, and were also carried by voters. The tractors were part of an important peasant mobilization and suddenly became a symbol of defence of the land. In many polling stations, they were parked barricading the entrances, symbolically defending the sites.

Democracy, pacifism and anti-fascism

Slogans and chants on the day of the referendum referred mainly to democracy, peace and antifascism. Protesters repeatedly cried “votarem” (we will vote) and “hem votat” (we have voted) once the referendum finished. The defence of the right to vote was mixed with a deep questioning of existing democracy and the lack of real democracy, connecting with previous movements like the 15M.¹ The streets became the site where democracy unfolds, where politics is being done.

Secondly, due to the pacifist type of mobilization, “Som gent pacífica” (we are peaceful people) was also chanted, especially in those places where there was a police crackdown. Pacifism and non-violence have been a central feature of mass protest for independence since the beginning. This can be explained for the willingness to be an attractive movement for the majority, to gain supports internally as well as internationally and to declare (by doing it) that violence and war are neither wanted nor expected, that it is rejected as a way to solve conflicts. Pacifism also connects with previous movements (15M, anti-war protests of 2003, etc.).

Finally, antifascist slogans like “No passaran” and “Els carrers seran sempre nostres” (the streets will always be ours) were widely used in the whole of Catalonia. Antifascism erupted at the centre of the struggle as a result of the authoritarian drift of the state. Parallelisms with Franco’s times were made, highlighting the Francoist culture in the apparatus of the state (and so the weak democracy in Spain). The once ideal-type transition towards democracy was being revised, breaking down the constitutional consensus and bringing to the surface the need for a new consensus. The debate legality vs legitimacy that had surrounded the Catalan question was clear for the protesters: legality without legitimacy is not a democracy. This also raised criticism, from unionist sectors, about the banalization of fascism.

Other slogans referred to the firefighters that had a very active role and publicly committed themselves to protect citizens. They went from one polling station to another and were welcomed with the playful “Els bombers seran sempre nostres” (the firefighters will always be ours). Also the elderly women had a chant referred to them: “Sense les àvies no hi ha revolució” (without grandmothers there’s no revolution) that emphasized the importance of the participation of senior women (the slogan imitates the feminist motto: “sense les dones no hi ha revolució”—without women there’s no revolution).

1 For further information about the 15M movement see the chapter about the Spanish Indignados in Castells (2012).

The role of emotions

Emotions, like in all major mobilizations, took an important role in activating into action and connecting people. As Jasper (1998) points out, the emotional factor is motivating for participants and helps to canalize their objectives. The protest was based on solidarity actions and the importance of sharing and caring. People were offering food and drinks to each other, preparing and eating meals together, singing, entertaining... They were enthusiastically connecting to each other, even among those that were meeting for the first time. The protesters' feelings were expressed through hugs and smiles that showed the power of collective joy. Determination was a common and contagious attitude in every protest site. It was rooted in a deep conviction that reason was on their side and it was amplified by the fact that the Spanish state had to deploy the use of force, coercion and violence to maintain its rule.

At the same time, fear, exhaustion, uncertainty and tension were also present, especially when news about repression and brutality arrived or rumours and alerts about police coming to the polling station spread. It was a highly emotional day with both a comic (when people were hiding the ballot boxes from the police or pretending they were playing games instead of defending the vote) and a tragic side (with police crackdown). A mixed feeling of pain (for the violence) and pride (for having been able to defend the polling station and the right to vote) was blurred with the deep feeling of dignity. Tears of joy and pain were images of the day.

October 3 general strike

The protest event ended with the general strike of October 3. A transversal platform ("Taula per la Democràcia") composed by civil society organizations and trade unions called for a country stoppage to protest against state repression and for freedom and fundamental rights. It was a protest against the violence of the October 1.²

Time had changed its normal course, it had accelerated. People expressed that something great was happening, that nothing would be the same again. That no-one would forget that day. There was a widespread feeling of making history and of great dignity. There were 1,066 injured people, according to the Catalan Health Department, due to the clashes with police, some of them with severe injuries like a boy who received a rubber bullet (prohibited in Catalonia)

2 For further information on 3rd October general strike see <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/economia/20171002/paro-de-pais-y-huelga-general-en-catalunya-6327570> and <https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20171003/431755246244/catalunya-prepara-paron-pais.html>.

and lost sight in one eye. The mobilization and high participation went ahead despite the very high cost, even putting physical integrity at risk. The awareness of this possibility didn't deter the participation of senior citizens and parents with children, knowing that they wouldn't be treated differently and were also police targets. The images and videos of police brutality circulating that day and the following through the news and social media made anger and rage grow even further. October 3 witnessed huge marches against state repression all over Catalonia. Many of them were silent marches.

Mobilization grew even further beyond the ones that mobilized on October 1. People who had never considered the referendum a legal instrument to solve the conflict went down into the streets to join the marches and protest. Almost all sectors of society denounced the police brutality and violence. In the meantime, the Spanish government denied that the referendum had taken place and considered the police behaviour as reasonable and proportionate. This only made mobilizations bigger, debilitating the Spanish government.

As Hannah Arendt (1970) explained, power doesn't come from violence but from respect and legitimacy and when the use of force is the only and last resort it means the state is losing power. Tierney (2016, 118) links legitimacy with consent, stating that "people can be governed only with their consent. Otherwise, no polity, old or new, can claim for itself the ultimate source of legitimacy upon which the democratic state depends." It is worth noting that mass protests were mainly reactive: against the authoritarian drift of the Spanish government more than pro an independent state for Catalonia. In this sense, Opp and Rohel's (1990) work can be enlightening when they describe that when repression is considered unjust and unjustified it can produce an incentive for mobilization.

Conclusion

The Catalan referendum was a massive protest, an act of civil disobedience, based on grassroots mobilization. It showed an enormous capacity for resistance and self-organization. It was a process of democratic deepening with a broad politicization of the streets, a struggle for participatory democracy and against the authoritarian attitude of the state.

This was the last milestone in the secessionist mobilizations that have been going on for seven years. A massive, non-violent and long-lasting movement, involving many actions, protests and demonstrations, that has never witnessed an act of violence. These mobilizations have had the power to force the political elites to change their programmes or positions (i.e. PDeCAT to embrace independence, civil disobedience or to commit to opening a participative constituent process after the proclamation of the Catalan Republic) and take risks. October 1 placed democracy and anti-authoritarianism at the centre of the struggle. This shift was mainly reactive to the repressive strategy

of the Spanish government which, instead of destroying the movement, provoked the unintended consequence of amplifying its meaning and scope and embracing the struggle for democracy.

The Spanish government has continued with the repressive strategy imprisoning social and political leaders, suspending the Catalan autonomy, etc. But far from demobilizing, the Committees in Defence of the Referendum have turned into Committees in Defence of the Republic. October 1 is part of the personal biography of many Catalans and these shared memories play an active role in propelling citizen participation and future protest. This form of participation, born before the referendum is developing and strengthening a network of citizens engaged in promoting democracy as a way to defend the republic.

In a context of crisis of the nation-state system and severe critiques of representative democracy both at national and European levels the Catalan referendum becomes a relevant example of the ways through which civil society actors engage in promoting democracy. It is a conception of democracy based on participation and deliberation that has learned from previous social movements and confronts the neoliberal conception of democracy mentioned in the previous section, and therefore may have implications for the definition of democracy. At the same time, this may have implications for Europe as it can reinforce pro-independence movements elsewhere.

Further research may explore how these sites of citizen participation (CDR) may foster democratic innovations and which consequences they may have in the evolution of democratic structures and the quality of democracy. Moreover, the duality of legitimacies in Catalonia (Spanish central government vs Catalan regional parliament) challenges existing democratic institutions and ultimately democracy at a national and European level. The observation and analysis of this conflict will provide interesting insights into the evolution of democracy, its challenges and ways forward, in the 21st century.

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Recent conference publications supported by the World Society Foundation, Zurich

The Middle Class in World Society: Negotiations, Diversities and Lived Experiences

Christian Suter, S. Madheswaran, B.P. Vani (eds.)

London/New York: Routledge, 2020, ISBN 978-1-138-60950-1, 400 pages.
This volume delves into the study of the world's emerging middle class. With essays on Europe, the United States, Africa, Latin America, and Asia, the book studies recent trends and developments in middle class evolution at the global, regional, national, and local levels. It reconsiders the conceptualization of the middle class, with a focus on the diversity of middle class formation in different regions and zones of world society. It also explores middle class lifestyles and everyday experiences, including experiences of social mobility, feelings of insecurity and anxiety, and even middle class engagement with social activism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and in-depth interviews, the book provides a sophisticated analysis of this new and rapidly expanding socioeconomic group and puts forth some provocative ideas for intellectual and policy debates.

The Return of Geopolitics

Albert J. Bergesen, Christian Suter (eds.)

Wien/Münster/Zürich: Lit, 2018, ISBN 978-3-643-80268-2, 186 pages

With globalization fading and geopolitics on the rise this volume analyzes globalization/geopolitical cycles accompanied by rising and falling economic/military hegemonies and the Chinese concept of Tianxia as an equivalent of the idea of hegemony along with a theory of pre-emptive hegemonic decline. Geopolitical movements are also discussed including state-seeking movements since the 16th century, Kurdish struggles in Turkey, African terrorist groups, and the Russian intellectual movement called Eurasianism. Finally, there is a discussion of the geopolitics of the Anthropocene and the rise of Astropolitical theory.

Overcoming Global Inequalities

Immanuel Wallerstein, Christian Suter, Christopher Chase-Dunn (eds.)

Boulder/London: Paradigm Publishers, 2015, ISBN 978-1-61205-688-3, 238 pages.

This book examines the changing nature of global inequalities and efforts that are being made to move toward a more egalitarian world society.

The contributors are world historical sociologists and geographers who place the contemporary issues of unequal power, wealth, and income in a global historical perspective. The geographers examine the roles of geopolitics and patterns of warfare in the historical development of the modern world-system, and the sociologists examine endeavors to improve the situations of poor peoples and nations and to engage the challenges of sustainability that are linked with global inequalities. This is cutting-edge research from engaged social scientists intended to help humanity deal with the challenges of global inequality in the 21st century.

Structures of the World Political Economy and the Future Global Conflict and Cooperation

Christian Suter, Christopher Chase-Dunn (eds.)

Wien/Münster/Zürich: Lit, 2014, ISBN 978-3-643-80184-5, 352 pages.

Triggered by the profound financial and economic crises, increasing ecological degradation, rising social struggles and political and military conflicts, the structures of the world political economy seem to be, in the early 21st century, in a process of epoch-making transformation. Employing a world-historical and comparative perspective, the 14 contributions brought together in this volume deal with three core issues of global structures and dynamics: Firstly, the degree of stability and change of global hierarchical structures and economic and social inequalities; secondly, the transformation of global and national political structures; and, thirdly, global ecological change and its impact on the structures of the world-economy, the world polity and the world society.

World Society in the Global Economic Crisis

Christian Suter, Mark Herkenrath (eds.)

Wien/Münster/Zürich: Lit, 2012, ISBN 978-3-643-80073-2, 340 pages.

The global financial and economic crisis started in 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This volume examines the considerable economic, social and political consequences of the global crisis for world society. In particular, the 16 contributions focus on three central issues: Firstly, the long-term mechanisms of the recent global crisis and their relationship with world society structures and dynamics, secondly, crisis impacts and policy responses illustrated by case studies in different world regions, thirdly, crisis perceptions and crisis framing by different individual and collective actors, as well as the mass media.

This volume analyzes different facets of democratic struggles in these challenging times. Its first section addresses the democratization process in Mongolia, one of the least-studied cases of post-Cold War democratization. The second section broadens the analysis to cover democratic struggles in other parts of the world and considers in particular the governance of natural resources, which is a key concern for Mongolia and other countries that rely economically on the extractive sector. Its contributors are drawn from a range of different countries, disciplines and career stages. They use different approaches and methodologies in highly complementary ways to shed light on underexamined facets of democracy from a variety of perspectives.

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